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ABSTRACT 
This thesis comprises a study about directors’ duties in Iran, and 
examines whether they are in an acceptable state, whether there is any 
potential need to modify them and if so how could they be improved.  
After providing an introduction to the study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
provides a background to directors and their duties. There is an explanation 
of the different types of directors and an analysis of the nature of duties that 
can govern them and this is considered in relation to various jurisdictions. 
Chapter 3 focuses on Iran, explaining the types of directors’ duties, the 
legislation in place for companies and apparent weaknesses of the current 
law on duties. The thesis includes an extensive empirical study, which is 
documented in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 the process of the empirical 
research is set out, detailing the selection of semi-structured interviews, the 
process of selecting the interviewees, the development of the questions, the 
ethical review and the data collection process. Chapter 5 presents the core 
points of discussion from the interviews. Each point of discussion contains 
the various views of the interviewees to provide a complete sample of what 
the different groups of interviewees think about each subject matter. Chapter 
6 considers the shortcomings of the law on duties in Iran and it does so by 
drawing on the doctrinal analysis in Chapter 3 and the empirical research 
data from Chapter 5. One of the aims of the chapter is to see whether any of 
the alternative practices from other countries researched could resolve Iran’s 
problems. Recommendations are then suggested for potential reforms of 
	Iranian company law that could improve directors’ duties. Chapter 7 
completes the thesis with a series of concluding remarks. 
The study concludes that the law on directors’ duties in Iran has many 
flaws and that in order to ameliorate the state of the law there needs to be 
reforms to the legislation so that there is a comprehensive set of directors’ 
duties, an introduction of the Business Judgment Rule and greater ease for 
minority shareholders to enforce breaches of duty. 
Directors’ duties are required, as duties are currently not adequately 
provided for in either or both of statutory law and Islamic sources. This has 
led to companies being expected to make up for this shortfall in law by 
including their own set of duties in their articles of association.  
The inclusion of a duty of care is also advocated and to be 
accompanied by the introduction of a Business Judgment Rule. The 
introduction of the duty of care alone would be a substantial improvement, as 
it would allow for a greatly needed subjective and objective approach for 
assessing breaches. The utility of the Business Judgment Rule comes in to 
effect when directors need to defend themselves in circumstances where the 
company has suffered damage due to a decision they made with good 
intentions.  
 Developments to permit greater enforcement of breaches of duty are 
equally necessary as duties are only effective if there is suitable enforcement 
in place. Currently there are substantial barriers that prevent many actions 
being brought. These barriers, when removed would greatly enhance the 
ability of minority shareholders to bring actions against directors.  
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 CHAPTER ONE	
INTRODUCTION 	
1.1 General Background  
The existence of companies is a fundamental prerequisite to all 
economies around the world. Apart from fulfilling a service or providing a 
product, companies need to manage all elements of their businesses 
including finances, employees and often business premises in order to 
successfully navigate from one day to another. Behind the scenes of every 
company there are shareholders.1  These are people who have paid in 
capital and have a financial interest in a company as well as often having a 
personal desire for a company to succeed. Apart from the shareholders there 
is also a director or a board of directors who are responsible for making all 
the important decisions on the company’s behalf and deciding in which 
direction the company will be driven.2 
Appointing directors is a task carried out by the company 
shareholders. The director occupies the most authoritative and powerful post 
in a company and appointing an individual with suitable qualifications, 
experience, skills and personality is often key to whether companies flourish 
or fail. A board of directors will be in charge of formulating strategic plans for 
a company and selecting the best use of the company’s labour and financial 
																																																								
1 P. Davies, Introduction to Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 60. 
2 A. Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 189.  
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resources to promote the success of the business and provide benefits for its 
shareholders.3 
Ensuring that directors are executing their role correctly is a concern 
that all shareholders have to face. In smaller companies shareholders may 
rely on their own vigilance to monitor directors. Larger companies in contrast 
will usually rely on non-executive directors to monitor the executive directors 
in jurisdictions with one-tier boards.4 The main aid at the shareholders’ 
disposal is the law in place in the relevant jurisdiction that imposes duties on 
directors. These duties stipulate how directors are to act in the course of 
discharging their role and they also prescribe the obligations that directors 
must meet. The company is owed these duties by both the executive 
directors and the non-executive directors.5  These duties are often found in 
legislation, case law or religious law and they set out guidelines that must be 
complied with by directors.6 Every jurisdiction differs to some extent in the 
way that they include directors’ duties in their law.7  
This thesis is dedicated to the study of directors’ duties in Iran, a 
jurisdiction which is regarded as having a less than adequate provision for 
directors’ duties. The selection of directors’ duties as the subject of the thesis 
is due to the importance of the role that directors can play in aiding a country 
to improve their corporate governance and also in contributing to developing 
the economy. In regard to Iran, aspects that will be considered are the 
																																																								
3  A. Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle And Corporate Governance 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 11. 
4  R. Tomasic et al, Corporation Law in Australia (Sydney: Federation Press, 2002), 270 – 
271. 
5 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 319. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
	3	
provision of the duties, the enforcement of the duties, the efficacy of the 
courts as far as commercial cases are concerned and the standards of 
practising directors. The purpose will be to consider the extent to which 
directors’ duties are achieving their objective of ensuring that directors are 
executing their role correctly. 
Selecting Iran was based upon its unique company law and its unique 
economic circumstances in the world.8 The distinctiveness of its company 
law is due to the mixture of sources of law that it is comprised of, the fact that 
Iran is the only Shi’a country in the world and the lack of developments that 
have contributed to the law that exists today.9  The uniqueness of Iran’s 
economic circumstances are a result of years of isolationism in a world 
where globalisation has occurred, and this has, to a degree, left Iran behind. 
There are indications already that certain elements of duties require 
attention. Firstly, the company law that exists is not sufficiently extensive or 
comprehensive especially in terms of the statutory legal code for directors 
and their duties. Furthermore the researcher’s experience leads her to the 
opinion that directors and shareholders often lack the necessary awareness 
of the law surrounding company activities. Moreover, there is a general 
understanding that the courts are not dependable due to too much 
governmental involvement.10   
Through this study the researcher seeks to systematically address all 
the doctrinal sources that relate to directors and their duties. Empirical 
																																																								
8A. Rehan, The Iranian Revolution of 1979: Theoretical Approaches and Economic Causes  
(Washington DC: The American University, 2008), 35 – 39. 
9 Iran Company Laws and Regulations Handbook Volume 1 Strategic Information and Basic 
Laws (Washington: International Business Publications, 2016), 26.  
10 Sh. Ilias, Iran’s Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues  (Washington: Congressional 
Research Service, 2010), 11-19.   
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research will also be conducted in order to achieve a more thorough 
understanding of the situation that exists in the law and it’s practical 
application in Iran. By acquiring a complete understanding of the situation 
the researcher will be able to identify the weaknesses that exist as well. 
When armed with these data, one can begin to understand the problems and 
ergo start to consider what mechanisms are required to ameliorate the 
situation.  
The research will be directed towards an analysis in Chapter 6, which 
will detail the findings of the study. With the key weaknesses of Iranian 
Company Law exposed, the chapter will propose changes to the law. These 
suggestions that will be put forward by the researcher will be based on all the 
doctrinal and empirical research carried out. The findings and proposals in 
this analysis are the contributions offered by this piece of work to the existing 
literature on directors’ duties and company law. The findings will serve as a 
reference for future students and legislators when considering potential 
reforms to Iranian directors’ duties. It is hoped that the proposals might be 
taken into account in any reform of Iranian law. 
The piece is a much-needed contribution to the current stock of 
literature on Iranian Company Law. There is a shortage of research on 
company law that needs to be addressed for Iran to be able to make 
informed decisions about advancing its legislation. Whilst company law 
research conducted in many jurisdictions is plentiful, research on Iranian 
company law is almost non-existent. In terms of directors’ duties in Iran, this 
will be the first substantial piece written on the subject.  
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An additional reason why a greater stock of literature on Iranian 
Company Law is needed is due to the fact that the timing of this piece 
coincides with the removal in 2015 of the economic sanctions that had been 
applied to Iran.11  This event more than any other in the last 40 years will ask 
questions of Iranian company law as international businesses weigh up the 
benefits and the risks of investing in this new market. The prospect of 
opening a business in Iran will require companies to consider the corporate 
governance practices of the country, the involvement of the State in 
companies, the law in place to protect shareholders, the judicial procedures 
for settling disputes and the enforcement of company law.  
1.2 Research Question 
The matters referred to in the previous section of the chapter leads me to 
pose this research question:  
• Should directors’ duties in Iran be modified and, if so, in what way?  
In examining this issue I will explore to what extent factors inherent in a 
country, and Iran in particular, can be taken into consideration in regulating 
the duties of directors. 
1.3 Aims 
The first aim of this study is to explain the nature of directors and their 
duties. The second is to articulate and analyse the existing company law in 
Iran as it applies to directors’ duties. Thirdly, the study endeavours to 
ascertain what the position is, as far as directors’ duties are concerned, in 
practice in Iran. A major aim is to seek to identify weaknesses and problems 																																																								
11 C.A. Mokri & H. Biglari, ‘A Windfall for Iran? The End of Sanctions and the Iranian 
Economy’, Foreign Affairs (2015). Available online: https://www.foreignaffairs.com 
[Accessed 04/12/2015]. 
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associated with the way that Iran tackles directors’ duties and to suggest 
improvements or solutions to ameliorate the existing imperfections. In the 
course of the study the researcher aims to evaluate potential solutions to 
Iran’s problems that might be offered by other jurisdictions, namely the UK, 
Australia, Hong Kong and China. The reasons for considering these 
jurisdictions are articulated in Chapter 2. 
1.4 Contribution To Knowledge 
There is an ample amount of literature that addresses directors’ duties 
in many jurisdictions. This is the case in western countries with established 
legal systems where much academic research is carried out. In Iran 
however, and as mentioned earlier, there is a shortage of published material 
on company law and there is almost no literature that explicitly addresses 
directors’ duties. Certain company law editions only contain sections on 
directors’ responsibilities in companies. The principal texts are ‘Company 
Law’ by Mohamad Reza Paseban and ‘Commercial Law (Company Law)’ by 
Rabia Skinny and ‘Commercial Law’ by Hasan Hassani. These texts address 
directors’ duties, however they lack depth to their coverage of the material. 
Their purpose in discussing duties is to provide an overview for the reader 
rather than a meaningful analysis.  
Moreover, a lack of academic publications on Iranian directors’ duties 
has resulted in a lack of knowledge on the subject inside and outside of Iran. 
More research carried out on this subject would work to address this 
problem. With the study being addressed from an empirical perspective and 
not solely through a doctrinal lens, new useful material will be provided on 
duties that can be referred to by future researchers. The value in the work is 
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predominantly in Chapters 3, 5 and 6. Chapter 3 provides some new insights 
into the state of the law in Iran. Chapter 5 provides the findings from the 
empirical work and offers new first hand accounts of the views of 
professionals concerning duties. Chapter 6 contains an analysis of problems 
and weakness of the law, followed by suggestions as to potential solutions. 
Iran has the status of a significant country on the global stage with a 
population of 77 million people and a considerable amount of trading 
capability.12 It has some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves globally. 
As international trading becomes more common after the removal of the 
sanctions the requirement of having functional company law will increase.  
1.5 Methodology  
The study will implement a qualitative approach to explore the 
research question that has been presented and within this approach two 
methods will be utilised. Initially a doctrinal method will be adopted to 
research the law that exists at present in Iran, how that law came to be and 
what issues have emerged as a result of it. A doctrinal method will also be 
utilised to examine the legal practices of other jurisdictions. The method will 
involve the consultation of a variety of sources including journals, books, 
government reports, legislation, case law and periodicals. The empirical 
study is the second method to be employed and it will be used to enable the 
researcher to ascertain how the present law is functioning in Iran. It provides 
primary data about the current state of directors’ duties in Iran. This will 
involve the use of semi-structured interviews conducted with law scholars, 																																																								
12 S. Kamali, ‘Iran aims to ban vasectomies and cut access to contraceptives to boost births’, 
theguardian.com (2015). Available online:  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/11/iran-ban-voluntary-sterilisation-
contraceptive-access-block-boost-population [Accessed 10/09/2015]. 
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judges, company directors of public, private and governmental companies, 
commercial lawyers, and company shareholders.  
1.6 An Outline Of The Study  
The study will commence with an analysis of directors and their 
duties. Chapter 2 will begin this analysis by considering the various types of 
directors that are present in a company and their role within the company 
structure. The chapter will progress on to duties, examining the rationale 
behind them and what form they take. Reference will be paid to the law that 
is applied in the UK, Australia, Hong Kong and China in order to understand 
alternative applications of directors’ duties. Chapter 3 will focus solely on 
Iran, initially detailing the types of companies in Iran and how they sit within 
the broad spectrum of Iranian commerce. The chapter will detail the sources 
of company law in order to explain the origins of the current law on duties in 
Iran. Following on from this, it will be possible to highlight and itemise some 
of the various weaknesses in the law regarding duties. The empirical 
research will commence in Chapter 4. Beginning with an appraisal of the 
type of empirical research method, the chapter will move on to examining the 
theory of semi-structured interviews. Each interview question will be 
explained and rationalised. Following this and prior to providing an account 
of the research itself, the planning process will be discussed, a description of 
the communication with all the interviewees will be made and an account of 
the scheduling of interviews will be documented. Finally the chapter will 
detail the results of the research along with any issues that occurred during 
the process. Chapter 5 will contain the presentation of the data collected in 
the empirical research. The data will be presented to show all the major 
	9	
issues that are present in the law on directors’ duties. The chapter will 
explain how the data was analysed and coded. Point by point, each 
weakness that the data highlights will be presented along with the 
interviewees’ comments on it. Chapter 6 will provide an assessment of 
Iranian law in light of the doctrinal and empirical studies. The chapter will 
endeavour to put forward arguments for amendments to the law that could 
be introduced. These suggestions will be based primarily on the lessons 
learned from the jurisdictions considered in Chapter 2 and from any other 
source that might be appropriate. Finally, Chapter 7 will conclude the results 
of the studies and it will explain the analysis as well as providing some 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DIRECTORS AND THEIR LEGAL DUTIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having set out the intentions for the thesis in Chapter 1, it is now 
necessary to begin the doctrinal research by exploring the role of the director 
within companies and the duties that accompany the position. It is important 
to develop an understanding of this material prior to moving on to discuss the 
Iranian position, which we begin to do so in Chapter 3.  
In order to establish an understanding of the material and in particular 
the issues concerning the nature and importance of duties, the chapter will 
refer to various countries’ law on duties and the basis for that law as 
examples. These examples have varying practices in place and possess 
different approaches to law and companies. The jurisdictions covered are 
two western countries with developed legal systems and two Asian 
jurisdictions that have recently introduced legal codes on duties. The UK was 
selected due to its prominence as having such highly regarded directors’ 
duties. Australia was also selected due to it having a successful code that 
varies from that of the UK in certain facets as will be mentioned in the course 
of the chapter. The selection of Hong Kong was made based on its status as 
a jurisdiction that has transplanted directors’ duties and has since had to 
regularly update it. Moreover, much like Iran, it has many large family 
companies. China was selected for similar reasons in that it has recently 
transplanted duties into its law. Furthermore, the example of China is useful 
	11	
in that it has, like Iran, a civil law system and it provides us with an example 
of how a civil law system had dealt with duties. Again it has another similarity 
to Iran in that it has many large state owned companies. It offers a contrast 
to the UK, Australia and Hong Kong, which are all common law jurisdictions, 
which have predominantly privately owned companies.  
The chapter develops in the following way. After this introduction, 
directors are the focus of section 2.2 as there will be an expansion on the 
definition of directors, followed by an explanation as to the various types. 
Once a definition is in place, the types of directors will be the central 
consideration in this part of the chapter, with the greatest consideration given 
to the two principal types: executive and non-executive directors.   
Having explained in detail the intricacies of who directors are, the 
study then proceeds to discuss theoretical frameworks relating to the 
relationship between directors and shareholders. This study will address 
briefly the two major theories in section 2.3 dealing with an explanation of 
how directors operate and what is their motivation. Agency theory (section 
2.3.1) sets out the dilemma of personal interest set against professional 
interest and how directors can deviate from their duties by putting their own 
interests first. Stewardship theory (section 2.3.2) is based around allowing 
directors to apply their skills as professionals and to do the best job they can 
without destroying their motivation with constant monitoring from the board of 
directors or shareholders. 
The study then proceeds to consider duties. There will be an 
examination of the rationale behind directors’ duties, with an explanation as 
to exactly why directors have duties placed upon them and the 
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consequences that would exist should they not be in place. Next there is a 
consideration of the issue of to whom do directors owe their duties. Following 
this there is an examination of the types of duties that exist and what they 
are designed to achieve. In this section the jurisdictions mentioned above are 
considered.   
Having established the types of duties, the following three sections will 
consider three individual elements that form part of general duties. 
Consideration is given to the two broad duties of care and loyalty. First, the 
duties of loyalty are discussed. After that there is an examination of the duty 
of care, skill and diligence and in this context there is discussion of the 
Business Judgement Rule. Each of these sections will consider the basis for 
duties and the practices and legislation that relates to the duties in the four 
countries mentioned earlier.   
Finally, there will be a discussion of the enforcement of breaches of 
duty.  Many scenarios exist where directors can be accused of breaching 
their duties. Within this section both public and private enforcement 
mechanisms will be considered. 
Following on from our analysis of directors and their duties, a 
conclusion (section 2.9) will tie together all seven sections of the findings 
providing an overview of the research and a foundation from which Chapter 3 
can build upon where directors and their duties will be considered in regards 
to Iran. 
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2.2 THE MEANING OF DIRECTORS  
Despite a company’s identity existing as a unique legal entity, its 
existence is dependent on the actions of humans. Directors are those beings 
that are principally involved in the running of a company where they act as 
either a board, individually or in committees.13  
Directors are considered by some to be the agents of the 
shareholders, however this is not a theory universally accepted as others 
regard directors as agents of the company entity, on whose behalf they act.14  
Directors are in a unique position in that they receive most of their 
instructions from the board of which they are members. The law has 
recognised this unique position and in many circumstances it will require the 
directors of a company to behave towards the company and its property in a 
manner that is similar to trustees and their trust.15 For this reason, a director 
can be considered a fiduciary agent.16  
2.2.1 Definition of Director  
There is no universal definition of a director. In order to obtain an 
understanding of the meaning of a title that can encompass so much, it is 
necessary to refer usually to a relevant jurisdiction’s legal code for a 
complete definition. For instance, in section 250 of the Companies Act 2006 
(UK) a director is defined as,  																																																								
13 Re Baring plc (No 5) [2000] 1 BCLC, 523. 
14 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 CH, 34. See 
also A. Keay, The Corporate Objective ( Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 105. 
See also A. Keay, Directors’ Duties (Bristol: Jordan Publishing, 2014), 7. See also D. French 
et al, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
629-632. See also L. Sealy & S. Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 211-212. 
15 Charitable Corporation v Sutton [1742] 2 ATK, 400 & Re Exchange Banking Company, 
Flitcroft’s Case [1882] 21 CHD, 519. See also  R. Tomasic et al, Corporation law in Australia 
(Sydney: Federation Press, 2002) , 321-322. 
16 Charitable Corporation v Sutton [1742] 2 ATK, 400. 
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“Including any person occupying the position 
of director by whatever name called.17”  
 
However the definition is limited in the sense that it does not state who 
directors are, but rather generally describes them as the person who carries 
out the jobs of a director.18 Perhaps, from this definition, it is possible to 
surmise that directors are defined by what they do as opposed to what their 
job title is.19 It is also clear that without formal appointment of the title it is 
possible for a person to be a director as long as that person is carrying out 
the role of director.20 Therefore, for a person to be legally regarded as a 
director it is not necessary for that person to be appointed as long as they 
are carrying out that role.21  
As directors are defined by what they do, it is fundamental that 
persons in this role realise the range of responsibilities that they have and 
the duties that they owe in order for the company to be able to function from 
day to day and also for it to progress.22  Directors must also be aware that 
they are responsible for the company’s actions and in certain circumstances 
they might be liable for certain effects of company actions.23 This will not 
always be the case as typically a company will be liable for its own actions 
																																																								
17 Companies Act 2006. Section 250 (Norwich: The Stationery Office). 
Companies Act 1985. Section 741(1) (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also Companies 
Act 1963. Section 2(1) (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also Companies Act 1985. 
Section 741(1) (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also Companies Act 1963. Section 
2(1) (Norwich: The Stationery Office). 
19 Companies Act 2006. Section 250 (Norwich: The Stationery Office). 
20 Companies Act 2006. Section 250 (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also HMRC v 
Holland [2010] 1 WLR, 2793.   
21  Companies Act 2006. Section 250 (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also Re 
Hydrodam (corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC, 189. See also Re Canadian Land Reclaiming 
Colonizing Co [1880] 14 Ch D, 660. 
22Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd [1998] 2 All ER, 124. 
23Ibid. 
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despite those actions being chosen by the director. As a company is a 
separate legal entity,24 directors will not have any personal liability.25 
The standard practice of appointing the first director is for the person 
to be mentioned in the articles of association for that company.26 Following 
this step, directors are appointed by a notice and they are named in the 
annual returns27 that have to be filed with the relevant government agency 
that oversee companies or the registration of companies. In the UK it is the 
Registrar of Companies. 
2.2.2 The Different Types of Director  
As the director has a different role in the board, the classification of a 
director becomes significant. It is often not possible to find these 
designations mentioned under legislation that regulate companies. The 
Companies Act 2006 (UK) is a prime example. In practice the types of 
directors are the ‘executive or full-time’ director and the ‘non-executive or 
part-time’ director. There is not any legal difference between executive and 
non-executive director, but they play different roles.28 The company employs 
the executive director as a full-time director but occasionally this type of 
director might not occupy a full-time role. 29  Non-executive directors are 
																																																								
24Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC, 22. 
25A. Keay, Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditor (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 4-10. 
26 Companies Act 2006. Section 254 (Norwich: The Stationery Office). 
27 Companies Act 2006. Section 255 (Norwich: The Stationery Office). 
28Companies Act 2006, ‘The Model Article for Public Companies,’ Article 2, Companies 
House (2014). 
Available online: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/model-articles-of-association-for-limited-
companies [Accessed 08/02/2015]. See also D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text 
and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 258-264. 
29 Companies Act 2006, ‘The Model Article for Public Companies,’ Article 23, Companies 
House (2014). 
Available online: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/model-articles-of-association-for-limited-
companies [Accessed 08/02/2015]. 
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appointed as part-time directors.30 There are also shadow directors, de-facto 
directors and de-jure directors, however for the purpose of this study it is not 
necessary to examine these, as it is only the executive and the non-
executive directors that will be focussed on.  
2.2.2.1 Executive Directors (EDs) 
The King III report on Corporate Governance in South Africa31 has 
provided a clear definition of executive directors. It states that the position 
involves day-to-day management of the company or being in the full-time 
salaried employment of the company (or its subsidiary) or both. 
An executive director, through his or her privileged position, usually 
has an intimate knowledge of the workings of the company, while the non-
executive directors do not.32 There can, therefore, be an imbalance in the 
amount and quality of information regarding the company’s affairs possessed 
by executive and non-executive directors.  
The executive director is a leadership role for a company and often he 
or she fulfils a motivational role.33 Executive directors motivate and mentor 
members, volunteers, and staff, and may chair meetings of committees. 34  
																																																								
30 Companies Act 2006, ‘The Model Article for Public Companies,’ Article 23, Companies 
House (2014). 
Available online: 
 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/model-articles-of-association-for-limited-companies [Accessed 
08/02/2015]. 
31 A. Banik et al, Corporate Governance, Responsibility and Sustainability: Initiatives in 
Emerging Economies (Berlin: Springer, 2016), 83. 
32 Street Pty Ltd v Cott [1990] 3 ACSR, 54. See also W. Bewaji,  Insider Trading in 
Developing Jurisdictions: Achieving an Effective Regulatory Regime (Oxford: Routledge, 
2012), 160-172.  
33Street Pty Ltd v Cott [1990] 3 ACSR, 54. See also A.J. Dignam & A. Hicks, Hicks & Goo's 
Cases and Materials on Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 254-257. 
34 AWA Ltd v Daniels [1992] 10 ACLC, 933. See also W.L. Charles & R. Gareth Jones, 
Strategic Management (Mason (OH):South-Western, 2010) 393-410. 
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The Chief Executive Officer or ‘CEO’ leads the organisation and develops its 
organizational culture.35  
 Executive directors have extensive powers delegated to them by the 
articles of association of the company and these powers are usually 
formalised by contracts.36  
2.2.2.2 Non- Executive Directors (NEDs) 
 The role of the non-executive director has evolved over the last 30 
years or so. 37  In previous years non-executive directors were not 
accountable for any directorial responsibilities, however since the early 1980s 
there has been a growing awareness of the important strategic role they can 
play (an argument supported by groups such as ‘PRO non-executive 
directors,’ ‘the organisation dedicated to the promotion of non-executive 
directors’).38 The basis for the development of the role of non-executive 
directors is attributable to the report of the Cadbury Committee in 1992.39 
The non-executive director’s role has since developed into a more prominent 
position in the company.40 This type of director contributes significantly in 
providing objective judgment on issues facing the company. 41  Also the 
degree of responsibility expected of non-executive directors has increased 																																																								
35 AWA Ltd v Daniels [1992] 10 ACLC, 933. See also W.L. Charles & R. Gareth Jones, 
Strategic Management (Mason (OH):South-Western, 2010) 393-410. 
36 Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd [1989] 5 ACLC, 421. 
37Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General [1992] 10 ACLC, 933. See also, R. 
Lilley, Welcome on Board: Non-executive Directors and Primary Care Trusts (Oxford: 
Radcliffe Publishing, 2002), 85.   
38  The Sponsors of PRO-NED: Accepting House Committee; Bank of England; British 
Institute of Management; The Committee of London Clearing Bankers; The Committee of 
Scottish Management; The Committee of London Clearig Bankers; Confederation of British 
Industry, Equity Capital for Industry Limited; Finance of Industry Plc.; the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee; The London Stock Exchange.  
39 The Cadbury Committee (1992) Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (Section 131). London: Kogan Page Publishers. 
40Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC, 1229. See also, 
S. Griffin, Company Law: Fundamental Principles (Dorchester: Dorset Press, 2005), 279-82. 
41Daniels v Anderson [1995] 13 ACLC, 614. 
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since the late 1980s in a number of jurisdictions due to court judgments and 
provisions in legislation.42   
 In other words, non-executive directors whose main occupation lies 
outside the company, have the role of offering an independent view to, and a 
broader outlook on many facets of company activity. These include the 
company’s strategy, performance, resources, appointment selection and its 
standard of the conduct.43 They play an important part in the company’s 
decision-making and they may assist company management with specialised 
expertise or knowledge.44 
   Also, in the case of larger companies and particularly listed public 
companies, non-executive directors are seen as being able to protect the 
interest of shareholders and have been treated as an essential element in 
the UK’s system of corporate governance.45 For instance, the UK’s corporate 
governance code requires that non-executive directors must serve on the 
board committees for audits, remuneration (of the executive directors) and 
appointments (of directors).46 They have an important role in monitoring the 
work and stewardship of the company’s executives and managers.47  
																																																								
42Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General [1992] 10 ACLC, 933. See also M. 
Wright et al, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 282-285.   
43The Cadbury Committee (1992) Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (Section 4.11). London: Kogan Page Publishers. 
44 M. Wright et al, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 282-285.   
45Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley [2004] 1 BCLC, 180. See also B. Tricker & R.I. 
Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 325- 330.  
46  Financial Reporting Council (2016) UK Corporate Governance Code (Provision A.4) 
London: FRC Publications. 
47 Ibid. 
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A non-executive director, once appointed, will hold office for a period 
of time determined by the company’s articles. 48  Under the revised UK 
Corporate Governance Code (the code only applies to listed companies) a 
non-executive director of a public company should not ordinarily serve 
beyond a period of six years and may not serve for a period in excess of nine 
years.49 The company must, at least, have two non-executive directors and 
half of the company directors should be the non-executive directors. 50 
Moreover, the non-executive directors can be the executive directors of 
others companies.51  
One important reason for appointing the non-executive director is the 
size of company.52 When the company is very small or recently set-up and 
cannot afford appointing a full time director, the alternative is to have non-
executive directors who can bring the experience and skill of that person by 
saving the cost of a full-time employee.53 
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
This section considers theories concerning corporate governance and 
particularly the relationship between the shareholder and the director. There 
are four broad theories on this subject: stakeholder theory, sociological 
theory, agency theory and stewardship theory. Out of the four theories, there 
are two that are more relevant to this study as they offer contrasting views on 																																																								
48 Companies Act 1985, ‘Table A’, Article 73, Companies House, 1985. 
49 Financial Reporting Council (2014) UK Corporate Governance Code (Provision B.2.3) 
London: FRC Publications. 
50 Financial Reporting Council (2014) UK Corporate Governance Code (Provision A.3.2) 
London: FRC Publications. 
51 P. Mantysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance: Shareholders as a Rule-
maker  (Berlin: Springer, 2006 ), 95-101. 
52 A. Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 13.  
53 Ibid. 
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the level of trust and supervision that shareholders are to bestow on directors 
and how directors are to discharge their duties. Agency theory and 
stewardship theory are theoretical perspectives that have been advanced to 
understand how directors operate and to examine the functions and 
structures of the vital participants and organisations in corporate 
governance.54  
In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith, took a dim view of the 
corporate form proliferating, 
 
“The company director, however, being the 
director rather of other people’s money than 
of their own, cannot well be expected, to 
watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private 
company frequently watch over their own. 
Like the steward of rich man, they opt to 
consider attention to small matters as not 
for their master’s honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having 
it. Negligence and profusion therefore must 
always prevail, more and less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a 
company.”55 
 
Smith was suggesting that directors would not apply the same level of 
care concerning the affairs of the business compared with their concern for 
their own affairs and money. With it being someone else’s money they will 
treat it as such and it is possible that this approach will lead to cases of 
neglect or some ill fate for the company. 
																																																								
54A. Fernando, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (Delhi: Dorling 
Kindersley, 2009), 46-49. 
55A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1937), 380. 
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2.3.1 Agency Theory  
In the later decades of the twentieth century, during the period of 
financialisation of the Anglo-American corporation, a theory was 
established 56  for considering the relationship between shareholders and 
directors.57 Originally the first utterings of the theory can be dated back to 
dialogue about corporate governance in the 1930s however it was Jensen 
and Mekling’s pioneering paper that broached the subject of agency theory 
as we understand it today. 58 Agency theory is based on a relationship that 
arises when principals appoint agents to act on their behalf. The principal, 
through deciding that they do not have sufficient time or ability to take up the 
role, appoints an agent with the appropriate skillset who commits to carry out 
the role on their behalf.59 The shareholders therefore act as guides and 
supervisors of the execution of the director’s duties and responsibilities.60   
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
56 T. Clarke, ‘The Role of Agency Theory and Maximising Shareholder Value-Thomas 
Clarke-centre for Corporate Governance’, Law and Financial Marketing Review, 8.1 (2014) 
39-51. See also A. Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate 
Governance (Oxford: Routledge, 2012), 133. 
57O. Roche, Corporate Governance & Organisation Life Cycle (New York: Cambria Press, 
2009), 12-13. 
58 M. Jensen & W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3.1 (1976) 305. See also E. Fama, 
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 88.1 (1980) 228. 
See also E. Fama & M. Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26.1 (1983) 301.  
59  J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in J. Pratt and R. 
Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1985), 2. 
60J. Matheson & B. Olson, ‘Corporate Law and the Long-term Shareholder Model of 
Corporate Governance’, Minnesota Law Review, 76 (1992) 1313-1328.  
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Figure 1: Agency Theory- Relationship 
 
Jensen and Meckling understand the relationship to be, 
 
 “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some 
services on their behalf that involve 
delegating some decision-making authority 
to the agent.”61   
 
As the role of director is so broad in regards to the decision making 
and the actions that get made by the agent it is often not possible for a 
principal to be entirely aware of everything that the agent does. Thus there 
must be some control on the agent. 
Since first broached, the theory has developed as more literature has 
been produced. In both practice and in research, agency theory is now 
regarded as the primary model within corporate governance.   
																																																								
61M. Jensen & W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3.1 (1976) 305-308. 
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The conflict in the relationship of agent and principal can be reduced 
to two aspects. Firstly, principals can find it difficult to supervise directors. It 
can be expensive, time consuming and difficult to achieve this to a 
satisfactory level; this is known as agency cost. For this reason directors are 
made accountable for their actions and decision making to obligate them to 
execute their role as expected by the principals.62 Secondly, directors cannot 
be trusted, as human nature dictates that they will always prioritise their own 
interests before the company’s interests, 
 
“relying on reductionist assumptions of 
human motivation,63  that directors, as they 
will know more about the details of the tasks 
that they are required to do,64 and they are 
rational actors and self-interested utility 
maximisers, they will seek to benefit 
themselves, and so they cannot be trusted.65 
They will engage in self-dealing and/or 
shirking; they will have no incentive to 
maximise the interests of the shareholders,66 
and have no altruistic motives in anything 
that they do.”67 
 
This understanding of the relationship is a view shared by many. Keay 
states that despite both the director and shareholder being engaged in a 																																																								
62  A. Keay & J. Loughrey, ‘The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate 
Governance’, Legal Studies, 35 n2 (2015) 261. See also M Dooley Two models of corporate 
governance, Business Law, 47, 1992, 461-468. 
63D. Pastoriza & M. Arinio, ‘When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing Learning in the 
Stewardship Theory’, Journal of Business Ethics, 118.1 (2013) 3-16. 
64K. Kauppi & E. Raaij, ‘Opportunism and Honest Incompetence – Seeking Explanations for 
Noncompliance in Public Procurement’, Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 4.1 (2014) 4. 
65J. Roberts, ‘Trust and Control in Anglo-American Systems of Corporate Governance: The 
Individualising and Socialising Effects of Processes of Accountability’, Human Relations, 
54.1 (2001) 1547-1548. See also K. Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and 
Review’, Academy of Management Review, 14 (1989) 57. 
66 A. Keay & J. Loughrey, ‘The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate 
Governance’, Legal Studies, 35.2 (2015) 261. See also See also M. Dooley, ‘Two Models of 
Corporate Governance’, Business Law, 47.1 (1992) 461-468. 
67J. Heath, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory’, Business Ethics Quarterly, 19.1 
(2009) 497-500. 
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cooperative venture, there will be conflict between both their interests. 
Another leading scholar68 refers to agents as opportunistic actors given to 
self-interest seeking with guile.  
When considering that the supervision of directors is often weak and 
also that directors are likely to pursue their own interests before the 
company’s, it is not surprising that there are a host of situations that result in 
agency conflicts. Firstly, according to the Cadbury Committee’s Code of Best 
Practice (1992),69 agency problems can arise through directors pursuing 
their interests before those of the company. The solution put forward by the 
committee was for the accountability mechanisms in place to be as stringent 
as possible to ensure that there is no way for the directors to pursue such 
paths. The report also stated that the shareholders are considered as the 
company owners and they are the principals of the directors who act as their 
agents in operating the company’s matters.70  
Secondly, a great proportion of the responsibility for the financial crisis 
can be attributed to directors pursuing risky business ventures due to 
pressure exerted on them by shareholders.71 A lack of supervision and a 
desire to generate fast returns for shareholders can encourage directors to 
take risks they otherwise would not pursue. Where long-term steady growth 
																																																								
68O. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
171. 
69The Cadbury Committee (1992) Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (Section 131). London: Kogan Page Publishers. 
70R. Pilon, ‘Capitalism and Rights: an Essay Toward Fine-Tuning the Moral Foundations of 
the Free Society’, Journal of Business Ethics, 29 (1982) 31.  
71 B. Segrestin & A. Hatchuel,  ‘Beyond Agency Theory, a Post Crisis View of Corporate 
Law’, British Journal of Management, 22.1 (2011) 484. 
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was perhaps the safe plan for the directors, pressure to succeed can lead 
them to pursue immediate results despite risky consequences.72   
Directors as agents can also abuse their power by taking advantage 
of opportunities that come their way through their position as directors.73 For 
instance if the chance to earn profit from an opportunity that was brought to 
their attention through their role as director arose, the director should decline 
it as it is a conflict of interest. However, they might pursue these 
opportunities if they are self-interested opportunistic agents that put their own 
interests before that of the company.74  
A further issue that can often emerge between directors and 
shareholders is differences of opinion due to perspective.75 The agent who is 
involved in the everyday dealings of the business has a different view to the 
principal who views things from afar and is kept up to date by the director 
periodically. It is arguable that there is an unbalanced access to information, 
as the director has a privileged role in understanding the business, which can 
lead to differences of opinion and also to the agent taking advantage. In fact, 
this means that the principals are at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to 
decision making since the agent will have more information. This is known as 
‘Information Asymmetry’.76 
Having considered these three examples of how agency problems can 
occur, it is possible to see that they all involve situations where the interests 
of the agents and the principals are not aligned or when the agents operate 																																																								
72B. Segrestin & A. Hatchuel,  ‘Beyond Agency Theory, a Post Crisis View of Corporate 
Law’, British Journal of Management, 22.1 (2011) 484. 
73S. Wen,  Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Governance: Legal Aspects, Practices and 
Future Directions ( Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 59-61. 
74Ibid. 
75Ibid. 
76C. Mallin, Corporate Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17.  
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without being controlled and monitored.77 The result will be that the agents 
abuse their position through self-dealing or shirking.78 In order to prevent 
these acts, the options are to have sufficient control over directors to prevent 
improper agency behaviour from occurring or alternatively to have sufficient 
accountability to act as a deterrent or to allow principals to claim against any 
agency behaviour that occurs. Increasing control over directors would come 
in the form of a board of directors being elected by the shareholders to assist 
the monitoring of the executive directors.79  
Agency problems present a strong argument for why directors should 
be subject to duties. There are many scenarios in which companies can be 
impacted upon negatively due to the actions and decisions of directors. As 
previously mentioned, the job of the agent is to act on behalf of the 
principals. When an agent is not fulfilling his or her duties, the company is 
likely to suffer what is termed ‘agency loss’ which means there will be a 
negative effect on the business.80 When the agent returns to act in the 
interests of the principals, the ‘agency loss’ will cease. A director being 
subject to duties allows for the company to be protected should any agency 
loss occur. 
 
 
																																																								
77 S. Van Puyvelde et al, ‘Agency Problems Between Managers and Employees in Non-
profit Organisations’, Non-profit Management and Leadership, 24 (2013) 63-64. 
78 M. Jensen, Tests of Capital Market Theory and Implications of the Evidence, (Bicksler: 
Handbook of Financial Economics, 1980), 305-360. 
79A. Keay, ‘Stewardship Theory, Directors and Board Accountability’, Unpublished Paper 
(n.d) 1-15. 
80J. Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability  (Chichester: Wiley, 2007), 17-20. 
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2.3.2 Stewardship Theory 
One theory that has been established to rebut agency theory in the 
last twenty years is stewardship theory, which is popular amongst many 
management scholars and some progressive corporate law scholars. 81 
Unlike agency theory the principal concept of stewardship theory is that the 
directors will always place the interest of the company before their own.82 As 
a steward, the director focuses on serving the company or the organisation, 
and in doing so subjugating his or her own interests.83 When the director is 
appointed, there is the assumption that when the director begins their tenure, 
their objectives will be aligned with those of the principals.84 Within the 
theory, the agent is regarded as reliable, trustworthy and consistently 
interested in performing to their highest potential.85 
 
 “While agency theory posits individualism, 
stewardship theory adheres to 
collectivism.”86 
 
As the two theories both focus on the relationship between 
shareholders and stewards there are elements to the theories that contain 
similarities. Firstly, both theories regard agents as instruments to create and 
																																																								
81A. Keay, ‘Stewardship Theory, Directors and Board Accountability’, Unpublished Paper 
(n.d) 1-15. 
82 M. Huse, Boards, Governance and Value Creation: The Human Side of Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 54-58.   
83M. Hernandex, ‘Toward an Understanding of the Psychology of Stewardship’, Academy of 
Management Review, 37 (2012) 172-174. 
84 J. Davis et al, ‘Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management’, Academy of Management 
Review, 22.20 (1997) 29. 
85A. Keay, ‘Exploring the Rationale for Board Accountability in Corporate Governance’, 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 29 (2014) 115. 
86A. Keay, ‘Stewardship Theory, Directors and Board Accountability’, Unpublished Paper 
(n.d) 1-15. 
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increase shareholder wealth.87  Also there is agreement that both theories 
attempt to explain the role and behaviour of the director in achieving firm 
goals.88 
In contrast however, one difference is that stewardship theory is 
based on a model of managerial behaviour that departs from theories that 
are based on a conflict perspective of board organisation.89 The theory holds 
that stewards’ interests will not be based on promoting their own economic 
benefit but rather they will want to work to promote the best interests of the 
company. In working for the collective goal of the company’s best interests 
they will be indirectly serving their own interests. Furthermore, it is 
considered in stewardship theory that the agent’s interests are already 
aligned with those of the principal whereas in agency theory there is the 
constant need to monitor directors to measure the extent to which they are 
acting in the best interest of the company. The table below offers a 
comprehensive comparison between the two theories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
87  G. Davis, ‘Agents Without Principals? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the 
Interoperate Network’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (1991) 583-613.  
88A. Keay, ‘Stewardship Theory, Directors and Board Accountability’, Unpublished Paper 
(n.d) 1-15. 
89G. Maassen, An International Comparison of Corporate Governance Models (Amsterdam: 
Spencer Stuart, 2002), 72-77. 
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Figure 2: Comparisons of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory. 
Issues Agency Theory Stewardship 
Theory 
Principles 
- Reduce conflict of interest and 
Agency Costs. 
- Relationship between Principal 
and Agent is based on contract. 
Agent works in the 
best interest of the 
company. 
Scope 
Narrow, External; focused on 
shareholder 
Internal; 
Relationship 
between Principal 
and Agent. 
Motivation Personal Selfless 
Stakeholder Shareholder Directors 
Outlook External Internal 
Management 
Philosophy 
Self-interested manager 
The loyal Steward of 
asset 
Discipline Finance and Economic 
Sociology and 
Psychology 
Trust 
Low; Employees are working 
averse and so they will shirk 
High; Agents have 
an inherent partiality 
for loyalty 
Time Frame Short-Term Long-Term 
Theory Origin 1970 1990 
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Source: J. Davis, F. Schoorman and L. Donaldson, PETRANIX Corporate 
and Financial Communications AG, (2014). Available online: 
<http://www.petranix.com/en/index.php>, [Accessed 07/02/2015]. ‘Toward a 
stewardship theory of management’ (1997), The Academy of Management 
Review, 22 (1), 20-47. 
Having established the differences that set stewardship theory apart 
from agency theory it is necessary to elaborate further on this alternative 
non-economic premise for explaining relationships between shareholders 
and directors. 
The idea of stewardship theory dates back to the 1930s from the texts 
of debates between two leading law professors, Dodd and Berle.90  Directors 
would consider themselves stewards of companies during the 1920s to 
1970s, but it was only twenty or so years ago that organisational behaviour 
scholars have been credited with the development of stewardship theory.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
90 A. Adolf & J. Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees’, Harvard Law Review, 
44 (1932) 1365. 
91L. Stout, ‘On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of its Fall, and the Return of 
Managerialism (in the Closet)’, Seattle University Law Review, 36.1 (2013) 1169-1171. See 
also A. Keay, ‘Stewardship Theory, Directors and Board Accountability’, Unpublished Paper 
(n.d) 1-15. 
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Figure 3: The Principal Relationship of Stewardship Theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
Trust is also a core ingredient of stewardship theory. Due to the 
director being regarded as a steward the principal will offer greater trust to 
the director/agent. The relationship between the agent and the principal will 
be based on collective goals and can develop in to long-term professional 
relationships built on trust.92 When this type of relationship is created, loyalty 
is a common by-product.93   
With the agent and the principal working in harmony the company can 
succeed as the organisation is being driven by one agenda that is in the 
company’s best interest.94  
The motivation for directors under stewardship theory is principally 
driven by their own standards to accomplish targets and take pride in their 
																																																								
92  R. Kluvers & J. Tippett, ‘An Exploration of Stewardship Theory in a Not-for-Profit 
Organisation’, Accounting Forum, 35 (2011) 275-277. 
93 R. Kluvers & J. Tippett, ‘An Exploration of Stewardship Theory in a Not-for-Profit 
Organisation’, Accounting Forum, 35 (2011) 276-277. See also A. Keay, ‘Stewardship 
Theory, Directors and Board Accountability’, Unpublished Paper (n.d) 1-15. 
94 S. Van Puyvelde et al, ‘Agency Problems Between Managers and Employees in Non-
profit Organisations’, Non-profit Management and Leadership, 24.1 (2013) 63-65. 
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role. Their personal satisfaction is delivered through achieving results, 
improving in their role, developing skills, succeeding in challenging projects 
and gaining recognition from colleagues for their accomplishments. 95 
Another motivational ingredient can be the responsibility the director has for 
the company’s welfare and interests. Often this responsibility for the 
company’s prosperity is the director’s sole focus to the extent that its 
importance surpasses the director’s own self-interest.96  Personal sacrifice is 
a common feature for the director as their professional responsibility takes 
precedence over personal responsibilities.97 From these motivations there is 
not a financial contributor that incentivises directors to adopt this approach. 
Instead of pursuing economic rewards, stewards are interested in performing 
their roles with honour and helping the company achieve its targets.98 
Another incentive that is intrinsic to the motivation of the steward 
director is the association they see in their career progression being linked to 
the high standard execution of their roles. With this mentality, working for the 
																																																								
95 J. Davis et al, ‘Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management’, Academy of Management 
Review, 22.20 (1997) 20-47. See also K. Lambright, ‘Agency Theory and Beyond: 
Contracted Providers’ Motivation to Properly Use Service Monitoring Tools’, Journal of 
Public Administration Research, 19 (2008) 207-210. 
96 M. Hernandex, ‘Toward an Understanding of the Psychology of Stewardship’, Academy of 
Management Review, 37.1 (2012) 172-186. See also T. Schillemans & M. Basuioc, 
‘Predicting Public Sector Accountability: from Agency Drift to Forum Drift’, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 25 (2015) 191- 208. 
97 J. Davis et al, ‘Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management’, Academy of Management 
Review, 22.1 (1997) 20. 
98 J. Davis et al, ‘Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management’, Academy of Management 
Review, 22 (1997) 20-28. See also D. Pastoriza & M. Arinio, ‘When Agents Become 
Stewards: Introducing Learning in the Stewardship Theory’, IESE Business School (2008). 
Available online:  
http://www.iese.edu/en/files/6_40618.pdf [Accessed 08/02/2015]. See also H. Tosi et al,  ‘An 
Empirical Exploration of Decision-making Under Agency Controls and Stewardship 
Structure’, Journal of Management Studies, 40 (2003) 2053-2055. See also R. Kluvers & J. 
Tippett, ‘An Exploration of Stewardship Theory in a Not-for-Profit Organisation’, Accounting 
Forum, 35 (2011) 275-278; K. Lambright, ‘Agency Theory and Beyond: Contracted 
Providers’ Motivation to Properly Use Service Monitoring Tools’, Journal of Public 
Administration Research, 19 (2008) 207- 221. 
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interests of the company will result in furthering the interests of the individual. 
It has been said that, 
 
 “Their application in their roles and their 
loyalty cannot be considered as blind 
servitude but rather as their path to further 
their own best interests.99” 
 
A prosperous company they direct is likely to reflect them as a 
competent and successful director. 
It is arguable that duties are not needed within the context of 
stewardship theory, as the steward is not an opportunistic agent but rather 
an agent who will always work in the best interest of the company whilst also 
maintaining the business on an honest path free of conflict. 100  Duties 
principally exist for eventualities where directors fail to act to these standards 
so it is possible to question whether duties are needed should all directors 
act as loyal stewards. Whilst there is merit in this argument, stewards are not 
programmed to be perfect directors and the duties still have value in their 
role as a guide for directors to help them execute their roles as well as 
possible.   
 
 
 
																																																								
99 C. Daily et al, ‘Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data’, Academy of 
Management Review, 28 (2003) 371-372. 
100  J. Plessis et al, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 459-460.   
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2.3.3 Contrasting Theories 
When applying the two theories to the practices of modern 
corporations I find that it is only agency theory that can create sustainable 
relationships between shareholders and directors across the broad spectrum 
of corporate structures.   
The main objective in the relationship for shareholders is to have 
directors who do their jobs and pursue the best interest of the company.  
Agency theory sets out that the shareholder will monitor the directors and 
check that they are adhering to this guideline.  Regularly checking up on 
directors is a sustainable model in that the shareholders gain regular 
information on the business, which should help them identify any issues from 
directors. Directors benefit as they will always be clear on their role and 
objectives as shareholders will intervene if they are doing anything they 
shouldn’t be.  Also the general knowledge of being monitored encourages 
directors to follow their guidelines and keep on a good path. In contrast, the 
freedom permitted by stewardship theory permits directors to stray from their 
course without it being noticed by the shareholders.  
Secondly, an agency relationship is more suitable for dealing with 
breaches of duties should they occur.  If a director does breach a duty then 
the breach is more likely to be noticed if there is regular supervision from the 
shareholders. Through regularly monitoring the directors, shareholders are 
better positioned to identify any potential breaches and they will be in the 
position to bring actions.  If the directors have too much freedom as they 
would in stewardship theory then breaches can go unidentified and even 
covered up which is extremely damaging for companies. 
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In jurisdictions that do not have comprehensive duties in place, the 
benefits of agency theory are augmented.  A director that is classed as a 
loyal steward who is not monitored and is also not subject to duties 
effectively is free to damage the company without liability.  In jurisdictions 
that lack duties, it is especially important that directors are regularly and 
thoroughly monitored so that shareholders are aware of the decisions and 
actions being made by them. 
Finally, a certain amount of trust has to be bestowed on a director 
because they are being empowered to run the company and direct it, but an 
appropriate degree of supervision is fundamental to ensuring that a director 
follows the guides of the shareholders and to safeguard against any 
miscreant actions or decision-making.  Adopting a stewardship relationship 
of great trust on a presumption of loyalty from the directors is a practice that 
is more likely to result in damage to the company as directors can stray from 
their goals and responsibilities.  
2.4 THE RATIONALE FOR DUTIES 
Directors’ duties are considered to be a fundamental element of 
company law. Duties are a set of obligatory legal guidelines designed to 
ensure directors do not act in a way that is not in the best interests of the 
company. A company’s economic prosperity can be determined by whether 
directors execute their roles within the parameters of their duties. If they 
choose to not adhere to their duties it has an effect on third persons, not only 
shareholders but also constituents such as employees and creditors. The 
director’s actions will not always be perfect as they are humans, however in 
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their role they represent the company and the duties are also there to remind 
them of the approach that they must adopt. 101  Coupled with effective 
enforcement, the duties remind a director that they will face legal 
consequences should they not align themselves with the respective 
requirements of the law.102 
Moreover, companies require certain things to happen constantly in 
order for their successful existence. They also need to be run in an honest 
way.103  When someone is placed in the position of director they are placed 
in a position of power, trust and loyalty.104 Without a strict list of duties, 
directors could allow their power to lead them along dishonest or unprofitable 
paths.105   
The rationale is clear in that by having these duties in place, directors 
are incentivised to act properly and not to breach their duties, as they will be 
liable to the company for any such actions.106  Now that it is clear why they 
would not want to breach their duties, it is also of significance why duties are 
needed in the first place.107   
The shareholders are sometimes regarded as owners (and often 
creators) of the company and also the principals of the directors.108  They 																																																								
101 Companies Act 2006. Section 170-177  (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also D. 
Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 320-321. 
102 A.J. Dignam & A. Hicks, Hicks & Goo's Cases and Materials on Company Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 361-367. 
103 Companies Act 2006. Section 172(2) (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also J. 
Honds, Directors' duties in the Context of Insolvency (Norderstedt: Grin, 2007), 3-5,21. 
104 Companies Act 2006. Section 172(2) (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also J. 
Honds, Directors' duties in the Context of Insolvency (Norderstedt: Grin, 2007), 15-21. 
105 Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2002] 2 BCLC, 80. 
106 Companies Act 2006. Section 171 (Norwich: The Stationery Office). See also A. Keay, 
Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditor (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 196-273.   
107Ibid. 
108S. McLaughlin, Unlocking Company Law (Oxford:  Routledge, 2013) , 40-43. See also A.J. 
Dignam & A. Hicks, Hicks & Goo's Cases and Materials on Company Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 309.  
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have the right to be comfortable in the knowledge that the business in which 
they have invested is in safe hands and will be run correctly.109  When 
appointing a director they are employing a person to take care of an asset, 
which has a value. It is imperative that there are appropriate duties in place 
so that shareholders can know that the director is obliged to act appropriately 
and run the company properly.110  
2.4.1 To Whom Do Directors Owe Their General Duties?  
It is necessary to establish in this discussion to whom directors owe 
their duties, as it will impact upon the director’s decision making and actions. 
The company, the shareholders, the majority shareholders and the creditors 
might all have different opinions in regard to how the company should be 
directed. The objectives of the director might differ depending on which one 
is owed the duties. For instance, if duties are owed to the creditors, they may 
require a director to pursue the avenue of returning the monies owed to them 
even if it may be to the detriment of the company’s business. Alternatively, if 
duties are owed to the majority shareholder, then they might require a 
director to pursue an avenue that favours their interests over the interests of 
the shareholders collectively.     
In reality, different jurisdictions have different approaches to defining 
to whom directors owe their duties. In the UK since the beginning of the 
twentieth century it has been established that duties are owed to the 
company, as can be seen from section 170(1) of the Companies Act 2006 
																																																								
109S. McLaughlin, Unlocking Company Law (Oxford:  Routledge, 2013) , 40-43. See also A.J. 
Dignam & A. Hicks, Hicks & Goo's Cases and Materials on Company Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 309.  
110  Institute of Directors, The Director’s Handbook: Your Duties, Responsibilities and 
Liabilities (London: Kogan Page Publishers, 2010), 25-27. 
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(UK). 111  The usage of the term company in this section includes the 
collective shareholders within its meaning.112 
 Under common law, the notion of the duties being owed to the 
company was based on the decision of Swinfen Eady J. in 1902 in Percival v 
Wright.113 Within this case the term ‘the company’ referred to the members of 
the company. In the case the directors failed to declare to the shareholders 
as a whole that certain shareholders had approached them offering the 
opportunity to purchase their shares at a time when secret takeover 
negotiations were going on. It was held that the directors were not in breach 
of any duty to the shareholders. The director owed their duty to the 
shareholders as a whole and the court took the view that premature 
disclosure of the takeover negotiations would have been damaging to the 
shareholders. 114 The position would have been different if the directors had 
made the approach to the shareholders, as it would have held that the 
directors were using their positions to pursue a cause in their own personal 
interest. As the court understood, however, the directors did not instigate this 
and in that moment they had no requirement to inform those shareholders of 
the undetermined takeover negotiations.  
Since this approach came into being in the UK, it has also found 
acceptance in cases in different countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand.115 Within the decision, it was also declared that directors do not 																																																								
111Companies Act 2006. Section 171(1) (Norwich: The Stationery Office). 
112 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch, 421. 
113 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch, 421. Briess v Woolley [1954] AC, 333. See also Allen v 
Hyatt [1914] 30 TLR, 444. See also Esplanade Development Ltd v Drive Holdings Pty Ltd 
[1980] WAR, 151. 
114 Sharp and Ors v Blank and Ors [2015] EWHC, 3220. 
115 Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 NZLR, 225. See also Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC, 372. 
See also Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd [1993] 11 ACSR, 543. See also 
Western Finance Co Ltd v Tasker Enterprises Ltd [1979] 106 D.L.R, (3d), 81. See also 
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owe duties to the creditors, individual present or future shareholders and 
individual or collective employees of the company.116  
The notion, captured in section 170(1), also can be seen in the case 
of Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co Ltd v Multinational Gas.117 In this 
case it was said that the directors do not owe any responsibilities to 
shareholders in order to act in the best interests of the company, as they owe 
only fiduciary duties to the company.118 Also, Lord Cullen’s view agrees with 
this point when he states that the company is the only master of the 
director.119 
Whilst in the UK it is generally accepted that duties are owed solely to 
the company, there is also provision for specific cases in which the directors 
might owe their general duties to other persons besides to the company.120 
Take for instance the decision in Peskin v Anderson121 which relates to 
shareholders. The Court of Appeal confirmed that special circumstances 
would be necessary to justify the imposition of fiduciary duties on directors to 
particular shareholders. Where a former member of the Royal Automobile 
Club Ltd (RAC) claimed that the director owed them a duty to disclose the 
details of a pending sale, the Court of Appeal dismissed the claim on the 
grounds that the directors only owed duties to the company. They furthered 
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Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 QB, 606. See also Re Neath 
Rugby Ltd (No 2), Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] 2 BCLC, 427. 
117 Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co Ltd v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical 
Service Ltd [1983] 3 W.L.R, 492.  
118A. Dignam & J. Lowry, Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 403-415. 
119 Ibid. 
120Ch. Shepherd & A. Ridley, Company Law,  (Oxford: Routledge , 2015), 198-199. 
121Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC, 372. 
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the point stating that there needed to be special circumstances to justify the 
imposition of fiduciary duties on directors to specific shareholders. 
Generally in common law countries, duties are owed to the company 
as a whole (including members) and it is only in the case of special 
circumstances where it can be held otherwise. It is not accepted that 
creditors are owed any duties by directors apart from in certain examples of 
insolvency in which the interests of creditors may replace the interests of the 
shareholders.122  
In civil law countries there are various practices in place. Many 
countries follow the notion of the company as an entity being owed the 
duties, as can be seen in Germany and in France.123 In the USA directors 
owe their duties to the corporation and its shareholders.124 In Italy in contrast 
duties are owed to the company, the shareholders, the creditors and to third 
parties.125 
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Available online: 
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2.4.2 The Types Of Duties  
Directors’ duties can generally be categorised as a duty of care and a 
duty of loyalty. The duty of care refers to the standard of care, skill and 
diligence a director is expected to apply in managing the company’s affairs. 
The duty of loyalty refers to the directors’ management of their personal 
interest alongside the interest of the company and in particular the 
prevention of jeopardising the company’s interest through pursuing any 
conflicting personal interest they may have. When these duties coexist they 
are meant to ensure that directors act in the best interests of the company 
and that they act responsibly and carefully for the company’s wellbeing. 126  
The duties are not necessarily different in their application between 
civil law and common law jurisdictions. In civil law countries the duties are 
often defined in broad terms with the duty of care having less specificity and 
the duty to avoid conflicts is less definitive.127 In contrast in common law 
countries it is more common for a specific list of duties to be in place.128 This 
is certainly the case for the duty of loyalty in the sense that it is specific in 
that it provides for many situations where the director’s interests are in 
conflict or may potentially be in conflict with the interests of the company.  
There are no clear divisions between the application of the duty of 
care between civil law and common law jurisdictions. In relation to both it is 																																																								
126  A. Paolini, Research Handbook on Directors’ Duties ( Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2014), 250-256. 
127 C. Gerner-Beuerle et al, ‘Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability’, ISE Enterprise (2013). 
Available online:  
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50438/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_Gerner-
Beuerle,%20C_Study%20on%20directors’%20duties%20and%20liability(lsero).pdf 
 [Accessed 20/01/2017], 11. 
128 C. Gerner-Beuerle et al, ‘Study on directors’ duties and liability’, ISE Enterprise (2013). 
Available online:  
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50438/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_Gerner-
Beuerle,%20C_Study%20on%20directors’%20duties%20and%20liability(lsero).pdf 
 [Accessed 20/01/2017], 9. 
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common to find a dual subjective and objective standard applied, however 
the comprehensiveness and the specificity does vary between 
jurisdictions.129   
These two duties exist in different formats from one jurisdiction to 
another. It is useful to study the application of the duties in different 
jurisdictions and view the different approaches that are applied.130   
2.4.2.1 United Kingdom 
The Companies Act 2006 (UK) is the principal source of company law 
in the UK, and it is within this Act that the general directors’ duties are 
located between sections 170 to 177. Previously being located in case law, 
the duties were moved to statutory law and organised into a codified scheme 
to present them in the most accessible way that the law allowed.   
The duty of care, skill and diligence is in section 174 and it can be 
considered a detailed and specific version of the original duty of care. The 
duty of loyalty can be found within sections 171, 172, 173, 175, 176 and 177. 
These sections specify the core elements of the duty of loyalty. The diagram 
below sets out the general duties articulated in the Companies Act 2006 (UK) 
owed by the director to the company. 131   
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Figure 4: The General Duties of Directors according to the Companies Act 
2006 (UK). 
 
2.4.2.2 Australia  
General duties in Australia are not too dissimilar to those found in the 
UK due to Australia being a former British colony and adopting English 
common law. Much Australian Company Law has mirrored the British pattern 
of legal development in respect of core legislation and concepts. Importantly 
Australian law has embraced most of the UK law on directors’ duties.132 
Australian Company Law is essentially contained in the Corporations 
Act 2001, and in company law rules and equitable principles. Directors’ 
duties are provided for under both common law and statute, both operating 
																																																								
132 Corporations Act 2001. Sections 180 -185 (Canberra: Office of Parliamentary Counsel). 
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alongside each other. The statutory duties do tend to reflect those at 
common law. The Australian state ‘Victoria’ was the first Commonwealth 
jurisdiction to introduce statutory duties in 1958.133  The other Australian 
states followed soon after. 
The statutory duties were planned to give certainty to the law and also 
to impose a standard of criminality onto company officers. The duty of care is 
provided for in section 180 of Corporations Act 2001 and its application is no 
different to that in the UK. Within this section the Business Judgement Rule 
is also contained. The duty of loyalty again, in a similar way to the UK, is 
divided in to more specific duties, which can be found in section 181, 182, 
183 and 184.134 An overview of the duties can be seen in the table below.135 
Figure 5: Sections 180 to 185 of Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
Section 180 
(1) Care and diligence. 
(2) Business Judgment Rule. 
(3) Business Judgment. 
Section 181 
(1) Good Faith and for the Proper Purpose. 
(2) Person involved in contravention. 
Section 182 
(1) Use of position; directors, other officers and 
employees. 
																																																								
133R. Baxt, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors and Officers (Sydney: Australian Institute 
of Company Directors, 2005), 81. 
134  Codification of directors’ duties, first introduced into Australian legislation by The 
Company Act 1958 (Cth), was the first of its kind in English speaking world.  
135 This section was known as section 232 and was amended in 1992 to decriminalise its 
consequences and to make the standard of care objective for the courts and the regulators 
to enforce. 
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(2) Person involve in contravention 
Section 183 
(1) Use of information; directors, other officers and 
employees. 
(2) Person involve in contravention 
Section 184 
(1) Good faith; directors, other officers. 
(2) Use of position; directors, other officers and 
employees. 
(3) Use of information; directors, other officers and 
employees. 
Section 185 Interaction of Sections 180 to 184 with other laws ETC. 
2.4.2.3 Hong Kong 
The majority of the legal content and structure in Hong Kong was built 
during the period when it was a colony of the UK from 1842 to 1997.136 It is 
no surprise that many facets of British law are reproduced within Hong Kong 
law.137 Its company law legislation, since its early formation, was modelled 
quite extensively on the UK Companies Act,138 and still continues to be so 
despite the fact that China now has jurisdiction over Hong Kong.139 
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Company Ordinances that came into place in 1865, 1911 and 1932 in 
Hong Kong mirrored company law reforms enacted in the UK. 140  The 
changes established in the 1973 Second Report of the Company Law 
Revision, most of which were modelled on the UK 1948 Company Act, were 
implemented in the 1984 Companies (Amendment) Ordinance.141 Following 
this the government established the Standing Committee on Company Law 
Reform (the SCCLR) to keep the legislation up to date.142  The SCCLR’s 
drive to update the law has led to the publication of the Companies 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2003.   
 Both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care are well provided for in 
the 2003 Companies Ordinance. The duty of care can be found in section 
465 and the application of it is no different to that in the UK and Australia. 
The duty of loyalty again is spread between different sections. Article 33 is 
essentially the core duty of loyalty, however article 59 and article 60 are 
based around the duty of loyalty as well. 
2.4.2.4 China 
Directors’ duties were first introduced in the PRC (the People’s Republic 
of China) Company Law document of 1993 where duties were imposed on 
directors. The duties themselves were borrowed from German civil law and 
are as follows,143 
− A duty of good faith 
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− A duty not to divulge the company’s secret information 
− A duty not to engage in business that competes with the company 
− A duty to misappropriate company information 
As this set of duties was deemed to be inadequately comprehensive in 
terms of its provision on corporate governance and enforcement, the 
Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) introduced further 
duties in the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies. This 
code is derived from the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance and it is 
based around holding directors of listed companies to a higher standard.  
The code includes,144 
− A duty to diligently perform their duties for the best interest of the 
company and its shareholders.   
− A duty to ensure adequate time and energy for the performance of 
their duties. 
− A duty to attend board meetings in a diligent and responsible manner 
and express their opinion on the matters discussed. 
− A duty to abide by the relevant laws, regulations, rules and the 
company’s articles of association. 
− A duty to fulfil the undertakings they make publicly. 
− A duty to attend relevant training to familiarise themselves with rights, 
obligations and duties of a director, to know relevant laws, regulations, 
and professional knowledge required of a director.  
  China differs from other civil law jurisdictions in the specificity of its 
duties, as they can be considered quite precise in comparison. The formation 																																																								
144  Ch. Shi, The Political Determinants of Corporate Governance in China (Oxford: 
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of the Chinese duties was influenced by the existing duties in both the USA 
and the UK.145  Regardless of this the Chinese duties are not quite as 
comprehensive as those of the UK or Australia and they can still be open to 
interpretation. As the enforcement mechanisms in place are not updated, 
again it is difficult for directors to be found in breach of these duties.  
In terms of code surrounding liability for breaching duties the law fails 
to go far enough. Directors are only liable if their decisions are in violation of 
law as opposed to simply causing the company to suffer. This means 
directors can cause great damage to a company through breaching their duty 
of care, but they will not be liable.   
The law was again modified in the 2005 Company Law amendment 
where a new chapter was introduced that set out qualifications and duties of 
directors. Articles 20, 21 and 149 deal with the shareholder and director 
relationship applying compensation laws should directors breach certain 
duties. The duty of loyalty and the duty of care exist in this edition, however it 
is considered that they are still not well defined and they are left open to 
interpretation. Additionally there are no enforcement mechanisms in place, 
which meant that directors could not be held accountable for breaches.146   
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2.5 Fiduciary Duties  
The duty of loyalty, as already mentioned, exists in different formats in 
different jurisdictions. In the UK, Australia and Hong Kong, instead of the 
duty being a single duty, it has been separated into several more specific 
duties. These duties in many jurisdictions are not referred to as the duties of 
loyalty, but rather they form part of the fiduciary duties. This is the case in the 
UK, Australia and Hong Kong where the duties of loyalty have been included 
within the fiduciary duties catalogue. In other jurisdictions, fiduciary duties 
include all the general duties. In the USA, section 142 Delaware General 
Corporation Law for instance both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are 
considered fiduciary duties.147  
 Loyalty is perhaps the most noticeable feature of fiduciary law.148 It is 
often considered essential to fiduciary relationships, and within the fiduciary 
setting it has distinctive features. The loyal fiduciary will have the feeling that 
the well being of the object of his or her loyalty takes precedence over their 
own good.149 A duty of loyalty obligates a director to subordinate his or her 
interest in order to promote the best interests of the company.150 This is well 
demonstrated by the English Court of Appeal in both Bristol and West 
Building Society v Mothew151 and Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi.152 As 
Millett acknowledged in the former case, a person is, 
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“Not subject to fiduciary duties since he is a 
fiduciary; it is because he is subject to them 
that he is a fiduciary”.153 
 
In the case of Mummery LJ in Tower v Premier Waste Management 
Ltd, 154  the role of a director is defined in relation to their fiduciary 
commitments, 
 
“A director of a company is appointed to 
direct its affairs. In doing so it is his or her 
duty to use his or her position in the 
company to promote its success and to 
protect its interests. In accordance with 
equitable principles the special relationship 
with the company generated fiduciary duties 
on the part of a director. His or her fiduciary 
commitments to the company took the form 
of the duty of loyalty and a duty to avoid a 
conflict between his or her interests and his 
or her duty to the company.”155 
 
The first case of fiduciary duties can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century in the UK.156 With the definition set out in Tower of the role, it is clear 
to see that even in the eighteenth Century the fiduciary position requires a 
director to ‘promote the success of the company’, ‘protect the company’s 
interests’ and ‘avoid conflicts of interests.’ Since this moment fiduciary duties 
have been the core concept within Anglo-American law for addressing 
conflicts in the relationship of the directors and shareholders.   
Apart from loyalty to the company another leading responsibility of 
directors in relation to their fiduciary role is to act bona-fide for the benefit of 																																																								
153In Indata Equipment Supplies v. ACL [1997] 2 WLR, 436, 18. 
154 Towers v Premier Waste Management Limited [2011] EWCA CIV, 923. 
155Bairstow v Queens Moat House plc. [2001] EWCA CIV, 712, Keech v Sandford [1726] 25 
ENG. REP, 223. 
156 Leech v Sandford [1726] Sel Case, Ch, 61. 
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the company.157 As Davies has stated, the directors should act in the best 
interest of the company in terms of good faith.158 That is, the directors must 
act the way that they honestly consider to be right.159 As explained by the 
Appellate Division in South Africa,160 
 
“In common law, once a person accepts the 
appointment as a director, he becomes a 
fiduciary in relation to the company and is 
obliged to display the utmost good faith 
towards the company and in his dealing on 
its behalf.”161 
 
From considering the types of duties in the countries studied for this 
thesis, it is clear that China does not subscribe to the idea that fiduciary 
duties are a requirement of setting out duties. On the whole, it is possible to 
see that while fiduciary duties were not known to civil law systems, in many 
civil law and mixed civil and common-law jurisdictions, the idea of being a 
fiduciary162 has in recent decades come into its own via legislation163 and it is 
becoming increasingly common for them to be introduced.164  
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2.5.1 United Kingdom 
The mid-nineteenth century was a critical period in the development of 
common law rules and equitable principles, and it was in this time that 
directors’ duties first emerged.165   
In the UK there are, as we have seen, provisions that cover six 
fiduciary duties.166 These reflect the duties that are provided for in many 
jurisdictions around the world. 
Figure 6: Section 171 to 177 (Fiduciary Duties) 
Fiduciary Duties, The Companies Act 2006 (UK) 
SECTION 171 Duty to Act within Powers 
SECTION 172 Duty to Promote the Success of the Company 
SECTION 173 Duty to Exercise Independent Judgment 
SECTION 175 Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest 
SECTION 176 Duty Not to Accept Benefits from Third Parties 
SECTION 177 Duty to declare interest in proposed transaction or 
arrangement 
2.5.1.1 Duty to Act within Powers and to use Power for Proper 
Purposes 
Powers are provided to a director to enable them to effectively 
execute their role and lead the company.167  Without such a level of authority 
they would not be able to carry out the necessary management and running 
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of the company.168 Whilst the purpose of entrusting the director with powers 
is to enable them, the duty to act within powers is there to make sure these 
powers are not abused. 169  Directors must not act or enter into any 
transaction, which is illegal or compromises the integrity of the company, and 
they must not, without the sanction of the members in a general meeting, do 
any act or enter into any transaction that is beyond the powers conferred on 
directors by the articles.170 As it is apparent in section 171 of the Companies 
Act 2006 (UK), the two channels to the duty are that, 
 
“A director must- 
a) act in accordance with the company’s 
constitution, and  
b) only exercise power for the proper 
purposes for which they are conferred.” 
 
This section is founded on an equitable principle.171  Under section 
171(a) the scope of the power given to the director is determined by the 
company’s constitution. When the director acts outside of the constitution 
they are in breach of this duty and in simple terms they have overstepped 
the terms of their mandate.172 
Additionally, under section 171(b) directors may not use their power in 
a way that can cause the company a loss. In particular cases, the execution 
of power that extended beyond the confinements of a company’s constitution 
can be considered fraud on the part of the director.173 This underlines the 																																																								
168Re Sherborne Residents Co Ltd [1987] BCLC, 82. 
169Ultraframe Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC, 1638. 
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importance of the company constitution in UK Company Law and its role in 
defining the extent of the director’s power.174  On the whole, the duty to act 
within powers defined in the company constitution does not feature greatly in 
common law cases.175  An integral channel of the duty is that directors must 
use their power for a proper purpose.176  As statutory law is not sufficiently 
extensive on this duty, the case law is relied upon for determining many 
cases.177  If the articles stipulate that a director can use a particular power, 
the director can be challenged if when using the power, they use it for a 
purpose other than that which the articles intended it be used for.178   
Also under the model articles of association, 179  the powers of 
management are vested for the purpose of directing the affairs and 
associations of the company.180  Directors should not therefore use their 
authority to interfere with or undermine the shareholder’s rights. Nor should 
they for instance, use their authority to issue shares to frustrate a takeover 
bid.181 The duty imposed on directors to act bona-fide in the interest of the 
company is open to subjective interpretation by directors.182 For this reason 
they must be aware to not employ their power to affect any improper purpose 
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under the guise of bona-fide action in the company interest, particularly 
where the director’s personal interest stands to be enhanced.183  
In scenarios in which it is claimed that directors have not exercised 
their power for legitimate managerial purposes, the courts will review the 
facts to identify their genuine purpose.184 For instance, directors should not 
enter into long-term management contracts that are designed to reduce the 
shareholders’ power to appoint new directors.185 Moreover they should not 
enter into contracts that trigger improper obligations in the event of the 
takeover bid, the so-called poison pills, a strategy designed to discourage a 
takeover.186 As typically the director will claim that their actions were made in 
the best interest of the company, the courts will consider whether their 
actions were so urgent that it prohibited them from acquiring authorisation 
from the board and forced them to act outside of their powers for the interest 
of the company.187 
2.5.1.2 Duty to Promote the Success of the Company 
The duty to promote the success of the company originates in the 
equitable principle that the directors must act bona-fide in what they consider 
to be the best interest of the company as a whole.188 This requirement 
includes a broad definition of the company as a whole as directors have to 
make decisions factoring into account the following, 
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“(a) the likely consequences of any decision 
in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others, 
(d) the impact of the company's operations 
on the community and the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members 
of the company.” 
 
It is only in the latest edition of the Companies Act that the meaning of 
the company was specified as the ‘company as a whole’ as previously the 
duty was to the company as a separate legal entity.   
The duty itself can be considered subjective in that the director is 
making the decisions and it is they who are weighing up whether something 
is in the best interest of the company as a whole.189   There is not an 
assessment of whether a decision was right or wrong as far as the interests 
of the company are concerned, but rather an assessment of whether the 
director believed they were making a decision in the best interests of the 
company.190   
If directors are found to have made a decision that is not in good faith 
to promote the success of the business then their actions are open to 
challenge and they will also have to personally compensate the company 
and pay it for any loss.191 
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2.5.1.3 Duty to Exercise Independent Judgment 
Directors must use their own judgment managing the day-to-day 
running of a company and not execute actions based on the interests or 
desires of others.192  The duty could be included as part of the general duty 
to act in good faith, as part of the duty to exercise care, skill and diligence or 
as a component of not pursuing conflicts of interest. It has been deemed as 
necessary to have it itemised as its own duty and that is how it is presented 
in the statute. Section 173 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK) states, 
 
1. “A director of a company must exercise 
independent judgment. 
2. This duty is not infringed by his or her 
acting— 
a) in accordance with an agreement duly 
entered into by the company that restricts 
the future exercise of discretion by its 
directors, or 
b) in a way authorised by the company’s 
constitution.” 
 
This duty reflects the equitable principle that fiduciaries must refrain 
from being influenced by other parties. In other words, directors should not 
allow external pressures to compromise their decision-making integrity.193   
Directors may breach their duties by following the advice of external 
individuals rather than reaching their own decision. 194  Also, nominee 
directors representing a particular shareholder must not just follow the 
directions of their nominator, if to do so would not be in the best interests of 
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the company.195  
Directors can act on the instructions of third parties despite the fact 
that the third party is not a shareholder. These situations can occur when a 
holding company appoints directors to the board of a subsidiary company. 
Alternatively when a class of shareholders or a debenture-holder is given the 
power to appoint a director. In these situations the appointed director must 
make the shareholders aware of the nature of their appointment and it must 
have the approval of the company.196   
2.5.1.4 Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest  
Directors may have conflicts between their own interests and the 
interests of the company. A conflict of interest can be articulated as a rule 
that forbids a director from misusing a company opportunity and/or assets 
directly or indirectly for his or her self-interest, which is covered in section 
175(2) of the Companies Act 2006 (UK). A director is not to have a personal 
interest that is in conflict with that of the company. When circumstances arise 
where the director has a personal interest in a company relationship or 
transaction, he or she can disclose the interest to the other directors of the 
company and get the board to authorise the conflict.197 This duty applies to 
the misuse of any asset, information or opportunity.198 If the board authorises 
the director to pursue the course, then it will not be deemed to be in 
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conflict.199  A director who holds a directorship in another company and 
particularly in an opposing company should seek the authorisation of the 
shareholders to retain that directorship on the basis set out in section 175(5) 
and (6).200  
Business opportunities belong to a business until such moment as the 
company abandons the opportunity.201 A director might find that their own 
interests would be favoured if they were to exercise their power in a certain 
way.202  Directors who attempt to usurp a company’s assets and affairs for 
their own secret profit or profit of some other parties will be subject to duties 
if an action is brought against them, as this would constitute a conflict of 
interest.203 Any benefit achieved in breach of the business opportunity rule 
will be held in trust for the company.204 Take for instance, the approach 
adopted by the House of Lords in the well-known case of Regal (Hastings) 
Ltd v Gulliver.205 In this case the appellant corporation owned a cinema 
(Regal) theatre in Hastings. The company intended to acquire two other local 
cinemas. However, due to a lack of funds in the business account, the 
company received investment from the five directors and the company 
solicitor. Each personally invested a sufficient amount for the company to 
acquire leases on the two extra cinemas. Regal was eventually sold and the 																																																								
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directors’ made a profitable return when they sold their shares. The buyers of 
the company’s shares claimed against the directors for profiting personally 
from their position as directors.206   
 The House of Lords ruled that the directors had breached their fiduciary 
duty. 207  Despite the directors and the solicitor acting bona-fide in the 
circumstances in which they assisted the company financially to pursue its 
goal, they were required to account for any profit gained from acting as 
directors of the company.  
In a separate case, Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley, the 
director of an architectural design company was unable to secure a contract 
with a local gas board for the company.208 The board having made it clear 
that it did not wish to deal with the company offered him the contract 
privately. The director decided to pursue this offer and did not disclose the 
deal to the company and asked to leave his work as a director on the false 
grounds of poor health.209  The court decided that he was liable for the 
earnings that he made through the contract with the gas board. The reason 
for this is that he should have informed the company of the offer and instead 
he pursued his self-interest by using a fake illness to release him from his 
contractual responsibility and duty to the company to pursue an offer that 
would benefit his self-interest.210 Both these cases are evidence of a very 
strict approach to enforce breaches of conflict of interest in the UK.211 
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2.5.1.5 Duty Not to Accept Benefits from Third Parties 
The duty not to accept benefits from third parties is found in section 
176 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK). If any benefit is being presented to 
them as a result of their role as director (whether that be in exchange for 
them doing something or not doing something), they must not accept it.212 
The duty is only infringed however if through accepting the benefit it 
can rationally be considered that the director has given rise to a conflict of 
interest.213 This duty covers bribes or secret commissions.214  
2.5.1.6 Duty to Declare Interest in Proposed Transaction or 
Arrangement 
Directors are obligated under section 177 of the Companies Act 2006 
(UK) to disclose to the other directors any interest, no matter how minor, that 
they have in any transaction or arrangement the company is involved in. 
Sub-section (7) covers competing duties, which may include those owed to a 
third party as a trustee or director. 
On occasions it is possible for a director to find that he or she has a 
private interest in a transaction that the company they direct is involved in.215 
Provided that this conflict of interest in unintentional, the director must 
disclose the information to the shareholders and allow them to make a 
decision.216   
An interested director, directly or indirectly, may be removed from 
voting or being included in the quorum of a board meeting by the company’s 
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articles.217 Where the duty applies, the interested director should make full 
and honest disclosure of the nature and extent of its interest. After this has 
occurred the board are at liberty to decide what the solution should be to 
move forwards with the matter.218 
Section 182 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK) has extended the duty 
of a director to declare an interest in existing transactions and arrangements 
on broadly the same grounds that are mentioned in section 177. The 
declaration must be made once it is reasonably practical and failure to do so 
does not affect the underlying duty to make the declaration.  
 The Privy Council decision in Cook v Deeks 219  demonstrates the 
application of the principle contained in section 177. In this case three out of 
the four directors of a company misappropriated corporate assets from the 
company, Toronto the Construction Company Ltd (TCC). 220  The three 
directors tried to exclude the fourth by using their voting powers to approve a 
decision that was in their personal interest as opposed to the interests of the 
company. They passed a motion to declare that the company had no interest 
in a project with a third party and then they entered into contracts personally 
with the third party. These three directors intentionally used their positions to 
vote against an opportunity in the company interest, to then go on and steal 
the business opportunity for their own personal gain. The court held that the 
directors were in breach of their fiduciary duties to the company due to the 
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fact that they knowingly acted against the company’s best interest in order to 
further their own self-interest.221  
2.5.2 Australia 
Section 181(a) of Corporations Act 2001 includes ‘the duty of good 
faith in the best interest of the company’, which considers whether a 
director’s motivation for the action/lack of action was for the benefit of the 
company. Section 181(b) of Corporations Act 2001 is about the duty to use 
powers for a proper purpose.222 The provision combines the same sorts of 
duties that are contained in sections 171 and 172 of the UK legislation. 
Section 182 is the duty not to make improper use of position, which is 
based around fulfilling their role for its intended purpose. A director, 
secretary, other officer or employee of a corporation is in breach of the duty 
when they use their position to benefit themselves, someone with whom they 
have a relationship or to damage the business. Also, if the company is 
financially not in a strong position and the director, secretary, other officer or 
employee of a corporation exercises their power on a risk that the company 
cannot afford; they can also be in breach of this duty.223  
Section 183 of Corporations Act 2001 is the duty not to make 
improper use of information, which in essence is to use the information that 
they are privy to for its intended use, which is the company’s interest. 
Through being a director, any information that he or she comes by, should 
not be used to benefit themselves, someone with whom they have a 
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relationship or to damage the business.224 Sections 182 and 183 are akin to 
the sections 175-177 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK).  
According to a Senate Committee, the aim of directors’ duties is to 
shield shareholders who trust their interests to the care of directors. It does 
this by imposing standards of conduct that give rise to liability when 
breached.225  In other words, the directors’ duties in the general law and the 
Corporations Act are in place to protect the company from the abuse of 
directors’ powers.226  
2.5.3 Hong Kong 
According to a recent survey by the Hong Kong Institute of Company 
Secretaries, less than 40 per cent of directors in Hong Kong understand their 
fiduciary duties and legal responsibilities and the remainder give them low 
priority.227  
In fact, many smaller company directors disregard the concepts of 
company law and directors’ duties.228 The role of a director is sometimes 
mixed up with that of a senior manager.229 This is a common problem of 
many directors in Hong Kong.230 Lack of knowledge of their own positions 
and therefore their duties, responsibilities and liabilities is cause for great 
concern. Carrying out the work of the business, decision making and risk 
taking without proper understanding of the gravity of who their duties are 
owed to and legal consequences of actions, directors might unknowingly 																																																								
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breach their duties. In Hong Kong the legislation exists and the gaps in 
knowledge cannot be attributed to this cause. The following are a list of 
directors’ duties and related provisions, 
Figure 7: directors’ duties and related provisions in Hong Kong 
Article 33 
 
Directors should act in the best interest of the company 
and the shareholders and have duties of honesty, loyalty 
and diligence. 
 
Article 34 
 
Directors must ensure they have sufficient time and 
commitment to discharge their duties. 
 
Article 59 
 
Directors must discharge their duties faithfully, uphold 
the interests of the company, and not seize a company’s 
properties, etc. 
 
Article 60 
 
A director must not misappropriate company’s funds or 
lend company’s funds to a third party. 
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2.5.4 China 
Chinese Company Law does set out fiduciary duties and the concept 
of good faith in the 2005 amendment. Directors, supervisors and senior 
managers all have the obligations of fidelity and diligence specifically owed 
to the company imposed on them.  
The law is still not as clear as it could be regarding fiduciary duties. 
From the inclusion of the duty of good faith it can be understood that 
lawmakers intended for the duty to be interpreted based on the civil law 
doctrine as being equivalent to fiduciary duties.231  
This articulation of fiduciary duties is insufficiently comprehensive and will 
need to be amended. The duty of faith can certainly be expanded upon in 
future legislation updates intended to improve fiduciary duties. In order for 
fiduciary duties to be updated, there needs to be an improved archive for 
judges to refer to and establish a more consistent basis for determining 
cases. It would be an improvement if each court could refer to rulings of 
other courts and a system of mutual citation could be developed. From this 
base, the legislature could then codify those common principles and 
techniques emerging from cases after consistent patterns have been 
identified.  
There is also a need for fiduciary duties to contain greater protection for 
minority shareholders. At present there is one duty that touches upon the 
subject of minority shareholders, and that is the duty imposed to prevent 
controlling shareholders from prejudicing the interests of minority 
shareholders and the company. This duty is there to prevent shareholders 																																																								
231J. Zhao, Corporate Social Responsibility in Contemporary China ( Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2014), 141. 
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from taking advantage of the limited liability of the company to avoid paying 
debts. It does not however provide for prevention from controlling 
shareholders oppressing minority shareholders’ involvement in decision-
making. Particularly in Chinese listed companies this results in the powers of 
minority shareholders being limited as the state elects directly or indirectly 70 
per cent of each company’s board members. Having over 50 per cent of the 
board’s voting powers means that the state will have control of the company 
and ability to disregard the views of minority shareholders. 
2.6 DUTY OF CARE, SKILL AND DILIGENCE 
The duty of care takes slightly different forms depending on the 
jurisdiction that applies it. The main difference between jurisdictions is the 
standard that is applied to judge the degree of care required of directors. The 
standard is broken down into two categories, whether a director should be 
judged subjectively or objectively.   
 The objective standard is based on a director exercising the care, skill 
and diligence that would be applied by a reasonable person in the same 
position as the director in question without taking account of any particular 
expertise that the director possesses.232 That is to say, directors would be 
held liable through their failure to perform some required activity.233 The 
subjective standard in contrast is based on the director exercising the care, 
skill and diligence that would be applied by a reasonable person having the 
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director in question’s precise knowledge and experience. 234  Under this 
assessment, as Riley notes, liability would be based on whether the actions 
of the director fitted within their particular skillset or whether, with their 
knowledge, they were able to avoid the particular failure in question.235  
2.6.1 United Kingdom 
In the UK considerations of the foundation of the duty of care, skill and 
diligence are dominated by the case of Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co 
Ltd236. There has been a notable shift in standards when comparing case law 
that existed prior to and after this case. Much enhanced legislation places on 
directors a greater duty to always go about their work with care, skill and 
diligence.237   Importantly section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK) 
provides that directors’ actions will be tested objectively as well as 
subjectively. 
This duty originated from both equity principles and the common law 
of tort.238 This duty is not fiduciary as disclosed by section 178(2) when it 
states,239  
 “The duties in those sections (with the 
exception of section 174 (duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence)) are, 
accordingly, enforceable in the same way 
as any other fiduciary duty owed to a 
company by its directors.” 
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The UK currently applies both a subjective and objective standard. 
This has not always been the case however, as cases in the late nineteenth 
and for much of the twentieth century, tended only to apply the subjective 
standard.240 The subjective standard is based around placing liability on 
directors for breaches that occur when it can be demonstrated that directors 
are not ‘doing their best’ (what they should be capable of doing given their 
level of skill and/or experience) or they could have ‘avoided the failure’.241  
The reason that directors have hardly been held liable using this standard of 
liability is that it was legally difficult to apply due to the terms being vague.   
Let us consider the example of shirking responsibility. Shirking 
responsibility is a breach of duty of care. Through shirking tasks, the director 
has made a mental decision to deliberately not take action that they are 
aware that they are required to take. They have made a conscious decision 
to face the consequences as opposed to carry out their tasks. When this is 
considered in court through the subjective standard it will have to be proved 
that the director is aware of the responsibilities of the job and that they 
recklessly elected not to do them. Also it will have to be proved that not doing 
these actions resulted in a cost to the company.   
The real issue however is that the law does not articulate particular 
activities of a director. The case will depend upon the action in question that 
caused the loss to the company being included in the contract or articles of 
association as part of the director’s role. Without some evidence that the 
director is required to do the action then it is difficult for the breach to be 
applied. 																																																								
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In the 1911 case of Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation and Estate Ltd, 242 
Neville stated that, 
 
“A director’s duty has been laid down as 
requiring him or her to act with such care, 
as is reasonably to be expected from him or 
her, having regard to his or her knowledge 
and experience. He or she is, I think, not 
bound to bring any special qualifications to 
his or her office. He or she may undertake 
the management of a rubber company in 
complete ignorance of everything 
connected with rubber, without incurring 
responsibility for the mistake which may 
result from such ignorance.243” 
 
This case is an example of how the subjective standard alone permits 
a varied standard of care in companies. In fact the standard is only likely to 
be used when a director with considerable experience breaches their duties, 
as it would be the only scenario when the shareholders will be able to attest 
that the director in question should have known better. For this reason, the 
Court of Appeal stated that, 
 
“Directors have, both collectively and 
individually, a continuing duty to acquire and 
maintain a sufficient knowledge and 
understanding of the company’s business to 
enable them properly to discharge their 
duties as directors.”244 
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Reiterating this thought after several years, Romer in Re Equitable 
Fire Insurance245 stated that a director needs to acquire a greater level of 
skill, knowledge and experience than others in order to fulfil his or her 
duties.246  The judge said that subjective standards were the key element, 
although he did approve a degree of objectivity (something not recognised 
by most commentators and judges until the late 1980s).   
This line of thought opened up the door to the objective standard and 
how it could be incorporated into the duty of care. Justice said that directors 
should have ‘sufficient knowledge and understanding’ which can be 
interpreted as his belief that all directors should be required to be of some 
minimum standard.247 When considering the objective standard there is a 
need to balance the incentive for the director to carry out the role and the 
avoidance of liability for the actions and decisions that are outside their 
control. 
With an objective standard there is the risk that stewards will be made 
more cautious of the liabilities associated with the role that they will refrain 
from taking legitimate risks.248 It is necessary for directors to take certain 
risks, which are vital for the success of the business, and it is a problem if 
they are incentivised not to take these risks.249 The strictness of the objective 
standard can be increased by courts judging with the benefit of hindsight and 
a lack of business experience. 
In an objective standard there is the risk that the judge will misapply 
the standard. This can happen when the company has failed at something 																																																								
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due to a director’s decision and the judge assesses the director not on their 
decision making process or their behaviour but instead on the damaging 
result that emerged from their decision. It is the decision making process that 
should be the subject of the judge’s assessment, considering if the director 
carried out their research and weighed up alternatives as opposed to 
assessing their commercial decision.250  
At the end of the twentieth century, the court recognised that the law 
surrounding the duty of care, skill and diligence was insufficient and this led 
to the acceptance of the ‘dual or twofold’ objective and subjective standard 
that was taken from section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK).251 In 
1999 the Law Commission presented the possible standards that could be 
applied with a duty of this kind.   
As previously mentioned, in the revision of the Companies Act 2006 
(UK), there is the specification that both an objective and a subjective 
approach be applied for the duty in section 174. That is to say that the duty 
should be considered in both those aspects. It can be expected that directors 
work should be executed by a reasonably diligent person with (1) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may be expected of any persons who 
carry out that function and (2) the general knowledge, skill and experience 
that the director has.252 
The combination of both the subjective and objective standard is 
based on a director exercising the care, skill and diligence that would be 
exercised by a reasonable person in the same position and also that should 																																																								
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have been exercised by themselves when taking into account their 
knowledge and experience.  
2.6.2 Australia 
Section 180 details that a director of a company is required to 
exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the amount of care and 
diligence that a reasonable person would be expected to. Using the term ‘a 
reasonable person’ implies that an objective standard of care is to be 
expected.253 The court will consider the potential benefit against the potential 
harm that could have come to the business through the decision. Also the 
court takes into account, the state the business is in and the subjective 
position of the director.254  Section 180 includes the Business Judgment 
Rule. Apart from a reference to the Business Judgment Rule, the provision is 
very similar to section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK). 
The duty of care, skill and diligence sets out that a director or other 
officer must exercise their power and discharge their duties with the degree 
of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they,255 
 
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation 
in the corporation’s circumstances; and, 
(b) occupied the office held by, and had the 
same responsibilities within the corporation 
as, the director or officer.256 
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2.6.3 Hong Kong 
The duty of care, skill and diligence in Hong Kong is found within the 
Companies Ordinance and greatly resembles that of the Companies Act 
2006 (UK). There is both a subjective and objective test to determine the 
standard of care that should be adhered to by directors in their decision 
making practice. The objective test sets out a minimum degree of care, skill 
and diligence that a director must adhere to which is as follows, 
 
"the general knowledge, skill and 
experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the 
functions carried out by the director in 
relation to the company". 
 
The subjective test judges directors on the level of decision-making 
ability that they professionally should possess. If a director is experienced 
and qualified to a high level, it can be expected that they will be judged to a 
higher standard than someone who has recently acquired the position and 
has no experience.   
Within the Companies Ordinance there is a provision that extends this 
duty of care not only to executive directors and non-executive directors, but 
also to shadow directors.257   
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2.6.4 China 
The duty of care came in to place in the 2005 Company Law 
Amendment and is a transplant from the Anglo-American fiduciary duties of 
directors.258 There is only one article that treats the duty of care in the PRC 
Company Law and it is article 48. The article sets out that, 
 
“The directors, supervisors and senior 
executives of a company shall comply with the 
laws, administrative regulations and the 
articles of association of the company, and 
bear the duties of loyalty and due diligence 
towards the company.  
-The directors, supervisors and senior 
executives of a company shall not, by taking 
advantage of their positions and powers, 
accept bribes or other unlawful incomes, nor 
may they misappropriate the property of the 
company.” 
 
Within this description there is not a clear standard of care that is 
articulated, which makes the duty difficult to enforce.259 An updated duty of 
care will endeavour to balance an appropriate level of protection for 
shareholders against the retention of entrepreneurial endeavour and risk 
taking.260 
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2.7 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE  
The Business Judgment Rule may apply in cases of directors’ duties 
in certain jurisdictions. A director can claim that any poor decision/judgment 
that he or she has made which caused damage to the company was made in 
good faith and based on this logic they should not be liable. 
The rule is actively used in the USA and several other jurisdictions, 
each with their own adaptation of the rule.261  Reference will first be paid to 
the interpretation of the USA, as it is where the rule originated.262 
The rule was first introduced in the decades following the Second 
World War.263  The case of Smith v Van Gorkom264 is the most controversial 
authority on the rule. Here the Supreme Court in Delaware believed that the 
defence of business judgment could not be deployed in circumstances where 
the actions of the directors could be characterised as completely 
negligent.265  These statutes, as Steinberg indicates, resulted in a situation 
where, in practical terms, a plaintiff today must prove a minimum of reckless 
conduct to recover damages for breach of the duty of care, skill and 
diligence.266 
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The court acknowledged for years that the judgments made by 
directors involved a certain amount of risk, and that even an informed, good 
faith decision might result in an unfavourable outcome for the company.267 
Since it would be inequitable for directors to be held personally 
responsible for poor outcomes of informed decisions made in good faith, the 
court has looked to the Business Judgment Rule in deciding such cases.  
Figure 8: The Business Judgement Rule. 
 
According to the Business Judgment Rule, the director’s decision 
should be made once he or she is well informed, without personal interest, 
without corrupt motive, in good faith and in the honest belief that their choice 
serves the best interests of the company.268 If directors do this they will be 																																																								
267A. Schneema, The Law of Corporations and Other Business Organisations (New York: 
Delmar Cenage, 2013), 358-360. 
268Ch. Mallon & S. Waisman, The Law and Practice of Restructuring in the United Kingdom 
and US (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 135-140.  
	78	
safe from liability, whatever the result of their judgment. The rule recognises 
that not every decision will profit the organisation. The Business Judgment 
Rule protects directors from being held liable in certain respects but it does 
not protect directors against fraud, self-dealing, nor misconduct.269 This rule 
protects directors from accountability for corporate decision making as can 
be seen from the above chart.270  
2.7.1 Australian Law and the Business Judgment Rule  
One of the primary areas in which Australian law differs from UK law 
is in relation to the provision of the Business Judgement Rule, which is 
arguably at the heart of corporate governance and directors’ duties in 
Australia.271 The rule was first proposed in the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (CLERP bill) in 1997.272  The grounds for its introduction 
were that it was to protect the authority of directors in the performance of 
their duties, as explained Stephen Bainbridge, when referring to the 
American equivalent, 
 
“the Business Judgment Rule reflects the 
need to reach a compromise between 
recognising the director’s authority and 
discretion to decide, and the need for those 
directors to be accountable.”273 
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The Business Judgment Rule was introduced into the Corporations Act in 
March 2000. The Australian version contains all the same rules as the 
American version in that the rule is fulfilled if a director: 
− Makes the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose. 
− Does not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the 
judgment. 
− Informs himself or herself about the proper subject matter of the 
judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate. 
− Rationally believes that the judgment is in the best interests of the 
corporation.274 
When directors have met the above criteria then the rule is there to 
prevent their decisions being judged unjustly.275 As highlighted by D’Aloisio, 
there is a balance that must be found between on the one hand ‘protecting 
shareholders’ and on the other ‘providing the freedom to the board to allow it 
to take risks without fear of liability’.276 If there is a legal mechanism in place 
to bring actions against directors for poor business decisions then it will deter 
directors from risk taking entirely and they will even apply caution when 
taking necessary risks through fear of liability.277  
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• The Legal Basis Of The Business Judgment Rule In Australia 
The Australian Business Judgment Rule is similar to the American 
version in many ways. 278  The decision in Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Rich279 explained the Business Judgment Rule in 
Australian Company Law, and indicated that this rule can provide a 
protection for actions in some cases that would otherwise amount to a 
breach of directors’ duty.280 The Business Judgment Rule in section 180(2) 
states that a director or other officer of a corporation will be protected from 
liability in relation to decisions made in the company’s best interests unless 
the belief is one that no reasonable person in their position would hold.281 
More precisely, it is a defence for actions that may otherwise be in breach of 
section 180(1), which imposes an obligation on directors to exercise their 
duty of care and diligence when discharging their decision-making 
responsibilities.282  
The subject matter of the Business Judgment Rule is included in 
section 180(2)(c) and it states that,  
 
“The director or officer must inform 
themselves about the subject matter of the 
judgment to the extent that they reasonably 
believe to be appropriate”.283   
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Taken directly from US legislation, it requires directors to make 
informed but not necessarily flawless decisions.284  
The rationality of the rule is that in order to make decisions the 
director needs to have done sufficient due diligence.285  They require the 
time available for obtaining information, the costs relating to obtaining 
information, the director’s confidence in exploring the matter, the state of the 
company’s business at the time, the nature of the competing demands on 
the board’s attention, and whether or not material information is rationally 
available to the director.286 In the circumstances where the decision prompts 
an uncertain question of law, compliance with section 180(2)(c) involves the 
procurement of proper independent legal counsel.287 In order for this section 
to function, there is the requirement for all four principles (they can be seen 
in the Business Judgment Rule diagram) to be present. Furthermore the 
drafting suggests that the onus of establishing the presence of those criteria 
is borne by the party who contends that section 180(2) applies (that is, the 
director or officer).288  
Within Australian law culpability of the director lies in whether any 
alleged damaging decision was made in an honest, informed and sensible 
way. If this is the case then the director should be held not liable for any 
losses sustained by the company. 289  Therefore under the Business 
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286 Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Rich [2009] ACSR 1, 75. See also 
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Judgment Rule, if all the factors in section 180(2) are fulfilled then the 
director is deemed to have acted with sufficient care and diligence.  
 Also, section 180(3) of the Australian Company Law defined a 
business judgment as any decision to ‘take or not take’ action regarding ‘a 
matter relevant to the business’ operations of the company.290  Thus, a 
business judgment may be a decision to act or not to act. In this section, the 
language is used ‘in respect of a matter relevant’, that is to say that when a 
matter presents itself it might require a director’s decision as opposed to 
simply a decision that the directors produced of their own accord. The 
language is however recognised as being broad and unspecific. 291  The 
courts have to give the definition of ‘business judgment’ a wide interpretation 
including, according to section 180(3). This provision states that  ‘business 
judgment’ means any decision to take or not take action in respect of a 
matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation.292  
Figure 9: Section 180(3) Australian Law, the Business Judgment Rule 
1. Decisions that are preparatory to the making of a business 
decision. 
2. Decisions relating to corporate personnel. 
3. Decisions relating to the termination of litigation. 
4. The setting of policy goals. 
																																																								
290Corporations Act 2001. Sections 180(3) (Canberra: Office of Parliamentary Counsel). See 
also Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] 75 ACSR, 608. 
291P. Redmond, Safe Harbours or Sleepy Hollows in Corporate Governance and the Duties 
of Company Directors (Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 1997), 195. 
292 AWA Ltd V Daniels (t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) [1992] 7 ACSR, 759. See also Re HIH 
Insurance Ltd [2010] 78 ACSR 405, 240. 
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5. The apportionment of responsibilities between the Board and 
senior management. 
6. Decisions about planning, budgeting and forecasting. 
2.7.2 United Kingdom 
There has been no attempt to introduce the Business Judgment Rule 
in the UK as it is currently deemed that there is no issue that exists that the 
rule would be required to solve. The rule is predominantly to protect directors 
from liability for decisions made with good intentions based on their 
professional knowledge. In the UK, case law provides a similar level of 
protection for directors as a Business Judgment Rule would. Directors can 
be granted full or partial relief for a director’s liability if it is satisfied that a 
director acted honestly and reasonably. 
With this case law in place, even if it is clear that a decision is not the 
best decision the director could have made, English courts have on the 
whole demonstrated a position of standing by the business judgment of the 
director. This position of the courts coupled with the case law has meant that 
the UK has not had any requirement to introduce the Business Judgment 
Rule.293  
2.7.3 Hong Kong 
The Business Judgment Rule is not in place in Hong Kong for the 
same reason as the UK. The courts do not assume to question the decision 
making of directors unless it is clear that decisions are not made in good 																																																								
293 Simmons & Simmons, Time for a Business Judgment defense for United Kingdom 
Directors, International Financial Law Review (2002). Available online:  
http://www.iflr.com/Article/2027080/Time-for-a-business-judgment-defence-for- United 
Kingdom -directors.html [Accessed 25/08/2016]. 
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faith. The case law from the UK also applies in Hong Kong, which means the 
position of Hong Kong regarding the Business Judgment Rule is no different 
to that of the UK.   
2.7.4 China 
At present China does not have the Business Judgment Rule and 
there are no signs of its intended adoption. That is not to stay however that 
legislation would not be improved through its adoption. At present when it 
comes to cases where damage has been caused to a company by directors’ 
decision making, the judges consider whether the decision making process 
was reasonable or not in the circumstance. Judges are not businessmen and 
this approach can be far too subjective. The Business Judgment Rule has 
standards of review and it is up to the director to demonstrate that their 
decision was made with good intentions based on the information they had 
available at the time. The judge is then not allowed to question the 
reasonableness of the decision, but only whether the decision-making 
process meets the requirements of the standard or review.294   
2.8 ENFORCEMENT OF BREACHES 
A significant process that is required for the successful application of 
directors’ duties is an effective enforcement of breaches. When a breach of 
duties has occurred, it first needs to be identified and secondly there needs 
to be a mechanism in place for an action to be brought. Enforcement of 
directors’ duties is carried out by one of two methods, private or public 
																																																								
294 Ch. Xiao & Ch. Weng, ‘Assessing the Applicability of the Business Judgment Rule and 
'Defensive' Business Judgment Rule in Chinese Judiciary: a Perspective on Takeover 
Dispute Adjudications’, Fordham International Law Journal, 34 (2010) 124.   
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enforcement. 295   Private enforcement involves actions brought by 
shareholders either on their own behalf or on behalf of the company against 
a director. 296   The most common form is derivative actions, which are 
actions brought by shareholders against directors on behalf of the 
company.297  Public enforcement in contrast is less common and is currently 
only used in certain countries.298  The identification of breaches and the 
process of commencing actions are both carried out by public authorities.299   
When breaches are enforced and the director is found liable of 
profiting from the breach, they will be obliged to pay the company any money 
that they have made as a result of the breach.  
2.8.1: United Kingdom  
In the UK it is the company that must bring an action against a director 
believed to have breached their duties.300  The company itself is empowered 
with the rights and ability to sue the director.301 Section 178 provides that the 
consequence of a breach of any of the duties is the same as would have 
been applied under common law rules or equitable principles.302 
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• Derivative Action  
Derivative action is an exclusive scheme, which has existed in common 
law since the nineteenth century.303 The actions permit an individual member 
of a company to bring an action that belongs to another. The courts, initially, 
and now the legislature, allow shareholders to bring a derivative action on 
behalf of the company in order to enforce the company’s rights against the 
allegedly miscreant directors.304  It is worth pointing out that the benefit from 
the action brought by the shareholder does not mean that that relief directly 
benefits the shareholder.305 
Where a director or third party has committed the wrong done to the 
company, the directors in the exercise of their duty and power will decide 
whether the company should sue.306 The directors should bring an action on 
behalf of the company, but they do not always do so for a variety of reasons. 
Then a shareholder may sue derivatively on behalf of the company to obtain 
a remedy for the company.307  
In 1843, Foss v Harbottle 308 provided the legal foundations of the 
derivative action. From this case, derivate action as we understand it today 
has progressed considerably. 309   Several jurisdictions around the world 
provide for derivative actions in statutes. In 1997 the Law Revision 
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Committee made a recommendation for a revision of direction by assigning 
the litigation decision to the court.310  
This recommendation was supported by the Company Law Review 
(CLR) and added to the Companies Act 2006 (UK), giving validity to the 
original reform recommendation by the Law Revision Commission.311 The 
derivative action can be taken under the statute, which removes the need to 
use an exception to Foss v Harbottle,312  save in limited circumstances, 
namely where there is a multiple derivative action sought.313 
Accordingly, from 1st October 2007, derivative action314 can be found 
in Chapter 1(11) of the Companies Act 2006 (UK). A shareholder must obtain 
the approval of the court for permission to bring the action.315 The statutory 
definition for derivative action in section 260(1) of the Companies Act 2006 
(UK) comprises three essentials. Initially, the action must be brought by a 
company member not by any other constituency.316 Secondly, the action is in 
respect of a cause of action vested in the company and thirdly, the action 
obtains relief on behalf of the company.317 Importantly, shareholders must 
first get approval of the claim before continuing a derivative action in court.318 
There are instances however where a director has breached their duty 
where minority shareholders are not able to sue derivatively on behalf of the 
company. Breaches of duty can be ratified by a resolution of the 																																																								
310 Office of the Lord Chancellor 1997, Shareholder Remedies, Law Commission, Cm. 3769. 
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shareholders.319  This is achieved by over 50 per cent of the members voting 
in favour of ratification and it effectively releases the director of their breach 
and following this there is no wrongdoing that the company can sue them for. 
Following ratification of a breach, the company, the minority shareholders 
and any liquidator that is responsible for winding the company up, will not be 
allowed to sue the director over this breach as they will have been absolved 
from liability due to the ratification. The exception to ratification freeing the 
director from their breach is in circumstances where the breach is fraudulent. 
Fraud on the minority is therefore a circumstance where derivative action 
would still be an available tool for minority shareholders to claim against the 
director.320 
2.8.2 Australia  
It is possible to state that the regulatory model for the enforcement of 
directors’ duties in Australia is distinctive from other nations. While private 
enforcement of duties plays a part in Australia, its regulatory model321 for 
enforcing breach of directors’ duties importantly includes a public 
enforcement model, reducing the regulatory burden on business and the 
community.322 In contrast, the USA and the UK have their primary means for 
enforcing breach of directors’ duties as private litigation. 323  Australian 
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Securities and Investments Commission act as the public enforcement tool 
and the process is supported by a civil penalty regime.   
There has been a demonstration of a shift in balance between 
standards of conduct and standards of review shown by multiple cases 
brought forward by Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
alleging breach of directors’ duties.324 
In a speech on 27th November 2002 at a Corporate Governance 
summit, Berna Collier, a former commissioner of Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and now a Federal Court judge, outlined the role of 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission in corporate 
governance.325  In a description of their role in corporate governance and 
what they do on a daily basis to improve corporate governance, she itemised 
three points, 
 
1. Monitoring, enforcing and administering 
compliance with the broad range of 
corporate governance provisions in the 
Corporations Act; 
2. Carrying out a public education or advocacy 
role; and  
3. Contributing to law reform in relation to 
corporate governance.326 
 
          It should be noted that Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s role is as a regulator also instituting action against directors 																																																								
324 The Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 11) [2009] 256 
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to enforce the duties they owe towards the company, is one of the most 
distinctive aspects of the Australian corporate law and corporate 
governance model. 327  In other jurisdictions the task of directors’ duties 
enforcement is left to the shareholders, and it has been shown in several 
jurisdictions that even with a statutory derivative action scheme available, 
legal actions against directors for the breach of their duties are few.328 This 
is not so in Australia because of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s active role enforcing these duties on behalf of companies.329 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act sets out 
all the powers and functions of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, which must be applied with independence and objectivity.330 
They must also have to be aware of the government’s policy framework as 
they address their role and responsibilities. 
2.8.3 China  
As already mentioned, public companies in China have a considerable 
state presence in the ownership structure and in terms of representative 
directors. 331  It is articulated in the Chinese Constitution that the government 
should be the principal shareholder in listed companies.332 The government’s 
shares in a public company are owned by the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission and the chairman of the board of directors is 																																																								
327Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 11) [2009] 256 ALR, 
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usually a representative of the management of the State Asset Supervision 
and Administration Commission. The mandate of this Commission is to ‘own’ 
these listed companies and direct them in the interests of the public. This 
structure delivers a strong monitoring function over managerial 
performance.333 
The official body of public enforcement is the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission.334  This organisation carries out the regulation of 
public companies holding companies subject to government auditing and 
having to adhere to governmental standards in order to be approved both for 
national and international trade.335  
In terms of private enforcement, the law does not stipulate exact 
specifications for penalties or mechanisms for enforcing directors’ duties.336 It 
is difficult for shareholders who are not the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission members to bring actions against a director, as 
often they will be minority shareholders and the government involvement will 
prevent a case from being accepted.  
2.8.4 Hong Kong  
Much like the UK, Hong Kong’s method for enforcing duties is private 
enforcement. Shareholders can bring derivative actions for any breach of 
duties committed by the director or any case of misconduct. Any shareholder 
can also equally apply to the court for an injunction against a director or 																																																								
333  Company Law of the People's Republic of China 2013. Articles 108-116 (Beijing: 
Standing Committee of the National Peoples’ Congress). 
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12. 
335  Company Law of the People's Republic of China 2013. Articles 108-116 (Beijing: 
Standing Committee of the National Peoples’ Congress). See also J. Saee, China and the 
Global Economy in the 21st Century (Oxford: Routledge, 2012), 12. 
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individual for breaching the Companies Ordinance, fiduciary duties or articles 
of association. 
2.9: CONCLUSION  
This chapter has investigated directors and their duties in various 
jurisdictions to consider whether there is legislation and practices that Iran 
can learn from and potentially transplant to its own situation. The most 
important relationship a director has, besides his or her fellow board 
members, is with their shareholders. Agency theory and stewardship theory 
are the two main theories that consider this relationship. The former 
suggests that the agent requires constant supervision as left to their own 
devices they will follow their own self-interest as opposed to the company’s 
best interest. Stewardship theory differs in that it presents the agents as 
trustworthy individuals who can be depended upon to lead a company 
honestly with some support and assistance where necessary. Duties are 
necessary for directors under both these theories because they help them 
know the scope of their role and how they should approach their decision-
making.  
Directors’ duties exist to ensure a company’s well being and without 
them a business could be taken advantage of by directors, as it is ultimately 
the director who is responsible for whether a business succeeds or fails. The 
duty of loyalty and duty of care are the two principal categories of directors’ 
duties. All four jurisdictions considered have developed law in relation to both 
of these duties and offered varying insights into the basis and application of 
the duties.   
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The fiduciary duties in the UK, which encompass loyalty, have been 
updated periodically to suit the country’s social and economic changes over 
time. For this reason they are specific in terms of their definitions of duties 
and they serve as a comprehensive guide for directors to adhere to. The duty 
of care in the UK has evolved in much the same way, having began with only 
a subjective standard of care to hold directors to, it now comprises of both a 
subjective and objective standard. The UK models for both these duties are 
useful to consider for any jurisdiction considering transplanting duties.  
Australia’s fiduciary duties and duty of care, being based on the UK 
model was not able to offer any unique contribution on these duties, save for 
consideration of the Business Judgment Rule. This rule emerged as result of 
the need to protect directors from being held liable for decisions that have 
had a detrimental impact on businesses but were made with good intentions. 
The rule is useful to consider for jurisdictions considering enhancing their 
duty of care.   
Much like Australia, Hong Kong’s duties are transplanted from UK law. 
The example of Hong Kong’s transplantation is relevant to a study of the 
efficacy of replicating one jurisdiction’s duties in another, particularly where 
the cultural and political situation is so different. The lack of awareness about 
fiduciary duties is a result of statutory duties being introduced in an 
environment that has no channel for directors to become aware of it. Any 
jurisdiction transplanting duties should take note of this example and 
consider possible solutions for avoiding such issues.  
China is not as advanced as the other three jurisdictions in its 
provision of fiduciary duties. The law is less specific and it has been left too 
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open to interpretation for judges. Its broad duties do not go far enough in 
defining the key duties and they may be too vague to be easily enforced. The 
duty of care is similar in that it is too broadly defined and it lacks a defined 
standard of care. The result is that it too is difficult to enforce it and attempts 
are being made to improve it.  
In terms of enforcement, Australia and the UK offered the most 
successful examples. The Australian model of public enforcement of 
breaches of duties consists of having an independent body that holds 
directors accountable. The UK is an example of the application of private 
enforcement whereby the responsibility is held by shareholders to claim 
against their directors. An element of the Chinese enforcement system that 
would be useful to examine further is the involvement of the state in 
regulating public companies.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN EXPLORATION OF DIRECTORS AND THEIR LEGAL DUTIES IN IRAN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided a consideration of the role of the 
director and the nature and purpose of directors’ duties. The analysis 
provided was required prior to discussing directors and their duties in Iran, 
which is the subject of this thesis, as it provides the necessary background 
and acts as a basis for the more specific study of Iranian law. This chapter 
will now address Iran and discuss the features identified in Chapter 2 in the 
context of Iranian law through the use of doctrinal research.   
As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis in Chapter 1, company 
law in Iran is unique in that there is no other law that resembles it. Since the 
1979 revolution, Iranian Company Law has not been updated and it has 
stood still during a period when the rest of the world went through 
globalisation. The company law that exists has been moulded together by 
borrowing laws from the French Civil Code and Islamic sources. This 
melange is far from perfect and in terms of directors’ duties there are gaping 
holes in the law that can be identified. By studying the law in Iran it will be 
possible to develop a picture of the weaknesses in directors’ duties and how 
they fit into the larger picture of Iranian Company Law.   
The chapter develops in the following way. After this introduction, the 
study will be divided into four main parts. Initially the chapter will provide an 
account of the various types of companies that exist in Iran and how they fit 
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into the economy. Following on from this there will be a focus on company 
law and an overview will be provided of the two pillars that hold it together: 
Napoleonic code and Islamic law. Once an understanding has been provided 
as to how company law functions under these two pillars an analysis will be 
provided of the process for legal reforms. The third part of the chapter will 
focus on directors’ duties in Iran with a consideration of the laws that exist 
and how the principal directors’ duties are provided for. Reference will be 
made to the provision for fiduciary duties, the duty of care, the use of the 
articles of association and the mechanisms of enforcement. The final part of 
the chapter will address the weaknesses of law that exist in relation to 
directors’ duties. The weaknesses are explained in terms of what duties are 
lacking in Iran and also what duties are omitted from Iranian Company Law. 
Following on from this study a conclusion will be developed that will draw 
together the principal lessons from the study covered in this chapter.   
3.2 COMPANIES  
In Iran there are various different structures of companies to choose 
from when it comes to registering a new business.337 There are several 
different types of business associations provided for under the Iranian 
Company Law, even if shares or stocks of the company belong to foreign 
natural or juridical persons.338 In other words, Iranian law and regulations339 
																																																								
337Iranian Company Law 1933. Article 20 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher).  
338Ibid. 
339 For instance, Iranian Company Law, Tax Code, Export and Import Regulations, Labor 
Law and Panel and Trade Mark Law for Registration of the Company.  
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generally control the legal relationship between company shareholders and 
directors.340 
The incorporation of companies involves a similar procedure to that 
found in most countries. The type of company must be added to the name of 
the company on all company documents, papers, publications and all other 
paper and electronic documents published by the company.341 Below is a 
chart detailing the various types of Iranian business vehicles that are 
available. These are very similar to those that are available in most 
jurisdictions, such as the UK.  
Figure 10: Iranian Business Vehicles according to The Iranian Company 
Law, article 20 of Iranian Company Law 1933. 
 
																																																								
340For instance, Iranian Company Law, Tax Code, Export and Import Regulations, Labor 
Law and Panel and Trade Mark Law for Registration of the Company. 
341Iranian Company Law 1933. Article 9 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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3.2.1 Limited Liability Company 
A limited liability company342 is defined in the Iranian Company Law 
as a private company formed by two or more people for trading purposes.343 
It does not prescribe a maximum number of shareholders but it does 
stipulate a minimum of two.344 ‘Liability’ is based on the direct contributions of 
the shareholders to the companies, meaning that liability is limited to the 
payment of what is owed for shares.345 One or more directors could manage 
the limited liability company, however, if there is more than one manager, 
one of them must be selected as the company chairman.346 
The formation of a limited liability company is deemed to have taken 
place when the capital in cash has been fully contributed and when non-cash 
contributions have been assessed and delivered to the company.347 There is 
also no legal limitation on the nationality of shareholders and directors who 
may form a limited liability company.348 
3.2.2 The Joint Stock Company 
The private joint stock company 349  and the public joint stock 
company350 are the most common forms of company in Iran possessing all of 
the fundamentals of modern, corporate business associations.351 The joint 
stock company is described in the Iranian Company Law as a company that 
is formed where its capital is divided into shares and the liability of whose 
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shareholders is limited to the par value of their shares.352 Also, the number of 
members of a joint stock company must not be less than three people.353  As 
is the case with limited liability companies, in joint stock companies there is 
also no legal limitation on the nationality of shareholders or directors.354  
The important distinction between a private and a public joint stock 
company is that the shares and debt securities in a public joint stock 
company could be offered to the public whereas in a private joint stock 
company they could not.355 In Iran, the private joint stock company is the 
more popular form of doing business and perhaps the most suitable as far as 
foreign investments are concerned.356 Private joint stock companies must be 
formed with a minimum of three shareholders and public joint stock 
companies must be formed with a minimum of five shareholders.357 
According to article 21 of the Iranian Company Law 1968, the liability 
of the shareholders is limited to the value or their shares358 and in the 
absence of fraud, there is no recourse to shareholders as far as the liability 
of the company is concerned once they have paid up what is owed on their 
shares.359 According to articles 583 and 588 of the Iranian Company Law 
1968, the joint stock companies also have a separate legal standing with 
most of the same rights and duties as a person and it may be inferred from 
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these articles that a joint stock company may legitimately engage in all of the 
activities permitted for a person. 360 
The minimum Iranian share capital at the time of formation is one 
million Rials361 for a private joint stock company and five million Rials for a 
public joint stock company.362  Payment can be made either in cash or in 
kind for a public joint stock company and a minimum of 20 per cent of the 
share capital should be made available to the general public.363 Management 
of a joint stock company is through a board of directors, who are elected by 
company shareholders. Should a board member reside abroad, delegation of 
power to resident board members is permitted, however the articles of 
association of the company must authorise such a delegation of power.364 
Shareholders possess the usual rights held by their counterparts in 
other countries such as the right to attend shareholder meetings, receive 
financial reports, elect or replace the board of directors and vote on major 
company decisions.365  
The joint stock company management is made the responsibility of 
directors who must be elected by the company shareholders at least once 
every two years.366 According to article 107 of the Iranian Company Law 
1968, a board of directors, appointed from among the shareholders, 
manages a joint stock company. In a public joint stock company there must 
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not be less than five directors.367 They are elected either at the statutory 
meeting at commencement or at the ordinary general meeting of 
shareholders.368 The board at the first meeting should elect a chairman and a 
vice-chairman (If the chairman cannot perform his or her job, the              
vice-chairman should do these duties), both of whom must be members of 
the board of the directors.369 Directors in public and governmental companies 
do not have to be a shareholder, while in private joint stock companies they 
must be. 370  In public and governmental companies the minister that 
represents the government’s share in the business appoints a director.371 A 
serving director of a governmental company whilst in their position cannot 
occupy any position or hold membership on the board of directors of any 
private company.  
The board must appoint a person as the managing director of the 
company and specify clearly the scope of his or her duties, term of office and 
his or her remuneration.372 The managing director cannot be the chairman in 
the same company unless three-quarters of shareholders confirm that.373 
The directors and the managing director of a company are responsible 
either individually or collectively for the company, in respect to any 
infringement of legal regulations or provisions stipulated in the articles of 
association or the minutes of general meeting.374 The court should determine 
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the scope of responsibility of each for indemnity purposes.375 They do not 
have any personal liability for the company’s wrongs.  
3.2.3 Differences Between The Joint Stock And The Limited Liability 
Companies 
There are some differences between the two types of companies and 
there are reasons why people would choose one over the other depending 
on what type of company they wish to operate and how they want it to be 
structured.  
The first difference is the limit on the amount of shareholders that are 
allowed to be in the business. Whilst neither type of business has any limit 
on how many shareholders, both have limits on how few are permitted. The 
private joint stock companies must have a minimum of three shareholders 
and public joint stock companies must have a minimum of five 
shareholders, 376  whereas the limited liability companies must have a 
minimum of two shareholders.377 
The second difference is the process involved in the registering of the 
company. For a joint stock company it is required to demonstrate that there 
is a minimum of five million Rials that will be invested in the company.378 This 
has to be demonstrated with evidence from the bank.379 However, in limited 
liability companies, whilst there exists the same financial requirement of five 
million Rials, it is possible to transfer an asset to the business that has the 
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value of the share that the shareholder will have.380 That is to say, if three 
shareholders wish to start a limited liability company, two agree to invest five 
millions Iranian Rials each and the other sells an asset worth five millions 
Iranian Rials to the company, they will all own an equal third of the business 
and their responsibility and liability will be proportional to this. 381  As 
mentioned, in the joint stock company the shareholders have to commit in 
cash to the total amount of investment they will invest in the company.382  
Finally once private and public joint stock companies are registered 
the shareholders should inform the public of the registration of the company 
by publishing a notice in a widely read local paper.383  This requirement is, 
however, not enforced. 
Retaining directorships again is an area where differences are 
apparent. An appointed director of a joint stock company can be assigned 
their role for a term of two years before the shareholders must decide 
whether to reappoint them or to make a change of director.384  In contrast in 
limited liability companies there is no limit to the duration of the term of the 
director.385 
Moreover, when a company decides to have a board of directors as 
opposed to just a single director, there are practical differences in managerial 
terms.386  In the limited liability company it is not necessary to have a 
shareholder on the board of directors and there is no requirement for the 
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chairman of the board to be a shareholder.387  In the joint stock companies, 
the board of directors should be comprised of company shareholders.388 
The final difference that exists is the selection of the auditor. Private 
and public joint stock companies should select auditors for the company, 
however auditors are not a fundamental requirement for limited liability 
companies.389 
3.2.4 State-owned Companies 
State-owned companies play an important role in Iran. The general 
assembly regulates the state owned company’s general policy framework, 
approves the annual cost, financial statements and balance sheets, and 
manages all functions.390 The general assembly is made up of the President 
(Rouhanni), Vice President, Director General of the Management and 
Planning Organisation, Ministers of Oil, Energy, Industries and Mines, 
Labour and Social Affairs, Economy and Finance.391 
The company’s board of directors approves the operational schemes 
within the framework ratified by the general assembly. It also approves 
transactions and contracts and prepares annual budgets, balance sheets 
and reports for presentation to the general assembly.392 The managing board 
oversees the operation of the general policy guidelines defined by the 
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general assembly, and pursues executive operations via the company’s 
managing director.393 
State involvement in business prior to the revolution of 1979 was 
minor as the private sector enjoyed great freedom.394  An amendment was 
made to company law in 1968, which opened the door to state involvement 
in companies. 395  It was not until 1979 that the Islamic government 
nationalised many major companies in Iran with the operational principles of 
Islamic economics. This meant taking ownership of over 80 per cent of the 
economy including banks, insurance companies, dams and irrigation works, 
large-scale manufacturers, radio and television stations, transport companies 
and several companies in other sectors.396  Also, the large part of economic 
and industrial capital stock was allotted to Bonyad. 397  This was a 
considerable reformation of the private sector converting an open market to a 
state controlled market.398 This policy derived from the combination of Middle 
Eastern socialist ideology coupled with a desire to retaliate against 
commercial supporters of the Shah who had been deposed.399 
In many instances the supreme leader Khamenei, the Army of 
Guardians and the government seized control of entire companies and in 																																																								
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certain industries there are no longer any completely private businesses 
without any state ownership.400 This seizure of Iranian business has provided 
the state with a major role in the national economy as owner and manager of 
a vast share of Iranian national companies.401 This transition despite being 
swift was entirely smooth and unproblematic.402 Since the revolution a lack of 
appropriate surveillance and monitoring systems allowed managers to abuse 
their power and steal from the businesses they ran.403  Common offenses 
have been pocketing salaries from non-existent employees, setting up 
fraudulent sales contracts and transferring funds to favoured individuals.404 
3.3 COMPANY LAW  
In the Iranian legal system today it is possible to see two pillars of law 
married together, namely the Napoleonic code and Islamic law. 405  The 
Napoleonic code can be classified as the principal source that the legal 
system has been built upon.406  Islamic law arrived later in Iran’s history, and 
is now completely engrained in the legal framework.407  Islamic law exists to 
ensure that the legal system reflects the religious principles of the Islamic 
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regime.408 The Napoleonic code and Islamic law, as they are applied in Iran, 
will now be discussed and analysed more extensively. 
3.3.1 The Napoleonic Code 
The Napoleonic code was introduced in Iran in 1927, during the reign 
of the monarch Reza Shah. At this point in Iran’s history, the country was 
modernising following the 1905 revolution and required a legal system that 
would be able to fulfil the needs of a growing economy and modernising 
society.409  The most sensible and achievable option for updating a legal 
system that would satisfy these requirements was to borrow frameworks 
already in existence in other parts of the world.410  The principal models that 
could have been considered adoptable for Iran were the Anglo-American 
model of common law or the continental European model of the Napoleonic 
code.411 
At that point in time, the Anglo-American model was not sufficiently 
popular around the world, or at least it was unfamiliar to the Iranian 
lawmakers and businessmen. Typically the nations that decided to pursue a 
common law system had some form of English influence or they had been 
British colonies. 412   Whilst the common law system includes statutes, 
historically it has granted the majority of power to judges as laws are 
provided for and applied most commonly as a result of judicial outcomes. 
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This type of system might be considered by some countries to be 
uncontrollable and their preference might be to ensure that law-making 
powers are only subject to government control.413  
The Napoleonic model can be considered as more manageable from 
a political perspective as it permits the government a level of involvement in 
the economy and greater control of the private sector. The French civil code 
system contained elements of the common Iranian ethos that there should 
be a strong relationship between the state and the private sector.414 The fact 
that the Napoleonic code preserved this relationship between private 
ownership and government control presented it as a less demanding 
alternative than a common law system.415 Iranian statesmen for different 
reasons have always wanted to have a weak and controlled private sector.416 
Iran was not the first nation in the region to start on this path, as the 
neighbouring Islamic nation of Turkey had already begun to adopt the 
Napoleonic code model.417  
The Napoleonic code, whilst being the principal code in Iran, always 
had to fit within the existing parameters of Islamic law of the Shia Jafari 
School. 418  In the years following the introduction of company law, law 
became increasingly secular and borrowed heavily from the French code of 
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laws. The Iranian Company Law brought in distinct legislation for companies 
in 1927 that allowed members of the general public to incorporate companies 
for the first time.419 Iran utilised the company laws of France and Belgium as 
models, whilst also ensuring that the Iranian Company Law remained 
consistent with Islamic principles. 420  The Iranian Company Law was 
subsequently reviewed and upgraded in 1932.421 This action was one of a 
number that was taken by Mohammad Reza Shah (the son of Reza Shah) to 
move Iran down the path towards westernisation.422 As part of this process, 
in 1969 the Iranian government proposed to Parliament a new collection of 
300 sections based on the Napoleonic code in order to address deficiencies 
of the Iranian Company Law in respect of the joint stock companies.423 The 
new collection was passed and remains at the moment the primary source of 
company law with the joint stock legislation in Iran.424  
Within Iranian Company Law, the latest version of the code exists in 
the joint stock company law 2009, sections 86, 87 and 88. This edition 
superseded the joint stock company law 1968 and is currently the active 
code on joint stock companies providing a true reflection of present Iranian 
law in this area.425 The code however does not apply to limited liability 
companies, which still follow section 94 to 115 of Iranian Company Law. 
These sections are still broadly translated sections from the original code 																																																								
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that was included in 1933. The Iranian Company Law is an example of a 
piece of the Napoleonic code that has periodically evolved throughout 
Iranian legal history. From the arrival of the Napoleonic code in Iran, the 
company law was one of the first pieces heavily influenced by the 
Napoleonic code.426  It was the first company law in Iranian legal history to 
introduce the concept of legal entity.427  Nowadays it can be regarded as a 
piece of company law that has evolved throughout the varying transitions 
Iran has gone through. Each time it is updated, most of the company law 
provisions (articles) stay the same and minor changes are made where 
necessary.428  In the late 1970s for example minor amendments were added 
to company law to bring it into line with the new Islamic values of the 
government.429   
The way that the Act operates is, to a large extent, to address 
shareholder and director conflict rather than the conflict that might exist 
between the majority and minority shareholders.430 It only confronts the issue 
of majority abuse of rights against minority shareholders in the circumstance 
of a wrongdoer director or shareholder wanting to vote in the general 
meeting to ratify their own misconduct.431 
The issue of justification for majority rule is relatively new in Iranian 
Company Law and has rarely been considered by company law scholars.432 																																																								
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The existing literature on company law often either neglects the issue, or 
tends to merely explain the law as it stands rather than to examine, analyse 
and clarify it. 
3.3.2 Islamic Law  
The second source of Iranian Company Law is Islamic433  law or 
Sharia law, as it is more commonly known. This law is based around original 
Islamic religious texts such as the Quran and Hadith.434 The principles that 
exist in the raw text of these publications are identified and converted into 
law. This practice is not a science, but rather it is a subjective task that is 
open to interpretation.435  Jurists with advanced linguistic competence carried 
out the task of interpreting the figurative lexicon and general language to 
enable there to be precise meanings in the texts.436  Many principles are not 
always directly transferable as a legal article, especially not when they are 
applied to modern society and the legal context.437  
According to Schacht J., a British-German professor of Arabic and 
Islam at Columbia University in New York, the origin of Sharia438 law (Islamic 
Jurisprudence) is the theory that emerged as a result of a complex historical 
process spanning a period of some three centuries.439 Nowadays, according 
to western scholars, a notable change can be seen in the commercial branch 
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of sharia law, as social, economical and political factors have forced change 
upon what is seen as traditionally out of date legal codes.440  
It must be understood however that the core component of its identity 
is that it is conscious about its character as a religious ideal.441 Mohammad’s 
aspiration as a prophet was not to make a new system of law; it was to teach 
his society how to act, what to do, and what to avoid in order to pass the 
reckoning on the day of judgment. 442  This leads to the result that 
consideration of good faith, equality, justice, truth and other moral rules play 
only a subordinate part in the system.443  
Within Islamic law there are differences in its application amongst 
countries that incorporate it in to their legal systems. Certain countries 
practising Islamic law are greatly exposed to western legal codes and 
practices.444  Turkey for instance, in an attempt to advance its integration into 
the European Union, has made efforts to westernise aspects of its legal 
system and steer it away from Islamic law. The European Union is Turkey’s 
principal trading partner, a relationship encouraged by a free trade 
agreement due to Turkey’s membership of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. 445  As Turkey currently seeks membership of the European 
Union it is in a position whereby reform of its legal code is necessary in order 
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to meet the European Union’s convergence criteria.446 The Iranian theocratic 
government in contrast, following the 1979 revolution introduced certain 
measures to gain more control of the private sector.447 Article 44 of the new 
Iranian constitution gave state protection to corporations on the condition that 
they contributed to the development of the Iranian economy. 448 In effect 
through this article it allocated a large portion of opportunity for economic 
activity to the government, even in areas that are, normally, by their legal 
definition regarded as private. As a result of this provision, the government 
controls business in many key sectors of the economy and can also involve 
itself in the private sector should it wish to do so.449 From a non-Islamic 
perspective, control of the government over companies could also address 
the factionalism concern of the Islamic jurists.450  Furthermore, article 22 
approved the Islamic government’s right to take constitutional measures to 
seize the assets and control of companies that fail to adhere to the objective 
of the public interest.451  
Moreover, the branch of Islam that a country follows, whether that be 
Shia or Sunni, determines the religious texts that are used as raw legal 
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sources.452  The division between the two religious sects of Islam is due to a 
disagreement over the rightful successor to Mohammad in 632 AD (anno 
Domini).453  
Both groups have an overall belief that adherence to Islamic law is a 
religious duty, and they believe that the totality of God’s commands must 
control life in all its features.454 There is the understanding in countries with 
sharia law that there is equality between worship, ritual and political and legal 
rules.455 
Sunnis and Shias disagree over the delegation of power and authority 
within the religion.456 The doctrine of the Imamat (Shia text) includes the idea 
that the successor of Mohammad is not merely a political leader but also 
must be a spiritual leader.457 In Iran this theory is accepted, and the Supreme 
Leader occupies this role as a descendent of Mohammad. The determining 
of legal rules vests in the Shi’ite Imam, who speaks with the supreme 
authority of the divine legislator himself, namely God.458  In Sunni countries 
there is not the same belief and whilst heads of states can have great power 
over law, there is not the same spiritual standing to their position.459    
																																																								
452B. Rubinpp,  The Middle East: A Guide to Politics, Economics, Society and Culture 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 325-327.  
453 B. Rubinpp,  The Middle East: A Guide to Politics, Economics, Society and Culture 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 327.  
454J. Kitagawa, The Religious Traditions of Asia: Religion, History, and Culture (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2013) , 157.  
455Ibid.  
456J. Hubbard-Brown, Shirin Ebadi  (New York: InfoBase Publishing, 2007), 46. 
457G. Curtis & E. Hooglund, Iran: A Country Study (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2008), 120. 
458L. Rosen, The Justice of Islam; Comparative Perspective on Islamic Law and Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 185-190. 
459L. Rosen, The Justice of Islam; Comparative Perspective on Islamic Law and Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 191-190. 
	115	
Behind many elements of the Shia faith is philosophical rationalism 
developed from Greek legal concepts.460 However, in some cases when 
philosophy and the Quran appeared to be in conflict, the Quran was 
interpreted ‘allegorically’461 by Shias to fit with the natural law theme of 
philosophy.462  
3.3.2.1 Sources Of Sharia 
In Accordance with the classical theory of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
Sharia law is made up of a range of primary and secondary sources. The 
leading primary sources, which are accepted universally by all Muslims 
around the world, are the Quran and the Sunnat (Hadith or Mohammad’s 
traditions). The leading secondary sources are Ijma (Consensus), Qiyas 
(Analogical Reasoning) and Ijtehad (the elaboration of new idea)463 as is 
displayed in the diagram below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
460O. Scharbrodt, Islam and the Baha’i Faith: A Comparative Study of Muhammad ‘Abduh 
and ‘Abdul-Baha ‘Abbas (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), 7-11. 
461 Allegories are used as literary devices that convey hidden meanings through symbolic 
figures, actions, imagery which together make the spiritual or political meaning the creator 
wishes to transfer. 
462N. Keddie  & Y. Richard, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 17-18. 
463 W. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 
20090, 21. 
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Figure 11: Sources Of Islamic Law 
 
A. Primary Sources 
A primary source is one that is accepted by all the Islamic schools. 
There are two sources that are considered to be primary, the Quran and the 
Sunnat (Hadith).464 
I. Quran 
The etymology of the word of Quran originates from the Arabic word 
‘Qurra’ which is best defined as ‘the reading’ or ‘that which ought to be 
read’.465  Devout Muslims believe that the Quran is the word of God.466  
																																																								
464 W. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 
20090, 21. 
465 W. Graham, Islamic and Comparative Religious Studies: Selected Writings (Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010), 130-132. 
466Ibid. 
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The Quran contains a substantial amount of material that lends itself 
to the application of legal problems.467 According to modern scholars and 
Muslim Jurists, there are approximately 500 verses with legal content.468 Of 
these verses approximately 140 relate to moral obligations for Muslims 
concerning faith, prayer, charity, etc.469 A further 70 verses are dedicated to 
marriage, divorce and family issues.470 Around 140 verses refer to laws 
concerning commercial and economic transactions.471 A further 30 verses 
relate to crime and punishment and the remainder treat issues about justice, 
fairness and responsibilities.472 
Islamic law cannot be considered without studying the Quran since it 
is the primary source of law in more than 55 Muslim countries.473 Iranian 
readers often find the Quran a difficult text to navigate, since the expression 
and rhythm of the Arabic words do not translate well to Farsi or other 
languages.474  
II. The Sunnat (Hadith) 
The Sunnat is regarded as an important text within Islamic law. It 
contains the spoken words and actions of Mohammad, the twelve Imams 
and Fatemeh, Mohammad’s daughter.475  The diverse range of issues, which 
Mohammad preached about are contained in the Hadith and are included in 																																																								
467N. Adam & A. Thomas, Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring and Investing in 
Sukuk (London: Euromoney Books, 2004), 25-26.   
468S. Goitein, ‘The Birth-Hour of Muslim Law’, In The Muslim World, 50.1 (1960) 23-29. 
469Ibid. 
470 S.C. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Nature And Source of The Sharia, in The Law in The Middle East 
(Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1955), 87. 
471 Ibid. 
472Ibid. 
473 The Quran includes 114 chapters, 6,666 verses and 86,430 words. 
474 Ch. Knight et al, ‘The Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge’, Harvard Collage Library, 3.1 (1834) 435-442. 
475H. Ramadan, Understanding Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary (Lanham 
(MD): Altamira, 2006),  12-14.  
	118	
Islamic law.476  In Iranian law, the Jurist must resort to the Sunnat only when 
he or she cannot find any applicable law in the Quran.477 The primacy of the 
Quran over the Sunnat is partially a result of the fact that the validity of the 
Quran is not open to doubt.478  
When the Quran and Sunnat are silent on the legal issue, the judge 
should refer to secondary Islamic sources,479 as shown below. 
B. Secondary Islamic Sources 
Should the primary sources fail to cover the context of a particular 
legal dispute, then it is possible to refer to a range of secondary sources 
such as the Ijma, Qiyas and the Ijtihad. These sources are not universally 
accepted, with certain Islamic schools disregarding their legitimacy.480 The 
schools that do accept them consider that their interpretations are in line with 
the primary sources.481 These subordinate sources will follow in subsequent 
subsections. 
I. Ijma (Consensus) 
Ijma constitutes a secondary source of Islamic international law. It 
provides the Islamic community with essential tools to reach agreement,482 
as Mohammad said, 
																																																								
476 A. Affi & H. Aff, Contemporary Interpretation of Islamic Law (Leicester:Troubador 
Publishing Ltd, 2014), 8-10. 
477 W. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-fiqh 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 89, 160. 
478Ibid. 
479M. Mattar et al, Mixed Legal Systems, East and West (Oxford: Routledge  , 2015), 208 to 
210. 
480L. Zakariyah, Legal Maxims in Islamic Criminal Law: Theory and Applications ( London: 
Brill Publication, 2015 ), 10-14. 
481 Ibid. 
482J. Burns, Introduction to Islamic Law:  Principles of Civil, Criminal, and International Law 
Under The Shari’a (New York: TellerBooks, 2014), 28-29. 
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“My followers will never agree upon an error 
or what is wrong… God’s hand is with the 
entire community.”483 
 
It is an important source that has been instrumental in the 
interpretation of the Quran and Sunnat.484  Ijma literally means consensus, 
however it is interpreted differently by different Iranian Jurists.485 As the 
interpretations of the source vary, there is still a serious question of whether 
consensus means a majority of opinion or common agreement.486  In Iran, it 
is applicable if the majority of opinion is not against the principle of Quran 
and Sunnat (Hadith).487  
II. Qiyas (Analogical Reasoning) 
Qiyas is the second important subordinate source, or the fourth ‘root’ 
of Islamic law.488 The idea is that, if a ruling is required on a situation not 
covered in the primary sources the Quran and the Sunnat, a comparison can 
be made with situations, which the Quran and the Sunnat did not provide 
for.489 If, take for instance, the Quran forbids the use of wine, the use of other 
liquids, with similar influence, can be illegal as well.490 However, Shiites do 
																																																								
483J. Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism: A 
Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilisations' in the New World Order (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005),13. 
484U. Khaliq et al, ‘Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism: 
A Critique of the Clash of Civilisations’, New World Order, 33.2 (2006) 324–330. 
485J. Burns, Introduction to Islamic Law:  Principles of Civil, Criminal, and International Law 
Under The Shari’a (New York: TellerBooks, 2014), 28-29. 
486J. Burns, Introduction to Islamic Law:  Principles of Civil, Criminal, and International Law 
Under The Shari’a (New York: TellerBooks, 2014), 29. 
487  N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 2: 137 and 4:115. 
488J. Burns, Introduction to Islamic Law:  Principles of Civil, Criminal, and International Law 
Under The Shari’a (New York: TellerBooks, 2014), 29-34. 
489Ibid. 
490 H. Visser, Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice ( Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013) ,10-15. 
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not accept analogical reasoning, but replace it with Human Reason (In Farsi 
called Aql).491 
III. Ijtihad (The Elaboration of New Idea) 
This source is considered as a supplementary source of Islamic 
law.492 Ijtehad came from ‘Jahad’ meaning to try one’s utmost.493 In other 
words, it means the use of human reason in the explanation of Islamic law.494 
It covers a variety of rational processes, ranging from the interpretation of 
texts of the Quran and the evaluation of the validity of the Sunnat (Hadith).495 
Ijtehad, therefore, it is an exercise of one’s reasoning to arrive at a logical 
conclusion on a legal issue undertaken by the Jurists, and to deduce a 
conclusion as to the effectiveness of a legal precept in Islam.496 
Shia jurists maintain that if a solution to a problem cannot be found 
from the primary sources, then Aql or Ijtehad can be used to deduce a proper 
response from the primary sources.497 
3.3.3 Legislation Reform 
Iranian Company Law has undergone very few updates since its 
inception. Since the 1979 revolution, there has been a new body in charge of 
regulating legislation reform. The Islamic Consultative Assembly receives 
legislation updates from legislators and determines whether or not they are 																																																								
491J. Burns, Introduction to Islamic Law:  Principles of Civil, Criminal, and International Law 
Under The Shari’a (New York: TellerBooks, 2014), 31-32. 
492Ijtihad, which is six hundreds verses and two thousand Hadiths. J. Burns, Introduction to 
Islamic Law:  Principles of Civil, Criminal, and International Law Under The Shari’a (New 
York: TellerBooks, 2014), 31-35. 
493 H. Visser, Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice (Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar 
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200. 
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497Ibid. 
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beneficial and in line with the Islamic principles of the state.498  With the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly in this role legislators have had very little 
success in gaining approval for legislation updates.499   
Since the revolution, apart from installing Islamic law, no sections 
relating to directors’ duties in company law have been updated. In 2002 a 
company law legislation update was submitted which included directors’ 
duties, however it was refused on the grounds that it was deemed to not be 
sufficiently in line with the Islamic principles. There was no attempt to 
suggest amendments that would allow for a revision to be submitted that 
would be accepted.  
Moreover, in 2011, a revision was made to the legislation that relates 
to corporate governance.500 The reform began a test period that was meant 
to run for five years beginning in 2012. It was active for a period of two years 
before the Islamic Consultative Assembly removed it following a review.501 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly rejected the reform due to section 241502, 
28503, 12 and section 43(2)504 of Iranian Company Law and principle (article) 
																																																								
498Iranian Constitution Law 1980, Article 4 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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85 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.505  Essentially the 
reasoning provided is that the reform put forward is not in keeping with the 
religious principles of the regime.   
3.4 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES  
Having now considered the Iranian legal system and the rules on 
company law, it is necessary to progress to the primary objective of the 
research, which is the duties of directors in Iranian Company Law’. This 
section is divided into general laws on directors, fiduciary duties, the duty of 
care, the articles of association and the law on enforcement. For both 
fiduciary duties and the duty of care, reference will be paid to both statutory 
law and Islamic law.   
3.4.1 General Law on Directors  
The principal source of law for directors’ duties is the Iranian 
Company Law.506  The Act was introduced in 1932 and the code on directors 
was included in this edition. Later in 1968 the act was amended and articles 
21 to 93 were deleted to make way for the introduction of 300 new articles. 
Within this update, there were no changes to any articles (sections) relating 
to directors’ duties. Still today Iranian Company Law is the source of law 
where the majority of rules relating to directors’ duties can be found. The 
																																																								
505Iranian Constitution Law 1979 (Amendment), Article 85 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher): 
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general rules on directors are located from article 107 to article 143. They 
dictate the appointment of directors, their terms and requirements. 
Article 107 specifies that directors must be from shareholders and in 
public companies there must be no less than five directors.507  Article 108 
dictates that directors must be appointed at general meetings and article 109 
states that length of directorship must be determined in the articles of 
association.508 Articles 110, 111, 112 and 113 specify who can and cannot 
be a director and the process for replacing directors.509  Article 114 dictates 
that directors must have an appropriate amount of shares to allow them 
voting rights in the meetings. It also mentions that the shares act as security 
in instances where the shareholders need to claim against directors for 
breaching duties. Article 115 sets out that a director must obtain the required 
amount of shares to be able to act as the director. Article 116 concerns the 
return of the shares of the director following their exit from the role of 
director. Provided that the shareholders approve the profit and loss accounts, 
then their shares are released. The role of the auditor is mentioned in article 
117 stating that they must note any actions that deviate from the restrictions 
of the articles of association. Article 119 to 123 details items of the board of 
directors. Firstly the board must elect a chairman and vice chairman, who 
cannot be the managing director unless three-quarters of the shareholders’ 
vote confirms the appointment. 510  The elected chairman must call the 
general meetings and the majority of the board must sign the minutes of the 
meetings. Moreover, the resolutions of the board are decided by majority 																																																								
507 Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 107 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
508 Ibid. 
509 Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 124 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
510Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 124 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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votes. Articles 124 to 128 refers more to the role of the managing director 
detailing that they must be a natural person and a representative of the 
company with the ability to sign on behalf of the company. They are not 
allowed to be the managing director of more than one company at a time. 
When a managing director is appointed, a statement must be submitted to 
the registrar of companies that details the scope of their authority and 
responsibility. 
Article 134 refers to the directors’ remuneration stating that it should 
be detailed in the articles of association. Article 135 dictates that once a 
director is appointed and is making decisions, these decisions cannot be 
voided by the suggestion that formalities were overlooked at their 
appointment. Article 136 refers to the expiry of the director’s term of office 
being located in the articles of association. Article 137 dictates that the 
directors are to prepare a report for the auditor every six months. Articles 138 
and 139 state that the directors have to call an annual meeting to gain 
approval from the shareholders for the finances for the previous year. 15 
days before the general meeting shareholders can get a copy of the profit 
and loss accounts and a report of operations of directors and auditors. Article 
140 sets out that a company has to have a legal reserve fund of 5 per cent of 
the net profit for the company. In cases of liquidation, article 141 states that 
any interested parties can call the general meeting to begin the process of 
liquidating the company.   
In terms of directors’ duties, article 142 stipulates that directors are 
bound to abide by the restrictions set out in the articles of association. The 
article provides that all directors are individually or jointly responsible for any 
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infringement of legal regulations or the provisions stipulated in the articles of 
association or in the minutes of general meetings.511 
Article 143 explains directors’ liability for breaches of their obligations. 
It is stated that should the company go into liquidation and there are not 
sufficient securities in the business to satisfy all the debts, then the director 
may be liable for debts if the reason for the damage to the company is 
caused by their violations of the legal regulations or the provisions stipulated 
in the articles of association or in the minutes of general meetings. This 
article demonstrates that statutory law does not cover duties. Should there 
be no provisions in the articles then directors have no liability at all. If duties 
are included in the articles with the exception of a duty to act in good faith 
then this will place the director in a position of liability for any damage 
regardless of any cause of the damage being made in good faith.   
In addition to statutory law, Islamic law includes certain principles that 
relate, albeit very indirectly, to directors’ duties. Specifically in the Fighh, it is 
achievable to examine the different roles of a director depending on different 
circumstances.512  A director could be viewed as an agent ‘Vakil’ of the 
shareholders and trustee ‘Amin’ and manager ‘Mudarib’ of the shareholders' 
assets.513 According to these three descriptions of the director’s role, they 
will have to fulfil their role as a manager, safeguard the shareholder’s assets 
and act as agent of the shareholders.514 
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512 T. Harrison & E. Ibrahim, Islamic Finance: Principles, Performance and Prospects  (Bern: 
Springer, 2016 ), 21-27. 
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3.4.2 Duties of Loyalty  
Article 118 sets out the duty to act within powers. The limitations to 
the power of the director are set out in the articles of association and by way 
of resolutions at general meetings. The director will be liable if they act 
outside of this power remit.   
Article 129 is the first article that is based around conflicts of interest. 
It states that any transaction of the company cannot be entered into with a 
party that the director is involved with directly or indirectly. 515 If the board 
permits such a transaction, then a report must be prepared for and delivered 
to the general meeting and the auditor must scrutinise the details of the 
transaction.516 After receiving a report from the auditor they can vote in a 
general meeting in which the director in question will forfeit their vote. Should 
the board vote against allowing the director’s involvement in the transaction, 
then a solution will be arrived at that prevents the director’s involvement 
being allowed to occur. The solution might be to not proceed with the 
transaction, or find an alternative third party to complete a similar transaction 
with.   
In article 130, it sets out that should the managing director approach 
the board of directors about a transaction in which they have a conflict of 
interest and the board of directors allow the director to proceed with it, then 
the liability for any loss to the company that results from the transaction will 
be attributable to the board members that approved the transaction as well 
as the managing director. 517  
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Article 131 continues on the subject of the transaction stating that if 
the board are not made aware of the conflict of interest and the director 
proceeds with the transaction then the board has up to three years to rescind 
the transaction.     
Article 132 sets out that directors will not be able to obtain any 
personal loans from the company nor will they be able to use security of the 
business to gain a personal loan. One scholar mentioned that in the banks, 
directors should follow that the director of any company is forbidden to do 
any deal for their personal interest. Before any agreement with their 
company the permission of the board of directors needs to be granted and it 
should be proven that the decision was in the interest of the company not in 
the personal interest of the director. Finally the decision needs to be revealed 
in the company’s general meeting. 
Article 133 relates to corporate opportunities stating that directors are 
not to be involved in transactions that compete with the transactions of the 
company. 518  Any transaction that is deemed to be in competition with the 
company that causes the company a loss, will result in the director having to 
indemnify the company for such losses.519  
Directors’ fiduciary duties and other duties can be derived from a 
general rule of agency under the Fighh. In particular the agent must act 
within the scope of his or her authority as an agent and in the best interest of 
his or her principal. An Iranian judge would decide agency related issues on 
a case-by-case basis relying on the general Fighh agency rule. This system 
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however opens itself up to inconsistent judgments as similar cases may 
result in different decisions. 
This is covered under principles of Sharia; take for instance, the 
following from the Quran, 
 
“-Do not take one another's property 
irrationally, nor bribe the judges, in order to 
misappropriate a part of other people's 
property, sinfully and knowingly.520 
-O you who believe! Betray not God and his 
Messenger nor betray knowingly your (trust 
you entrusted to).521  
…And if one of you deposits a thing on trust 
with another, let the trustee discharge his trust 
and let him fear God. Conceal not evidence: 
for whatever conceals it, his heart is tainted 
with sin and God knows all that you do.522” 
 
 The concept of trust is used in these principles and they can be 
applied in relation to the duty of loyalty. Also further Sharia principles are 
applied for setting out that a duty of loyalty involves considering all 
shareholders equally.523 The Quran includes,  
 
“-Give back the trusts to their legal owners, 
and when you judge between people, judge 
with justice.524  
-Of those we created are people who guide 
by the truth, and by it act with justice.525 																																																								
520  N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 2.188.   
521 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 8.27.  
522 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 2.283 & 9.4. 
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524 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 4.28. 
525 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
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-God commands justice and good-doing…. 
And he forbids indecency, dishonesty and 
insolence.526 
-Give just measure and weight, and do not 
withhold from the people the things that are 
their due.527 
…God does not love anyone who betrays his 
trust and its bereft of gratitude…528” 
 
 These latter principles are addressing honesty in general terms, 
which is linked to acting in a trustworthy manner with honesty. They take into 
account the Fighh principle that prohibits self-dealing by agents or 
employees (a director is under a duty not to benefit from a conflict of 
interest). The Fighh principle includes, 
 
“Honest businessmen will be raised on the 
Day of Judgment (According to Hadith from 
Mohammad). Truthful businessmen will be 
raised on the Day of Judgment together with 
the truthful and the martyrs (According to 
Hadith from Mohammad). 
When you deal with each other in lending for a 
set period of time, put it in writing. Let a scribe 
write it down with justice between the 
parties.529 
A director authorised to buy or sell an item is 
not permitted to buy or sell to/from himself or 
herself.530” 
 
The statutory code and the Islamic law exists side by side, however 
there is an unwritten rule that the Islamic law takes precedence over the 																																																								
526 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
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statutory code in instances where there is law from both sources that relates 
to a circumstance. 
3.4.3 Duty of Care  
The only articles in the code that are relevant are articles 141 and 
114. Article 141 provides that the directors can be held to be negligent for 
failure to alert shareholders when a threat to the value of the company’s 
shares arises. If the director is aware of the threat and fails to inform the 
shareholders, then they are considered negligent if the problem results in 
harm to the company’s investment.531   
Article 114 is particularly applicable in instances of breaches of the 
duty of care. The shares of the director (and it will be recalled that directors 
must hold shares in the company) act as a security against a director 
negligently damaging the company through making poor decisions on behalf 
of the company. If it is proven that a director has acted wrongly, then these 
shares could be seized by the court and returned to the shareholders as 
compensation for damage caused by the directors.532  
A duty of care is imposed by the Fighh on people in the positions of 
liability or authority. In this case, it is likely that the Fighh would require a 
director to act within the scope of the powers vested in them (and not abuse 
those powers), and fulfil their duties. The principles of the Fighh provide 
effectively that directors are to act to the best of their ability in the best 
interests of the company and in a rational manner as responsible directors 
would act.  
 The writer in the interpretation of the Quran said: an agent allowed 																																																								
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to trade an item, must do so at the reasonable market price, if there is no 
price specified by the owner.533  
  Responsibility of the director is covered under principles of the Fighh. 
These responsibilities include improving one’s own leadership qualities, 
taking responsibility for one’s area of business, strengthening the finance of 
the organisation (Bait-Ul-Maal), helping the local community in the 
organisation’s locality and having a good relationship with all Islamic 
personalities of the organisation’s locality.534 
  A director ratified to buy or sell an item at a specific price is 
responsible to the shareholders for covering the discrepancy between the 
actual price at which he or she buys or sells and the price originally stated by 
the shareholders,535  
 
“Each one of you is a guardian, and each 
guardian is responsible for everything under 
his care.” 536 
 
 As Mohammad said above we can now say clearly there is a type 
of guardian role for directors because he or she has to take care of assets 
for others. It is also stated in the Quran that Muslims should not disregard 
their responsibilities and accountability and they can face punishment in this 
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world or in the hereafter (life after death).537 
3.4.4 Articles of Association 
The articles must contain the key attributes of the company such as 
the name, the subject, the location, the amount of investment, the price of 
shares, type of company, the names of the board of directors and the voting 
system.538  Within the general rules from articles 107  - 143 there are several 
rules that refer to the articles of association. Article 109 stipulates that the 
length of directorship should be determined in the articles of association. 
Also, article 134 dictates that directors’ remuneration should be detailed in 
the articles of association. Importantly article 118 dictates that limitations to 
directors’ powers are set out in the articles and article 142 importantly notes 
that directors are bound by the provisions contained in the articles.539 
This last article is especially critical as essentially it provides that 
directors’ duties should be included in the articles of association.540 This is a 
key rule as it relinquishes the responsibility from statutory law to provide a 
comprehensive set of directors’ duties and instead defers that responsibility 
to the articles of association. Lawyers who seek to make up for this 
shortcoming will include duties in the articles and any shareholder aware of 
the lack of duties in statutory law will also endeavour to put duties in place.541  
Either the shareholders or a solicitor carries out the task of producing 
the articles.542 When it is the shareholders producing the articles, there is the 
risk that they will fail to include all the relevant and fundamental duties that 																																																								
537  H. Elasrag, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Islamic Perspective (Munich: 
Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015) ,  10-20, 17-18. 
538Iranian Company Law 1933. Article 37 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
539Iranian Company Law 1968. Articles 107-143 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
540Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 124 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
541 Ibid. 
542Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 124 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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are needed to protect them. Even with the assistance of a solicitor, articles of 
association can be brief and fail to cover all the duties in sufficient detail.543   
Some companies that seek an extra level of security will include the 
Sherkat Nameh (company letter or document) in their articles. This is a 
document provided by the Judiciary which companies can include in their 
articles to give them an extra level of authority. The document contains a 
series of rules and regulations that companies can agree to or not agree to. 
The rules they agree to will exist as other provisions of their articles. 
Following the inclusion of the Sherkat Nameh, the articles are signed by the 
shareholders and sent to the office of the Ministry of Justice for their stamp of 
approval.544 The purpose of this is to make clear the mutual agreement with 
the articles of all the shareholders.545  
In cases where the duties set out in the articles are breached, the 
directors and the managing director of a company are liable either 
individually or collectively for breaking company rules.546  Apart from duties 
on directors, there will be a host of other rules in the articles that apply to 
directors, shareholders, dealings with third parties and company protocol.547 
The court determines the scope of responsibility of each director for 
indemnity purposes.548  
																																																								
543Iranian Company Law 1968 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). See also Iranian Company 
Law 1933. Article 36 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
544Iranian Company Law 1933. Article 36 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
545Iranian Company Law 1933. Articles 36-38 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). Iranian 
Company Law 1968. Articles 197. 
546 Iranian Company Law 1968. Articles 142 & 61 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
547 Ibid. 
548 Ibid. 
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3.4.5 Good Faith 
Islamic law imposes a general duty to act in good faith in all 
transactions. It requires parties to act in good faith during negotiations, 
contract formation and performance. Ghaedeye Ehsan is an Islamic principle 
of fairness found in the Haddith. It is not solely assigned to company law and 
there are instances where it is applied in civil cases. It is in effect a 
requirement to act reasonably and moderately and to not use the terms of a 
contract to abuse the rights of the other contracting party. It is a requirement 
to not cause unjustified damage to the other party. 
 
“a contract must be performed in 
accordance with its contents, and in a 
manner consistent with the requirements of 
good faith”.549 
 
Good faith is also applied in Al’Amalo bel Niat, which is essentially a 
duty to act altruistically. This in effect is a requirement not to use the terms of 
a contract to abuse the rights of the other contracting party, not to cause 
unjustified damage to the other party and to act reasonably and moderately. 
For instance, a party that enters into contract negotiation in order to gain 
access to another’s’ confidential information violates the Islamic law duty to 
act in good faith. In addition, a creditor bears a duty to give his or her debtor 
a grace period if he or she is unable to pay the debt.550   
																																																								
549 Interpretation of Hadith (sentence) from Mohammad, 630 CE (Common Era). 
550  F. Akaddaf, ‘Application of The United Nation Convention on Contract for the 
International Sale of Good (CISG) to Arab Islamic countries: is the CISG compatible with 
Islamic Law Principles?’, Pace International Law Review, 13 n1 (2001) 1-58. 
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3.4.6 Enforcement  
Iranian Company Law contains law on enforcement in the form of 
articles 276 and 277. These are the only two articles that deal with 
enforcement. The former states that only shareholders with shares that 
exceed 20 per cent of the share capital of the company can bring an action 
against the director and also that the shareholder must fund this action 
personally. Article 277 supports article 276 by stating that no provision can 
be added to the articles of association that conflict with article 276. For 
instance no rule could be added to the articles allowing any shareholder to 
bring an action regardless of their portion of share capital.    
3.5 WEAKNESSES OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES  
3.5.1 Sources of Law on Duties 
The first weakness of the law on duties is that it is not straightforward 
enough due to there being too many sources and also due to the actual laws 
being ambiguous. Having duties spread between the articles of association, 
the Fighh and Iranian Company Law results in an unclear presentation of the 
duties that directors are bound by and a significant degree of uncertainty for 
all parties. Ideally there would be only one source of law that details duties. 
In terms of the duties being too ambiguous, statutory law has several duties 
that are vague and not clearly defined. The same is true of the duties in the 
Fighh. The articles of association of some companies are likely to be the 
source with a more precise series of duties, but these will be unique to 
individual companies and not employed across Iran in a consistent way.   
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For directors and shareholders there will be confusion and uncertainty 
over what duties directors are bound by. More importantly for judges the law 
on duties is spread across the articles of association, scattered articles in 
statutory law and scattered principles in Islamic law. As a result, judges have 
various sources to look through to find a relevant rule to determine a case, 
which instils uncertainty in them as well. As some of the laws are so dated 
judges are even harder pressed to interpret the law as they are referring to 
laws created 80 years ago, which might be completely irrelevant to today’s 
modern business context. Islamic sources as well date back to the origin of 
the Quran in 1382. 
 If company law were continuously updated taking into account new 
cases that appear in Iran, then it would start to become more precise and 
relevant and easier for judges to make accurate decisions. Added to this is 
the fact that Islamic law is particularly difficult to interpret, as it is not 
designed for resolution of company law disputes and problems. 
3.5.2 Duties in the Articles 
Moreover, as already mentioned article 142 states that directors are 
responsible for any regulations that are prescribed in the articles of 
association. 
 
 “The directors and the managing director of 
a company are responsible either 
individually or jointly, as the case may be, 
vis-a-vis the company and third parties in 
respect of any infringement of legal 
regulations or the provisions stipulated in 
the articles of association or the minutes of 
general meetings.551” 																																																								
551 Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 142. (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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This deference of duties and regulations to the articles results in each 
company having its own unique set of duties in place as opposed to the 
jurisdiction having a universal set of duties. This is a considerable weakness 
to the law as it results in directors around the country being bound by varying 
levels of liability. Where a director might have liability for a decision in one 
company they might not in another. This variation in liability leads to many 
issues for shareholders and directors. Universal levels of liability are needed 
for companies having protection from directors and for judges to make 
consistent decisions.    
3.5.3 Duties of Loyalty 
The fiduciary duties are not adequately comprehensive in Iran and 
many key aspects to fiduciary duties are not included. Whilst there is a duty 
to act within powers it is not specific enough as it states that the scope of the 
power must be defined in the articles. By adding the dimension that the onus 
is on shareholders to specify the scope of the director’s power will result in 
many cases of nothing being specified. The alternative would have been to 
specify in the law what the scope of the power would be.     
Articles 129 to 133 relate to conflicts of interest however they are too 
specific on the scope of the duty. Instead of having a ‘duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest’ the duty is made up of descriptions of scenarios in which director 
would be liable. For instance in article 29 directors cannot, 
 
 “Without the permission of the board of 
directors, be a party whether directly or 
indirectly, to a transaction consummated 
with or on account of the company, or share 
in the said transaction. Even if allowed, the 
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board of directors shall be bound to inform 
the inspector(s) immediately of the 
transactions allowed by them and, 
simultaneously, submit a report to the next 
ordinary general meeting. A board member 
or managing director who has an interest in 
such transactions, shall not be allowed to 
vote at meeting of the board of directors 
and general meetings when such 
transactions are put to motion.”  
 
Equally article 130 refers to article 129 clarifying that, 
 
“If, as result of such transactions, losses are 
inflicted on the company, then the board of 
directors and the managing director or the 
director or directors having an interest who 
sanctioned such transactions shall be jointly 
responsible to indemnify the company.” 
 
Article 131 also refers to article 129 stating, 
 
“If transactions are performed in the 
absence of approval of the board of 
directors and the ordinary general meeting 
does not confirm such transactions, then 
they will be rescindable. The company shall 
be entitled to apply to the court and obtain 
an injunction of recision of such 
transactions within three years from the 
date of their conclusion and if concluded 
secretly, within three years from the date 
they were discovered. In any case, the 
responsibilities of the interested director or 
directors or managing director vis-a-vis the 
company remain intact.” 
 
Moreover, article 132 considers a different scenario of liability where, 
 
“The managing director and the directors-
with the exception of legal entities-will not 
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be allowed to obtain any loan credit facilities 
from the company; the company will not be 
allowed to guarantee or assume the 
obligation of payment of their debts.” 
 
A different scenario of liability is considered in article 133 where, 
 
“The directors and the managing director 
shall not be allowed to conclude 
transactions identical to the transactions of 
the company which are considered to 
compete with the company. If any director, 
acting in contradiction of the purport of this 
article, inflicts a loss to the company by his 
violation, he shall be held responsible to 
indemnify the company's losses. The losses 
mentioned in this article purport actual 
losses incurred or reductions in profit.” 
 
There is a lack of broadness to these articles and many conflicts of 
interest do not fall within these parameters. For instance, there is no 
provision to prevent third parties from influencing the decision making of the 
director. In a country where both family companies and public companies 
make up such a high proportion of the company stock, there is a need for a 
law that makes directors liable for allowing their decision making to be 
influenced at the detriment of the company.  
3.5.4 Duty of Care 
Whilst article 141 refers to a particular liability for negligence it is far 
too specific to be an all-encompassing duty of care. Without the law, 
directors are free to cause considerable damage to a company without any 
risk of liability. For the shareholders this is a serious concern as their 
interests are constantly exposed without any protection and at present they 
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can only rely on trust or surveillance to protect their interest. Any shareholder 
who is aware of the danger would be prudent to include the duty in the 
articles of association however certainly there are many who do not do this.    
3.5.5 Good Faith 
Good faith exists only in Islamic law in Iran, as there is not any 
statutory law on the subject. Both Ghaedeye Ehsan and Al’Amalo bel Niat 
are broad versions of good faith law and they are not designed for company 
law applications, they are rather general laws that are applied to company 
law cases. Furthermore, the rules are rarely used in cases of breaches of 
duties (from articles). Directors need a level of protection against unjust 
cases of negligence being brought against them and at present this law is 
not comprehensive enough to be able to protect directors. Should the duty of 
care come into force, then a provision of good faith would be necessary 
alongside it.   
3.5.6 Enforcement 
A legislation update to enforcement was put forward in 2011. It 
contained a suggested reform of articles 276 and 277 to allow for the 
derivative action to be brought by any of the minority shareholders against 
the directors regardless of their portion of share capital. Furthermore the 
shareholders would be exempt from paying the fee for bringing the action. 
The proposal was rejected. The fact that this proposed update was submitted 
demonstrates that there is some acceptance of flaws in the enforcement of 
breaches of duties in Iran. 
Apart from bringing actions against directors, there is a common 
practice of resolving issues internally in companies. Directors who have 
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damaged companies might be well connected either as a family member or a 
politically connected individual.  Punishments may take the form of fining a 
director or suspending them without pay. When a director does not have 
connections the typical solution is to dismiss them which is a considered the 
most useful tool for dealing with improper actions from directors. Needless to 
say dismissing a director does not compensate a company for damage 
incurred as a result of the director’s actions. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has investigated company law and in particular directors’ 
duties in Iran. The formation of companies in Iran is not that dissimilar to 
other jurisdictions.  The private joint stock company and the public joint stock 
company are the two most common company vehicles.   
The majority of Iranian law can be traced back to civil law for since its 
foundations the Iranian legal system has borrowed many sections that are 
now key points of legislation. This civil code has been placed within a rigid 
Shia Islamic framework, which demands adherence. The Islamic law is 
derived principally from religious scriptures, or secondary texts that refer to 
the scriptures.   
Legislative reform of company law has been limited in Iran and there 
is clear preference from the Islamic Consultative Assembly to prevent 
updates coming through the system. Since 1932 directors’ duties have not 
been updated despite a later update to the company law in 1968.   
There is considerably more guidance on directors’ appointments, 
share structures and the details regarding the formation of a company as 
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opposed to on duties. Article 142 dictates that directors’ duties will be 
contained in companies’ articles of association.   
There are several articles that refer to duties of loyalty within Iranian 
Company Law, however they fail to broadly cover the main properties 
needed in such duties. Whilst article 118 states that directors should act 
within their powers, it defers responsibility for setting out the scope of their 
powers to the articles. Specific conflicts of interest are mentioned in article 
129 to 133 however there is no ‘duty to avoid conflicts of interest’ that would 
be broad enough to cover all examples of conflicts.   
Equally the closest Iranian law comes to applying a duty of care is in 
articles 141 and 114 where there are provisions against negligent directors. 
These two articles do not set out any duty of care, skill and diligence’ that 
directors can follow, but they do state that companies can bring actions 
against negligent directors.   
The articles that exist can be classed as wholly inadequate in their 
provision of allocating liability to directors for damaging companies. 
Additionally, there is no form of protection in statutory law for directors in 
instances of actions brought against directors who have acted in good faith. 
The Islamic law that does provide for good faith is too broad and the 
principles that are applied to company law are too general in nature to the 
extent that they are also applied to many other fields of law. 
The articles of association, as mentioned, are where shareholders are 
able to specify a comprehensive series of duties. In theory this is satisfactory 
as long as all shareholders provide adequate duties through the assistance 
of a qualified legal practitioner. In reality though, many shareholders do not 
	143	
seek legal advice when drawing up the articles of association and even those 
that do seek advice cannot be secure in the knowledge that their provision of 
duties will be adequate to cover all eventualities. Depending so heavily on 
companies developing their own articles of association is an unsatisfactory 
practice as it results in an inconsistent level of liability across the jurisdiction 
for directors.  
The enforcement of directors’ duties is also lacking in that article 276 
and 277 limit directors who are minority shareholders with less than a 20 per 
cent stake in a company from bringing an action. Furthermore, the costs of 
bringing an action must be borne by the shareholder.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROCESS AND FORMULATION OF AN EMPIRICAL STUDY INTO 
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN IRAN 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided a detailed doctrinal account of the law 
in Iran and specifically it focused on the law relating to directors’ duties. The 
doctrinal approach has been useful to understand many elements of the 
research such as the code that exists and the legal structures in place. 
Through carrying out empirical research on the subject matter the research 
has been developed by the acquisition of new data. This new data has made 
it possible to provide new findings on the subject, which have allowed for a 
more in depth understanding than previously existed.  
Up until this point there does not appear to have been any other 
empirical research carried out in relation to directors’ duties in Iran. Including 
empirical research in this project has provided a greatly overdue new insight 
into the state of directors’ duties in Iran today.   
The chapter considers the use of empirical research and how it has 
been included within the thesis. The subject matter is broken up into five 
sections that explain the stages of the empirical research process. 
Section 4.2.1 discusses the method of empirical research and the 
reason for its selection of qualitative research in conducting this study. 
Section 4.2.2 explains the preparation undertaken for embarking on the 
empirical research. Section 4.2.3 details the organisation of the empirical 
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research, including the communication with interviewees and the steps taken 
for the university ethics review. Section 4.2.4 accounts for the period during 
which the researcher was in Iran. The process of the one-to-one interviews, 
including the difficulties and problems that were experienced, is explained. 
Section 4.2.5 details the data collection process that took place after the 
research was concluded, describing the coding of the collected data. 
4.2 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
As examined in the methodology section in Chapter 1, this research 
aims to discover what are the problematic issues that exist under current 
Iranian Company Law relating to directors’ duties and it also aims to make 
suggestions about potential reforms that could be considered. To obtain data 
that is relevant to the current state of directors’ duties and how they affect 
practice in Iran, it was necessary to conduct empirical research. 
Empirical research had to take the form of either a quantitative or a 
qualitative analysis. The target of quantitative methods is to acquire data 
from a random or representative sample in order to achieve objectivity in the 
responses and to be able to replicate the data.552 A qualitative method 
however involves the acquisition of data from authoritative sources that can 
provide personal insight into the mechanics of the topic.553 When comparing 
the two methods, it was clear that the quantitative method would not be able 
to provide the level of depth in the data reproduction that was required for 
this thesis. The qualitative approach, however, did have potential to produce 
																																																								
552  R. McQueen & Ch. Knussen, Research Methods for Social Science: A Practical 
Introduction (Gosport: British Library Cataloguing Publication Data, 2002), 196, 197, 200.  
553 U. Flick, An Introduction To Qualitative Research (London: SEGA, 2002), 11-15, 34-35. 
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data that would satisfy these requirements. For this reason it was considered 
that a qualitative approach was superior for the purpose of this study. 
Having decided that a qualitative approach was the preferred strategy, 
the researcher had to select the type of qualitative approach to be 
undertaken. Interviews in the native language of the interviewees was 
chosen as the preferred means of obtaining data, as this would be 
substantially more useful than other approaches in being able to provide 
genuine insight into the subject material from authoritative sources. 
4.2.1 Method of Empirical Research 
Having established that the empirical research would be carried out 
through interviews it was necessary to establish what type of interview format 
should be implemented. When deciding between structured interviews, semi-
structured interviews and unstructured interviews, the decision would be 
based on which would allow for the greatest extraction of useful data. It was 
concluded that structured interviews would be too limiting, as they would not 
permit the interviewer to probe interviewees for further information beyond 
the scope of set questions. Unstructured interviews were also deemed to be 
unsuitable, as all the interviews should cover the same material in order to 
get a response on the same issues in order for the data to be useful. Semi-
structured interviews were selected as the most suitable type of interview 
technique as they would allow for a structure that would be repeated for all 
the interviews whilst at the same time permitting sufficient freedom for the 
interviewer to probe certain interviewees on certain topics where appropriate. 
Semi-structured interviews involve the interviewer having a planned 
set of questions on particular topics but commencing the interview they are 
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afforded the ability to deviate away from the questions in order to gain the 
most from the responses of the interviewee. On occasions there might be 
considerable deviation and on other occasions little deviation.554  They are 
typically conducted one-to-one however they can be carried out in groups or 
in pairs.555 
4.2.1.1 Semi Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are considered to be the most common of 
the qualitative methods used to obtain data within social sciences.556  From 
anthropology to philosophy to law the most effective means for extracting 
precise data is semi-structured interviews.557 When reflecting on the use of 
semi-structured interviews, many researchers have considered the method 
and considered the various aspects including the selection of interviewees, 
the selection of questions to match the candidates, the interview location, the 
recording technique and the process for analysing the data.   
In comparison with structured interviews, they can make better use of 
the knowledge-producing potential of dialogues by allowing the freedom to 
follow up on points that they deem important. The interviewer has the 
opportunity of engaging as a ‘knowledge-producing participant’ in the 
process itself, rather than hiding behind fixed interview questions. 558 
Compared to unstructured interviews, the researcher has a greater control 
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557 Ibid. 
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over the discussion and extracting what they believe is vital information in 
relation to the research project.559 
Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to be active and 
reflective in the process of the data generation rather than as a neutral data 
collector.560  By engaging with the interviewee it is possible to further develop 
points and access a more profound level of response than would otherwise 
be possible. This also justifies the researcher’s role as a participant-
observer. As a method of primary data collection, interviews are the most 
efficient way of obtaining the information required in a trustworthy format. In 
comparison there is not another means for obtaining the same objectives. 
Asking experienced people for their accounts and talking and listening to the 
persons selected is the best way to ascertain the existing position in 
commercial life in relation to the law on directors’ duties.561 Also, according to 
Mason,562 
 
“It is better to try to understand the 
complexities of the interaction rather than 
pretend that the key dimension can be 
controlled.”563  
 
It is also important to distinguish between the two ways in which the 
term ‘depth’ is utilised. Researching a point in depth is to develop a more 
extensive knowledge of it.564  Moreover, researching something in depth is to 																																																								
559 P. Leavy, The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2014) , 286. 
560 P. Cane & H. Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 262-270. 
561 Ibid.  
562 A. Bryman & E. Bell, Business Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 385-386. 
563 Ibid.  
564 Ibid.  
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uncover the complex nature of something that initially seemed simplistic.565 
This research deals with the latter meaning of depth as it involves delving 
into the complex landscape of directors’ duties in Iran. 
The semi-structured interview offers great potential to attend to the 
complexity of a research project. It allows for the engagement of the 
interviewee with segments of the interview, with each segment progressively 
being more structured. It can be carried out in one sitting, or several and 
allows for considerable reciprocity between the interviewee and the 
interviewer.566   This reciprocity or give and take creates space for the 
researcher to probe an interviewee’s responses for explanation, meaning 
and critical reflection. It is thought that a great deal can be accomplished 
within the semi-structured interview, as long as one gives considerable 
thought to the preparation of the questions.567 
The benefits to the semi-structured approach are many, the first of 
which is that the openness to the conversations allows the interviewer to 
explain any terms or points that the interviewee might not understand in the 
questions posed.568   When subject material needs expanding upon, the 
format of the semi-structured interview allows for conversation between the 
interviewer and interviewee to clarify meanings.569 Whilst the interviewees in 
this study had professional backgrounds, most in law, certain question topics 
seemed foreign and complex to certain interviewees. A glossary was 																																																								
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Techniques And Projects (Oxford: How To Books Ltd, 2002), 28-32. 
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provided to the interviewees with clear explanations of terms to aid them in 
the event that they were not familiar with any points.  
The semi-structured framework allows for the interviewer to rephrase 
and simplify the point of the questions when it is necessary to avoid any 
misunderstanding of terms or concepts or if the interviewee asks for any 
parts to be clarified. This is important as it eradicates any margin for 
misunderstanding. The flexibility to converse and rephrase elements of the 
questions can be a much-needed tool to help simplify the intention of the 
questions in the interviewee’s mind. Without being able to do this, they might 
have a poor understanding of the questions and respond with short answers 
that prove not to be useful.570  
Another benefit to the semi-structured approach is the freedom it 
allows interviewees to expand upon their responses.571  It is the preferred 
technique for achieving depth in the research, as it allows the interviewee to 
expand on and explore a thought or sequence of events.572 When dealing 
with a complex subject that has many levels and has occurred over a length 
of time, the interviewee requires time and freedom to consider their response 
and elaborate.573  
The method is also useful for exploring social process, changes and 
problems and to achieve depth and a complete understanding in these areas 
rather than a superficial broad understanding of surface patterns.574 This is 																																																								
570L. Luton, Qualitative Research Approaches for Public Administration  (Oxford: Routledge, 
2015) , 21-27. 
571 Ibid. 
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573 Ibid. 
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because interviewees will often be encouraged to elaborate when points are 
raised that are not fully expanded upon in answering prescribed questions.575 
The ability to ask the interviewee to clarify points allows the interviewer to 
gain an extended depth of response.576   
For certain subject areas semi-structured interviews are fundamental 
and without the method it would not be possible to fully understand certain 
research projects. 577   Moreover, the third benefit to semi-structured 
interviews is the researcher’s freedom to probe the interviewees for more 
information on points of interest that arise in the discussion.578   Semi-
structured interviews enable interviewees to expand on complex and specific 
issues, clarifying in detail how they understand certain subjects. 579 
Researchers can probe exact points extracting the core information that is 
required and also permit the interviewee to open up and disclose information 
freely.580 
Through probing and exploring subjects with the interviewee, greater 
depth of information is unearthed and it allows for the opportunity to gain 
from the professional experience and understanding of the reality of the 
subject matter.581 As long as the questions are sufficiently open-ended the 
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interviewee’s real views and beliefs can surface.582  Obtaining the thoughts 
of the interviewees in their own words is key to the process.583  
Probing can result in needing to re-order the questions throughout the 
interview.584 The semi-structured interview lends itself to reordering certain 
questions to help with the flow of the dialogue in instances where certain 
points are probed to extract more information.585 Furthermore, it might also 
be seen as beneficial to add extra questions to probe significant points that 
arise.586  What is fixed in the process of the semi-structured interview is the 
topic that is identified in advance along with the date, time and 
interviewee.587 Apart from these core elements, interviewers are permitted to 
guide the interview as they wish. 
The fourth benefit to semi-structured interviews is the added flexibility 
it permits in the flow of the discussion.588  Whilst the series of questions are 
organised as a guide for the interview, the researcher is able to make 
changes to the order of the questions to best suit the progression of the 
discourse (see the questions by the researcher for example in this chapter). 
The questions can be more open ended in their approach than those in a 
structured interview schedule. Interviewees however are typically less keen 
on open-ended questions as they do not have any idea in advance that 																																																								
582 M. Walsh & L. Wigens, Introduction to Research (Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes, 2003), 
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University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 92,93. 
584 N. King & Ch. Horrocks, Interviews in Qualitative Research (London: SAGE Publications 
Ltd, 2010), 125-132. 
585 V. Braun & V. Clark, Successful Qualitative Research: a Practical Guide for Beginners 
(London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013), 85-89. 
586 V. Braun & V. Clark, Successful Qualitative Research: a Practical Guide for Beginners 
(London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013), 78-80. 
587 A. Galletta & W. Cross, Mastering The Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond: From 
Research Design to Analysis and Publication (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 
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these will be added. They might view them as more time consuming and 
place them in a position of reduced control. The flexibility to ask further 
questions probing the interviewee on specific points is an extremely useful 
tool for controlling and organising the interview whilst it is in progress.589 For 
the purpose of this study, the researcher was flexible in terms of the order in 
which the topics were considered and, perhaps, more significantly they 
permitted the interviewee to develop ideas and speak freely on directors’ 
duties and company law in Iran. The dialogue was more fluid and there was 
more emphasis on the interviewee elaborating points of interest. As a result 
of this, the researcher was able to follow up particularly interesting avenues 
that emerged in the interview and the interviewee was able to develop their 
thoughts more comprehensively. The semi-structured qualitative method was 
able to capture the richness of the themes emerging from the interviewees’ 
speech rather than restrict the interviewee to quantitative categories.590 
A fifth benefit to semi-structured interviews is the possibility that the 
interviewees might initiate new topics due to the open-ended questions being 
more likely to generate rich-in-depth responses.591 In this study, with 21 
questions prepared in advance there was already a clear structural 
framework for the interview that the interviewer was able to drop in and out of 
depending upon how the interview unfolded. The elite interviewees however 
with their professional experience were able to divulge information that the 
researcher might not have anticipated.  
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A considerable benefit to semi-structured interviews is that whilst the 
researcher is primarily only intending to gain data regarding the questions 
that they are posing, the answers potentially can reveal new issues or useful 
information. If new information is revealed that is potentially useful, the 
interviewer has the flexibility to probe the interviewee and guide the flow of 
the conversation as they choose. Without the constraint of a fixed order of 
questions, new concepts can be brought into the discussion by 
interviewees.592 
The final benefit of semi-structured interviews is that they allow high 
calibre interviewees to perform at their best and share as much as 
possible.593  For this research the use of a standardised interview schedule 
was not appropriate due to the varied professional, educational and personal 
histories of the sample group.594 The interviewees that were selected can be 
classified as ‘elite interviewees’ due to their expertise on the subject matter 
covered by the questions.595  A great deal of social research is aimed at the 
least well-off and least influential members of society, ‘ordinary people’. 
When dealing with those who cannot be classed as ordinary, for instance: 
judges, magistrates, senior police officers, senior members of organisations, 
it is necessary to apply a more tailored approach that respects the 
interviewee’s position.596 This calibre of interviewee is most likely to consider 
the act of answering a mundane questionnaire as a less than productive use 																																																								
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Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19 n1 (1994) 331-332. 
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of their time. 597  Semi-structured interviews manage to balance the two 
aspects to the arrangement.598 Firstly the interviewer can make the most of 
the opportunity to interact with powerful elites and secondly the interviewees 
are addressed with some elevated status in the research project.599 This 
balancing act necessitates the interviewer managing the interviewees 
accordingly to achieve the best results for the project.600  
Elite interviewees are extremely useful sources for interviews as their 
answers are those of authorities on the topics that are discussed.601  Taking 
into account their positions, knowledge and influence, they can provide 
considerable input in terms of depth of understanding of social context and 
processes.602 Methodological challenges do exist when the interviewer is 
dealing with elite interviewees, as whilst the process of developing interview 
questions and arranging the interviews is identical whether the interviewee is 
part of an elite or not, the actual discourse and debate between interviewee 
and interviewer can change considerably.603 
The consensus amongst researchers is that when dealing with elite 
interviewees the semi-structured interview is the preferred approach.604  An 
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unstructured interview format can give respondents too much control over 
the progression of discourse and the structured format can be limiting when 
trying to extract key information.605  The semi-structured approach allows the 
interviewee to maintain control whilst also allowing them to probe for more 
complete answers when required.606 Moreover, in the event that the interview 
has to be completed in a shorter time period due to unpredicted urgent 
matters or a shortage of time to complete the questions, the semi-structured 
approach allows for adaptability from the interviewer to prioritise certain 
questions over others to be sure of getting the most fundamental information 
from the interviewee.607 
There are of course some negative aspects to semi-structured 
interviews. Utilising open-ended questions in interviews prevents the 
discourse from having clear scheduling boundaries for each subject that is 
brought up in conversation. The risk is that they will speak too much on 
certain topics without touching on the core point of the question.608 The 
freedom of open-ended questions is that interviewees are able to direct the 
focus away from the question’s subject matter if they so choose.609  Another 
consequence of these responses that fail to answer the intended questions is 
that the coding of such responses is labour intensive and in some cases 
pointless.610 Certain questions that are open ended can engender a high 																																																								
605 I. Crow & N. Semmens, Researching Criminology (Berkshire: Open University Press, 
2007), 118 . 
606 Mayser & Wagstaffe, ‘Research Methods for Elite Studies - G, Moyser, M. Wagstaffe’, 
Political Studies, 35.4 (1987) 672-673.  
607 Ibid. 
608M. Denscombe, Research Proposals: A Practical Guide (Berkshire: Open University 
Press, 2012), 91-101. 
609 Ibid.  
610M. Hamid, How To Write a Research Proposal and Thesis: a Manual for Students and 
Researchers (North Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013), 49-
51. 
	157	
refusal rate as well if the topic area is too vast for them to provide a 
meaningful answer.611 One of the lawyer interviewees, LAW3, for instance, 
refused to answer two questions due to the subject area being too large for 
him to provide a useful response.  
Another negative aspect to semi-structured interviews is that by 
allowing the interviewee freedom to express themselves, their emotional 
state and the level of their awareness is able to impact on the data they 
provide.612 If the interviewee is at the time for whatever reason at all anxious 
or worried they can allow these sentiments to affect their discourse.613 In 
these moments it is up to the interviewer to retain their own composure and 
ability to control the environment and apply their knowledge allowing the 
interview to flow.614  
The final negative aspect to semi-structured interviews is that they 
tend to be one of the more time consuming methods of data collection.615 
From recruiting interviewees, scheduling the appointments, organising 
places to conduct the interviews, carrying out the interviews, transcribing all 
the interviews to finally coding all the transcripts. The end result is the 
product of many hours of labour. 616 
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4.2.2 Preparation for the Empirical Research 
Having established that semi-structured interviews were to be the 
method of empirical research, it was thus necessary to make preparations for 
the process. The two fundamental ingredients required for the research were 
appropriate interviewees and an appropriate set of questions. Following on 
from this it was also necessary to consider a suitable period for the 
interviews and suitable locations for the meetings to occur.   
4.2.2.1 Selecting Interviewees  
The criteria for the interviewee selection were based on prospective 
candidates’ knowledge and experience in the subject field of the interviews. 
The purpose of the criteria was to identify individuals who would be able to 
provide relevant and useful information from their genuine experience of 
having operated professionally in the field.  
The candidates selected were Iranian government agents, judges, 
company directors of public, private and government companies, scholars, 
commercial lawyers, and company shareholders. It was felt that this mixture 
of professional expertise would allow the interviewer to gain first hand data 
about what the present situation in Iran was as far as directors’ duties were 
concerned. Some interviewees had a strong understanding of directors’ 
duties and others had less, however all had sufficient understanding to 
engage with the questions, which were outside the parameters of a casual 
discussion. 617  The method would be able to enhance the researchers’ 
understanding of the current Iranian Company Law relating to directors’ 
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duties and how it is practised. Furthermore it had the potential to uncover 
issues that were not accounted for in doctrinal sources. 
The types of professional people who were able to fill these criteria 
were professionals who worked in law and business. Professionals 
occupying different posts within the field of company law and company 
practice would be able to offer varying insights into the subject material. For 
this reason the researcher decided that if lawyers, legal scholars, judges, 
directors and shareholders viewpoints were all included in the study it would 
produce a broad spread of data for the research. These different groups of 
people were expected to offer different perspectives in the interviews. With 
different types of interviewees, there was a chance for the researcher to 
compare their views on the same topics. When selecting the quantity of 
interviewees the researcher was of the opinion that there would have to be at 
least four from each group in order to see possible correlations in responses 
from groups. It was also deemed prudent to include a fifth interviewee for 
each group in case during the process of arranging interviews any 
interviewees decided not to participate for any reason. With there being five 
groups this resulted in 25 interviews. 
The interviewee groups are considered in greater detail below, with an 
account of a brief justification for the selection of each.  
4.2.2.1.1 Judges 
Even though the judicial system in Iran, like other developing 
countries in the Middle East, is still fairly weak in its management of 
commercial cases, it was felt that it was important to try and obtain some 
data from judges, as the judiciary is core component of the legal system. It 
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was decided that judges would be interviewed and arrangements were made 
accordingly. Of the five that originally agreed, two judges did not end up 
taking part in the interviews. When seeking permission to interview the 
prospective five judges, these two judges were sceptical over the purpose of 
the project querying the rationale for why a researcher from the UK wished to 
know their opinions on directors’ duties in Iran. These two judges requested 
all the questions in advance and after they were presented to them, they 
elected not to participate due to the questions being, in their view, too open 
ended. It is possible to conclude that the reason for two of the judges 
declining the interviews was due to the subject matter. Prior to requesting the 
questions both had in principle agreed to the interviews. As the researcher 
had foreseen this kind of situation occurring, she had identified several other 
candidates who would be suitable replacement interviewees. An extra 
scholar and an extra lawyer were included to the list of interviewees as it was 
not possible to find replacement judges. 
4.2.2.1.2 Corporate Lawyers  
The researcher considered corporate lawyers to be useful 
interviewees as they have daily interaction with shareholders, directors and 
judges in their professional capacity. Corporate lawyers understand the 
business effect of any legal decisions they make and also the legal effect of 
any business decisions their clients make. They ensure the legality of 
commercial transactions, they advise corporations on their legal rights and 
duties and they have a professional knowledge of company law. LAW1 and 
LAW2 work for large companies and they also work privately advising 
different firms. Their knowledge and understanding of directors and their 
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duties for this reason could be expected to be more than adequate. The 
other three lawyers are general solicitors who practice all types of law.  
4.2.2.1.3 Legal Scholars 
The scholars interviewed are knowledgeable about business law and 
legislative and regulatory developments. They participate in drafting 
committees for law reforms and give suggestions to draft legislation and 
other legal documents. They provided analysis of current laws, and they 
suggest the direction that company law reform should take. Since they are 
working in academia, and they are therefore more independent, scholars 
may also be able to give fairer views on some of the issues being 
considered. All scholars interviewed work in academia at prestigious 
universities ranked within the top ten universities in Iran.  
4.2.2.1.4 Company Directors 
As the research topic is about directors’ duties in Iran selecting 
directors in public, private and governmental companies was necessary. The 
selected directors include both executive and non-executive directors. 
Including the opinion of directors in this research is instrumental to 
understanding directors’ duties and how they considered by directors 
themselves. DIR1 is a director in a national bank, DIR2 is a director in a state 
owned oil company, DIR3 is a director who runs a family Mining Company, 
DIR4 is a director in a private Inertial Design Company and finally DIR5 is a 
director of Money Exchange Company.  
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4.2.2.1.5 Shareholders 
The researcher chose to select shareholder candidates from various 
types of companies. It was expected that interviewing shareholders would 
help identify the apparent weaknesses in Iran that exist from not having 
sufficient directors’ duties.   SHA1 is a shareholder in a government company 
that is the shareholder represents the government’s interest. SHA2 is a 
public company shareholder and SHA3, SHA4 and SHA5 are private 
company shareholders (in family companies).  
4.2.2.2 Selecting the Questions  
Whilst it is common for practised interviewers to take a list of themes 
as opposed to a series of questions to the interviews, the nature of semi-
structured interviews necessitated a prepared set of questions. This method 
increases the interviewer’s ability to have a clear path to follow for the course 
of the interview with a logical progression in the questions that have been 
prepared in advance.618  
Question construction for interviews can be geared to produce 
responses that are factual, descriptive, thoughtful or emotional. With the 
purpose of this study it was predominantly factual and thoughtful information 
that was preferred. The majority of questions for this reason were prepared 
with a view to extract responses that are factual and thoughtful. In the initial 
stages of the interview however the researcher adopted a softer approach 
that aimed to make the interviewees feel comfortable in the environment as 
opposed to immediately having to produce factual and thoughtful responses. 
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To assist the flow of the interview the interviewer had to be very familiar with 
the questions.619 
The purpose of the questions was to secure data from the responses 
that built upon the theoretical and doctrinal research already carried out. 
From the doctrinal research, certain issues in directors’ duties in Iran had 
already been identified and it was the researcher’s aim to acquire new 
information on these issues from the interviewees. Having already carried 
out a great deal of the doctrinal research in Chapter 3 at this stage the 
researcher already was thoroughly versed in the subject field and was at a 
suitable stage to gather new empirical data. From the issues in directors’ 
duties that had been highlighted, the researcher developed 21 questions that 
would potentially be able to extract useful responses that would develop 
these points.620  
At the beginning of the interview the researcher posed several general 
questions that required short and factual responses that the interviewee was 
able to answer without too much thought or effort. These preliminary 
questions established the interviewees’ names and their professional 
background within the field of law. These questions allowed the researcher to 
collect valuable background information about the interviewee whilst at the 
same time letting them begin by covering familiar territory.621 
The more sensitive and testing questions were left for the latter stages 
of the interview. By the time the first question of significance arose the 
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interviewee felt settled and relaxed.622 Without adequately warming up the 
interviewee prior to posing the significant questions, there would have been 
the possibility that they would not have opened up and spoken freely in their 
responses. 
Detailed below is the list of questions that made up the semi-
structured interview. Also alongside the questions was an explanation of their 
intended purpose. 
Question 1: What is your post in your organisation in which you work? What 
are your general duties? 
− The purpose of asking this question was to ascertain from which of 
the five groups the interviewee belonged and what the interviewee’s 
job entailed. The nature of the interviewee’s duties could have 
provoked additional questions.  
Question 2: Do you regard the court as an efficient means of settling 
business disputes in terms of cost and time expenditure? 
− The aim was to understand the efficiency and affordability of the 
courts. It was crucial to understand clearly if one of these factors is 
reducing the courts’ popularity and use. Also, the answer to this 
question helped to discover the popularity of the courts as a means for 
settling disputes. Moreover, when hearing from directors it was likely 
that they would share their experience of directors’ duties cases and 
provide their opinions on the speed and cost of the courts.  
Question 3: Do you feel that in your current job you and your colleagues 
have a professional understanding of directors’ duties? 																																																								
622 M. Walsh & L. Wigens, Introduction to Research (Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes, 2003), 
90-98. 
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− It was important to know what level of understanding interviewees had 
of directors’ duties both to enable the researcher to explain questions 
and to gauge the general understanding of duties in Iran. 
Question 4: Where would you go to find out about directors’ duties? 
− This was to asked to discover just how accessible information about 
directors’ duties in company law is in Iran and whether people know 
how and where to access the information. There was the potential for 
varying answers between the different groups as well, which would 
have produced interesting results. 
Question 5: Do you know what duties are imposed on directors? 
− The aim of this question was to get a clear picture of which groups 
know what about directors’ duties in Iran. The duties that get more 
focus than others by the different groups will suggest how duties are 
perceived from group to group.  
Question 6: What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the law 
on directors’ duties in Iran at this time? 
− The aim of asking this question was to find out about how the present 
law on directors’ duties in Iran is perceived. The interviewer thought 
that if multiple interviewees repeat the same weaknesses then it 
would highlight those weaknesses.   
Question 7: In the cases where fiduciary duties are set out in the articles of 
association of a company, is it the directors’ duty to always act in the 
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company’s best interests or is it the shareholders’ duty to make sure the 
director is doing what they want?623  
− This question relates to whether directors are viewed as opportunistic 
agents motivated by self-interest or whether they are viewed as loyal 
stewards. It was of interest to hear how the directors responded to this 
and compare it against the view of the judges and the lawyers.   
Question 8: Occupying the post of director comes with a host of liabilities; 
do you think the insertion of directors’ duties in the company’s articles of 
association is a sufficient way to protect the company and the shareholders? 
− The responsibility to include fiduciary duties in the articles of 
association is uncommon in most countries as it is usually included in 
legislation or case law. This question was posed to gain an 
understanding of how Iranians working in law view this. Perhaps they 
would be oblivious to the practices in other countries or perhaps they 
would see it as a flaw that there is no legal code to stipulate that 
directors owe fiduciary duties to a company.  
Question 9: Do you think that it is better to insert directors’ duties in 
legislation? If so, why? If not, why not? 
− The aim of this question was to get each interviewee’s opinion as to 
the advantages and disadvantages of introducing specific directors’ 
duties in Iranian legislation.  
																																																								
623 For this question the researcher referred interviewees to the glossary at the end of the 
questions, where fiduciary duties is defined. It is defined as a legal obligation of one party to 
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someone entrusted with the care of money or property. 
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Question 10: Do you know of instances where directors have taken 
advantage of corporate opportunities? Do you consider the current law 
sufficient to manage instances of corporate opportunities?624  
− This was to ascertain firstly their opinion on corporate opportunity and 
secondly to understand whether they consider the current law capable 
of tackling it? Iran is well known for its corruption and this is a subject 
where corruption could exist. If examples of corporate opportunities 
with outcomes were found, the information would have been useful for 
the research. 
Question 11: Can directors be trusted to make decisions on behalf of 
shareholders in the shareholders’ interest? What problems can arise from 
this relationship? How can this be dealt with? 
− The aim of asking this question was to find out what each interviewee 
thinks about trusting directors, and the risks that are present in 
trusting directors. 
Question 12: As directors are in positions of power they can find themselves 
in situations of conflict, that is, where their interests and the interests of the 
company/shareholders might be in conflict. What do you think should be 
done in such cases? 
− The aim of asking this question was to understand how commercial 
law in Iran could control the conflict of interest when the directors get 
opportunities. Is there a sufficient deterrent in place to prevent 
directors from taking unfair advantage of commercial opportunities?  																																																								
624 The researcher referred interviewees to the glossary at the end of questions where 
corporate opportunity is defined. It is explained as when directors have the opportunity to 
benefit personally from a business opportunity that is presented to their company or comes 
to the directors in their role as directors of their company, and the directors take advantage 
of it at the expense of the company. 
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Question 13: From your own experience have you found that people who 
occupy the position of director in companies have been appointed through 
merit or family ties or social contacts? 
− The aim of asking this question was ascertain whether the decision to 
appoint directors is typically based on the candidate’s merit or rather 
through a social or family relationship. Also it was useful to hear the 
interviewee’s thoughts about the benefits and disadvantages of both 
sides when it comes to appointments. 
Question 14: Do you think that directors should be subject to a duty of 
care?625  
− The aim of asking this question was to find out the views of the 
various interviewees about whether they believe there is a need for a 
duty of care in the law. As the duty is common place in most countries’ 
legal codes, these perspectives provided an insight into potential 
issues that come up when the duty is not in place in a country. 
Question 15: Directors are often trusted with making judgments that will 
contain an element of business risk, and it is often these judgments that will 
either propel the business forwards or cause it difficulties. If directors make a 
bad judgment should they be liable for it? 
− This question has two parts to it. Directors’ liability for making poor 
judgements in their role and also directors’ freedom to take risk to 
attempt to progress a company forwards. It was key to find out how 
much freedom the directors feel they have when it comes to decision-																																																								
625 The researcher referred interviewees to the glossary at the end of the questions where 
duty of care is defined. It was stated to be a legal obligation which is imposed on an 
individual requiring adherence to a standard of reasonable care while performing any acts 
that could foreseeably harm others. It is the first element that must be established to 
proceed with an action in negligence. 
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making or whether they feel that sometimes their concern over 
personal liability (losing job, etc.) outweighs the potential reward for 
the company. 
Question 16: Do you think that Iran could benefit from adopting the 
Business Judgment Rule?626  
− The Business Judgement Rule does not exist in Iran. The researcher 
wanted to see if anyone believed that Iran could benefit from its 
introduction and whether they think it could work within the 
parameters of the legal system in Iran. 
Question 17: As the government owns controlling interests in many public 
companies, do you feel directors of these companies fear-taking risks 
believing that the law will not be on their side? 
− This question was trying to uncover the opinion of the interviewees on 
the pressures on directors in companies controlled by the 
government. Do directors feel that, should the eventuality arise where 
a disagreement between shareholders and directors reaches court, 
the court would be on the state’s side. And if they do feel this, does it 
influence their risk taking? 
Question 18: Do you know how breaches of directors’ duties are enforced?  
− This question was trying to understand what can be done if there are 
breaches of duty and how effective the court is in enforcing breaches 
of directors’ duties. It was also trying to gauge the level of 																																																								
626 The researcher referred interviewees to the glossary at the end of the questions where 
the Business Judgment Rule as envisaged in the US is defined (the one used was one of 
two definitions available the one used in Delaware). It is recorded as a presumption that in 
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company’ and as a consequence if the directors so act they are not liable. 
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understanding from each of the five groups about the level of 
punishment involved with breaching directors’ duties and whether they 
believe punishment is balanced given the breach. 
Question 19: Do regulators have sufficient power in Iran to enforce rulings?  
Do you understand Iran’s enforcement to be effective in the sense that there 
is belief that rulings will be upheld?  
− The aim of asking this question was to find out whether enforcement 
is well managed and all rulings are upheld. The general view of 
enforcement was also important as if directors are aware of rulings for 
various breaches and are aware of strict enforcement it acts as a 
deterrent to breaches being committed.  
Question 20: Do you think that breaches of duties should be subject to 
criminal prosecution in any case? 
− The purpose of asking this question was to find out the opinions of the 
interviewees surrounding the severity for breaches of directors’ duties. 
It was possible that opinion in Iran might vary from other countries as 
it has very little in its legal code that addresses directors’ duties and 
perhaps it is regarded differently. 
Question 21: What changes to the law governing directors’ duties would you 
make? 
− This open-ended question was trying to understand from interviewees 
about any possible reforms relating to the directors’ duties in Iranian 
Company Law. 
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The questions were translated into Farsi so that the interviewees would 
be able to understand them. 
4.2.2.3 Surveying the Location 
When considering the most suitable city within Iran to carry out the 
interviews, the selection had to be a city where it would be possible to carry 
out 25 interviews within 30 days and where it would be possible to find the 
most suitable candidates to interview. The researcher decided to select 
Tehran, the nation’s capital city. An ideal study area for the empirical 
research, Tehran whilst being the political and administrative capital of Iran, 
is also the central hub of commerce.627  It makes up for more than 40 per 
cent of the nation’s economic activities, 30 per cent of Iran’s public-sector 
workforce is based there and 45 per cent of the principal industrial firms.628 It 
is home to a significant proportion of central governmental agencies, legal 
service companies, universities and research institutes. Those who inhabit 
this young metropolis have come from around the country with different 
beliefs, cultures, languages and life styles and live in a national and 
international context together. With the location chosen, it was then 
necessary to select the interviewees and communicate with them about the 
project. 
The environment can impact upon an interview and the objective is to 
identify a place where both the interviewer and the interviewee feel 
comfortable. The interview is primarily a conversation, which is recorded and 
the environment for that reason had to be somewhere quiet and private so 																																																								
627 A. Bryman & E. Bell, Business Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 385-413. 
628 Tehran Municipality, Industrial Firm (2016). Available online: 
http://www.tehran.ir/ [Accessed 08/02/2016]. 
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that the two people could hear each other and for the tape to record 
accurately.629 While a neutral setting is perhaps preferable for meetings with 
business people or lawyers, judges and scholars, it is more common to visit 
them at their place of work in their offices. This is typically their preference as 
it is logistically the least demanding option for them and it is what occurred. 
Researchers find that interviewees are more likely to not accept an invitation 
if they realise they will have to go out of their way to take part.630 The rooms 
of the interviews were always private and there were not any issues with the 
interviewees speaking freely. It can be possible that in certain environments 
at work interviewees may feel uneasy about saying negative things about 
their place of work, but the researcher did not encounter this.631 
4.2.3 Organisation of Empirical Research  
With the preparation concluded, it was next necessary to commence 
making the arrangements for the interviews to take place. Within this stage 
the researcher had to communicate with the chosen interviewees and 
request their agreement to take part in the interviews, complete the ethical 
review for the research and correspond with the interviewees to organise a 
date and time to visit them.  
4.2.3.1 Communication between the Researcher and the Interviewees   
Whilst the researcher had identified the types of professionals to 
interview, there was still the matter of identifying the exact people to 
interview and making sure they were both prepared to be interviewed and 
																																																								
629 R. Longhurst, Interviews: In-Depth, Semi-Structured (Oxford: Elsevier Ltd, 2009), 580–
582. 
630 Ibid.  
631 R. Longhurst, Interviews: In-Depth, Semi-Structured (Oxford: Elsevier Ltd, 2009), 583. 
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available during the period of time the researcher planned to be in Iran. 
Family members assisted the researcher in sourcing suitable interviewees, 
some of whom were leaders in their field. 
The first point of contact with the interviewees was an email from the 
researcher explaining who she was, the person who had referred them, what 
the research was about and a question asking whether it was something they 
would be willing to take part in. Following a succession of positive replies, the 
researcher sent off the participant consent form required by the rules on 
ethical research work at the University of Leeds. The vast majority agreed to 
participate and sign the forms, however there were some who responded 
with requests for clarification of various points. Once all the responses were 
received and queries satisfied the schedule was arranged starting on 25th 
November 2015 and running to 15th December 2016. 
4.2.3.2 The Ethics Review 
Before the empirical research was actually carried out, the researcher 
attended particular courses to educate themselves about the ethics of 
empirical research. At these courses they learned about the process of the 
ethics review and data protection issues along with how the university 
administers such ethical review applications. Subsequently, an application 
form for the ethical review was drafted in consultation with the researcher’s 
leading supervisor and it was submitted to the University of Leeds’ Ethics 
Committee for approval. Prior to commencing any research project that 
involves human participants it was necessary to first acquire ethics approval. 
After the first submission of the ethics application from the researcher, 
the committee responded through email highlighting certain points that 
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needed to be addressed for the researcher to receive approval. The 
researcher addressed these points and resubmitted the application to the 
committee. On 24th November 2015 the researcher received approval and 
was granted permission to proceed. 
4.2.3.3 Organising the Timetable 
After arriving in Tehran, the researcher used her time to coordinate 
with the interviewees to finalise the individual meetings. The schedule was 
prepared according to the availability of interviewees and their location within 
the city.  
4.2.4 Execution of Empirical Research 
With all of the interviews scheduled it was necessary to make sure 
that they all were carried out successfully and provided the researcher with 
the data required. In this section it is explained how the interviews were 
carried out, complications that arose from the interviews and what tools were 
used to extract further information from interviewees in particular situations. 
All the interviews were carried out on a face-to-face basis and lasted 
between 60 to 90 minutes. The locations were the interviewees’ offices, 
which were university buildings, court chambers and office blocks.  
4.2.4.1 One-to-one Interviews 
The most common form of semi-structured interviews is the one-to-
one interview variety, which involves a meeting between one interviewer and 
one interviewee. 632  There are several positive aspects to one-to-one 
interviews, the first being that for the interviewer they are the simplest to 
																																																								
632 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: SEGA Publications, 2002), 62-68. 
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arrange. The second advantage is that the opinions and views expressed 
during the interview stem from one source (the interviewee).633 This makes it 
straightforward for the interviewer to converse about specific ideas with a 
particular interviewee. Also, one-to-one interviews help the interviewer create 
a relaxed, controlled environment in which the interviewee is more likely to 
feel comfortable in and respond best.634  It is easier to create an open 
atmosphere in these kinds of interviews than in ones where there are a 
number of interviewees present.635 In the case of this research the format 
allowed the researcher to question the interviewee directly on relevant 
questions about directors’ duties in Iranian Company Law with no interruption 
or distraction from others present.636 Also, another advantage is that the one-
to-one interview was straightforward to transcribe and produce an audio 
record from.637 
4.2.4.2 Recording 
The recorder allowed the researcher a much fuller record than note 
taking during the interview. It also meant that the interviewer was freed up to 
focus on how the interview was proceeding and where to steer the dialogue. 
It relieved the researcher of much of the burden of note taking during the 
interview.638  Moreover, note taking could have led the interviewer to lose the 
train of the conversation or eye contact with the interviewees. The researcher 
did not have to interrupt the flow of the interview to ask for clarification about 																																																								
633 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: SEGA Publications, 2002), 83. 
634 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: SEGA Publications, 2002), 65-67. 
635 N. Proctor & M. Butcher, Human Resource Management - Standard Level (Cambridge: 
Select Knowledge Limited, 2010),108. 
636 Ibid. 
637M. Denscombe, The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects 
(Berkshire: Open University Press, 2014), 187. 
638 B. Christopher & B. Cason,  Overseas Research II: A Practical Guide (Oxford: Routledge, 
2010), 110-115. 
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a word or phrase, which could have seriously impeded the discussion and 
disrupted the interviewee’s train of thought. By knowing that there would be 
an exact record of the interview that could be referred to at a later moment, 
the researcher was able to approach the interview with more freedom to 
focus on the dialogue and the extraction of valuable content.639  
Prior to all interviews it was made clear that whilst the interviewer’s 
preference was to record the interviews, it would not be a requirement of the 
interview. All interviews that were carried out were recorded with the consent 
of the interviewee and the only signs of concern over the recording came 
from the two judges who decided not to take part in the interviews. These 
two judges were concerned that there might be a recorded copy of their 
answers to the questions proposed. Even when informed that recording was 
not essential and that the information will be presented anonymously in the 
research, they remained sceptical. 
4.2.4.3 The Transcription Process 
Transcribing the Farsi audio recording was not a straightforward 
mechanical exercise in which the researcher simply wrote down the words 
that were spoken by interviewees. In practice, the task was made more 
difficult due to spoken language being different to written language. The 
cause of this was that the interviewees did not always speak in nice finite 
sentences.  
During the process of transcribing the audio recordings it was 
necessary to verify some of the statements from the interviewees. The 
researcher had to corroborate some interviewee information to confirm that 																																																								
639B. Christopher & B. Cason,  Overseas Research II: A Practical Guide (Oxford: Routledge, 
2010), 113. 
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the interviewees’ statements were all accurate. Typically, the checking was 
carried out using electronic sources and also through comparing it against 
other interviewee’s content for consistency.640  
There were several examples where interviewee information did not 
prove to be accurate: In section 5.2.5 ‘The Role of Judges’, JUD1 stated that 
minimum age requirement for becoming a judge was 24/25 but also that he 
was not certain of this fact. The researcher verified the information with the 
governmental website which clarified that the actual minimum age required is 
22.641  
JUD1 suggested that 30 years had passed since the general law 
including directors’ duties was last updated in Iran. Through referring to the 
Iranian Parliament Research Centre website it was possible to confirm that 
this date was incorrect as law surrounding directors’ duties had not been 
updated since the 1940s.642 Apart from this, the researcher had to amend 
certain dates provided by the interviewees.  
4.2.4.4 Using Probes in the Research Interview  
Since the aim of the researcher’s interview was to gain a profound 
understanding of the interviewees’ experience and perspective in relation to 
directors’ duties in Iran, probing the interviewee effectively was an important 
skill applied by the researcher in the interviews. By probing an interviewee’s 
response, the researcher was able to add to the richness of the data, and 
																																																								
640M. Denscombe, The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects 
(Berkshire: Open University Press, 2014), 173-189. 
641 Sharayete-Ghazio shodan, Judges Requirement (2016). Available online: 
 www.mashreghnews.ir [Accessed 15/04/2016]. 
642 The Iranian Parliament Research Center, Company Law (2016). Available online: 
 http://rc.majlis.ir [Accessed 02/04/2016]. 
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end up with a better understanding of the subject matter. Patton describes a 
probe as, 
 
‘An interview tool used to go deeper into the 
interview responses.’643 
 
4.2.4.5 Conducting the Interview  
It was important for the interviewer to keep the momentum going 
during the course of the interview and keep the dialogue on track. Whilst it 
was important for interviewer in general to try to limit any interruptions, there 
was little that could be done in particular circumstances.644  Delays and 
temporary cancelations whilst being a normal issue of interview organisation, 
proved to be very problematic on occasions for the study. On one occasion 
JUD2 did not come on time. He had overlooked the appointment and 
eventually arrived one hour later. He only came once it was made clear that 
the researcher had travelled a long distance to carry out the interview and 
would soon be returning to the UK and would not be available again. LAW3 
cancelled on two occasions, 30 minutes prior to the meeting. Eventually it 
was possible to carry out the interview. The interview with SCH1 lasted three 
hours due to the detail the scholar went into when answering the open-
ended questions.  
 
																																																								
643 B. Thyer, The Handbook of Social Work Research Methods (London: SAGE, 2001), 314. 
644J. A. Smith et al  , Rethinking Methods in Psychology (London: SAGE Publication, 2005), 
18-30.  
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4.2.4.6 Difficulties and problems  
The main issue that arose, as was mentioned earlier, was that two of 
the requested interviewees decided not to take part. A further issue that 
occurred was that certain questions were too personally or politically 
sensitive to answer. It was clear in some of the responses that interviewees 
skirted around their genuine opinions to offer answers that were brief and 
failed to acknowledge the key points of the subject matter. This was 
demonstrated in question 17 and 19 where the subjects of governmental 
involvement in the economy and criminal persecution for breaches are 
discussed. To deal with this issue, the interviewer would moved on to the 
next question and return to the skipped question later on with a rephrased 
version of it. This approach proved to be successful as the interviewee felt 
relaxed when the conversation subject was diverted away from the issue in 
question. When later returning to the subject matter generally the interviewer 
rephrased the question and often it seemed that the interviewee had a fresh 
approach to answering the question, most probably due to the time afforded 
them to consider the point. Overall, the interviewer considered it a useful 
strategy to obtain answers on points that were poorly addressed the first time 
around.  
Moreover, there were certain subject areas where many interviewees 
struggled to address the subject matter due to a limited understanding of the 
law. This made it difficult to extract useful answers, as the interviewee’s 
knowledge was insufficient to produce a meaningful opinion. Examples of the 
topics that proved to be difficult were the Business Judgment Rule, fiduciary 
duties, duty of care and corporate opportunities. In these instances, answers 
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would be general and superficial without suitably grasping the point of the 
question. The groups that struggled with the legal terminology were the 
directors and the shareholders, while the legal professionals were more 
comfortable with the terms used and the principles referred to. 
4.2.5 Data Collection of Empirical Research  
Following the completion of the interviews the researcher had 
acquired recordings from all 25 interviewees. At this juncture the researcher 
had to transcribe the recordings and produce digital files that could be 
uploaded to the University Postgraduate Development Record (PDR).   
The duration of each recording was between 60 minutes and 90 
minutes. The transcripts of the recordings were made in Farsi where the 
responses were numbered 1 to 21 and the interviewees were labelled 
appropriately. The digital files of the transcripts were accompanied by the 
time, date and location of the interview. This process left the interviewer with 
digital files of all the data stored on the university’s PDR.  
Having completed the transcripts, the interviewer began to code the 
data. All the names of the interviewees were replaced with appropriate 
labels. All judges were labelled JUD1 to JUD3, lawyers were labelled LAW1 
to LAW6, scholars were labelled SCH1 to SCH6, directors were labelled 
DIR1 to DIR5 and shareholders were labelled SHA1 to SHA5. The order of 
whether an interviewee was JUD1 or JUD3 was based on the order in which 
the interviews were carried out.  
The reason for the anonymity of the interviewees is to protect the 
interviewees from the data they provided for the interviews. Also the 
anonymity was also a requirement of the University’s Ethics Committee who 
	181	
seek not to divulge the identity of participating individuals nor their company 
or organisation. 
All quotations to be included in the research were translated into 
English and the Farsi transcripts were coded, labelled appropriately and 
saved. Each question was considered individually and the responses from all 
the interviewees were grouped together to allow the researcher to see how 
all the interviewees responded to the same questions. 
The beginning of the coding process involved reading the entire 
transcript, analysing it and dissecting the key points that the interviewees 
highlighted as issues with respect to directors’ duties. 15 points were 
identified as the main core issues uncovered in the interviews and these 
points were labelled 1 to 15, for example point 1 was fiduciary duties. The 
next step undertaken was revisiting each transcript and attaching to relevant 
material the appropriate number in accordance with the coding key. After this 
practice was carried out 25 times, the interviewer had coded the transcripts 
and was ready to start tackling each of the 15 points, drawing from the 25 
opinions provided by their interviewees. 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of empirical findings within the thesis was to build upon 
the doctrinal research with the addition of new data that would be able to 
uncover what the present situation of directors’ duties in Iran was like. 
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were selected as the form of data 
collection to be carried out. The selection was chosen as it was considered 
to be the most appropriate research means for encouraging targeted 
interviewees to share their understanding of complex and specific issues. 
Furthermore it was practical in that it allowed the flexibility needed to 
converse freely with the different interviewees to gain the most from the 
interviews.  
The questions constructed for the interviews were carefully formulated 
around the issues that had emerged from the doctrinal research documented 
in Chapter 3. The phrasing of the questions was designed to best permit the 
interviewee to expand their answers on the various subjects. The interviewer 
arranged 25 interviews with lawyers, judges, scholars, shareholders and 
directors. The first form of contact was an email to each selected person.  
Prior to visiting Tehran, the researcher carried out an ethical review 
application due to the research containing human participants. Following on 
from this the interviewer travelled to Tehran and contacted interviewees. The 
25 interviews were held at various places in Tehran.  
All the interviews were conducted on a one to one basis and they 
were recorded. The interviewer used probes to push the interviewees to 
extract more information. Transcripts were made in Farsi and quotations for 
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the research were translated into English for the purpose of including the 
data in the thesis.  
In order to code the transcripts, the interviewees were made 
anonymous and replaced by labels. There were certain difficulties that arose 
during the research such as only being able to interview three of the five 
judges, a reluctance from interviewees to engage on certain subject 
materials due to their sensitivity and also a lack of knowledge of certain 
subjects from some of the interviewees. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY INTO DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN IRAN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research in Chapter 3 demonstrated that Iranian Company Law 
has not developed and evolved to an adequate extent in order to satisfy the 
needs of commercial life and practice, and this is particularly so in relation to 
the law on directors’ duties. This chapter aims to build upon this analysis 
developed in Chapter 3 by providing data from empirical research that 
addresses the issues highlighted by this thesis. The empirical research takes 
the form of the information collated from 25 interviews with high level 
scholars, judges, lawyers, directors and shareholders that were carried out in 
Tehran, the capital city of Iran. These interviews delved into specific topic 
areas that had the potential to unearth insights into the true nature of the 
current practice of law as it relates to directors and their duties. These 
insights can assist the research to provide a more thorough and accurate 
picture of the state of directors’ duties today in Iran to provide a basis for 
reform proposals. 
The transcripts of the interviews are the source of the data for this 
chapter. Within all the interviews there were 11 principal points of discussion 
on which data has been collected. While engaged in coding the interview 
transcripts these points clearly stood out as critical matters that needed to be 
examined and they will form the structure of this chapter. The 11 points 
range from specific subjects within directors’ duties, such as fiduciary duties, 
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the duty of care, the Business Judgment Rule to broader issues which 
greatly affect duties in Iran, such as courts and the role of judges. 
Whilst there will be a degree of commentary and analysis concerning 
the data obtained, no attempt will be made in this chapter to pass judgment 
on the interviewees’ responses or to engage in any systematic analysis and 
synthesis of the data. The aim is to display the findings and provide a context 
for them. Detailed analysis of the data obtained will be undertaken in Chapter 
6 in the context of assessing the position overall in Iran and arriving at some 
recommendations for reform. 
5.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
From the 25 interviews carried out in Iran, both specific and broad 
issues are discussed. The findings have been coded and arranged to be 
able to address the principal points of discussion. Direct quotations are used 
to contextualise the material in instances where it is appropriate or 
necessary. Where interviewees provide examples of cases, more contextual 
information is provided in order to highlight the relevance of the information 
and to contextualise it.  
5.2.1 Fiduciary duties in Iran 
The first issue discussed with the interviewees was the presence of 
fiduciary duties in Iranian Company Law. Whilst previous research had 
suggested that Iranian Company Law does not address fiduciary duties it 
was important to hear the views of interviewees on the matter. The 
interviewees offered a diverse range of opinions on the inclusion of fiduciary 
duties in Iran and it could be stated that the lawyers, judges and scholars 
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were the most informed on this issue. As one might expect, directors and 
shareholders had insufficient expertise to provide a meaningful perspective 
on laws that do not appear to exist in Iran. Both LAW1 and LAW2 highlighted 
the fact that in statutory law there is no mention of fiduciary duties. LAW6 
corroborated this appraisal of fiduciary duties admitting to not being aware of 
there being any in Iranian Company Law. JUD1 stated, 
 
“Often cases arise which are related to 
fiduciary duties and you cannot refer to any 
code and article as there is none.” 
 
JUD2 furthered the point by adding that he thought that in general 
directors’ duties are a particularly weak area of company law. He added that 
the company law on directors solely provides a general overview of how 
companies should be run and that there is no mention of directors’ duties. 
JUD3 dismissed fiduciary duties as not part of Iranian Company Law, stating 
that it is not possible to refer to a breach of fiduciary duties in court, as they 
are not mentioned in statutory law. Scholars also referred to the lack of 
fiduciary duties in the law with SCH1 stating that the statutory and civil law is 
silent on fiduciary duties. SCH2 mentioned that there is added responsibility 
carried by shareholders in monitoring directors due to the absence of 
fiduciary duties. SCH4 raised concerns for the shareholders, as they are not 
protected by fiduciary duties. Overall, the message is conclusive that 
authorities of law are acutely aware of the absence of fiduciary duties in 
statutory law in Iran. 
	187	
When shareholders and directors were asked about fiduciary duties, 
they expressed both a lack of knowledge and in many cases they failed to 
see the importance of such duties. DIR2 mentioned that he did not believe 
any business shareholders read the statutory law in Iran. As both a 
shareholder and a director he was not aware what legal duties he had 
towards his company, only that he should try to make it always better and 
more profitable. In a similar way, DIR5 believed that as long as you do your 
job, you do not need to pay attention to these things. SHA3 was aware of 
fiduciary duties although he was of the belief that 80/90 per cent of directors 
do not know what duties directors have under statutory law and often under 
the articles of association as well.   
A theme that emerged from speaking to the directors and the 
shareholders was that when there is a relationship built on trust between the 
shareholders and the directors there is not such a need for fiduciary duties. 
SHA2 was of the belief that directors should be trusted as most of the time 
they are appointed from within shareholders. SHA1 was a director of a 
company of which he was the largest shareholder. He believed that 
shareholders have a fundamental necessity to trust directors. He also 
struggled to see why a director would act in a way that was not in his own 
company’s best interest. DIR1 was of the belief that because shareholders 
get to elect their directors they have the control to simply elect someone they 
are sure they can trust. He added that they do have options if the 
relationship does not work out as planned as they can always dismiss that 
person. He understood that as long as they always have that control, it is not 
necessary to have any laws in place. 
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Within family companies directors and shareholders seemed satisfied 
with the status quo in Iran. SHA1 felt a benefit to being the managing director 
and also the largest shareholder as he felt that other shareholders were not 
able to affect his decision-making. Directors who have this attitude can 
marginalise minority shareholders, as they will prioritise their own wishes 
before those of others. LAW3 was of the opinion that in family companies 
there was not the same belief that family members could not be trusted or 
would act outside the best interests of a family company.   
As statutory law does not address directors’ duties and fiduciary 
duties, in many cases fiduciary duties are added to the articles of 
association. DIR1 stressed the importance of the appointment of a suitably 
experienced lawyer to prepare the articles of association of a company. He 
argued that it is the responsibility of the lawyer to understand the business 
operations and adapt the articles of association to contain all the relevant 
directors’ duties and of course include fiduciary duties. He added that in the 
eventuality that the articles were still lacking, it would always be possible to 
update them. DIR2 seconded this point stating that he believed that fiduciary 
duties belonged in the articles of association. In his company they updated 
the articles of association annually and did not follow any other company law. 
LAW1 was satisfied with fiduciary duties existing solely in the articles of 
association, however he added that there are many examples where the 
addition of fiduciary duties to companies’ articles is overlooked. LAW4 
believed that the situation was not bleak, as the articles of association would 
provide companies the opportunity to protect themselves with the inclusion of 
fiduciary duties. LAW4 stated,  
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“All they need to do is call a meeting of the 
shareholders and agree upon amendments.” 
 
SCH2 placed the responsibility on shareholders to be aware of the 
absence of fiduciary duties in the law and he added that it was on their 
shoulders to make sure that duties were included in the articles of 
association, warning that failure to do so would expose them potentially to 
grave consequences. SCH3 also placed the responsibility with the 
shareholders, adding that he feared their inclusion was less common than 
one would imagine.   
From the interviews it also became clear that whilst there was a need 
for the inclusion of fiduciary duties in the articles of association, one could 
not expect all companies to have them in place and even if they were to, 
they would not be sufficiently detailed to fulfil their purpose. Many companies 
were not appointing a lawyer to prepare their articles and it was in these 
circumstances that fiduciary duties were not included or were insufficient. If 
we refer back to DIR1 and DIR2 who spoke about updating articles of 
association, one has to agree that this would be good practice, however the 
requirement of updating every year would most likely arise due to problems 
arising that would demand the updating of the articles. The concern is that 
the remedial action would be after the breach of duty had occurred. Statutory 
law, in contrast, could cover most if not all eventualities. JUD1 made a strong 
argument that there were occasions when cases were covered by neither 
company law nor the articles of association of a company. JUD3 further this 
point by stating that he had never come across the inclusion of duties in the 
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articles of association of any case he had encountered. SCH1 confirmed this 
when saying that, 
 
 “It is rare to find fiduciary duties in the 
articles of association of companies.” 
 
As an alternative to including fiduciary duties in the articles, DIR4 who 
worked in a bank stated that their constitution included all the duties for the 
employees as well as the directors. As opposed to following any statutory 
law, they updated their constitution annually and it functioned to remind 
directors of their duties. He stated that it was unwise to rely on the company 
charter, as it would not be as extensive as statutory law could be. He added 
that fiduciary duties were not covered to a sufficient degree and that the bank 
could easily encounter issues with directors. 
DIR5, who is a bank director, stated that he followed the obligatory 
law set by the bank regulations that were established by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. He stated that whilst the law remained as it is, the 
system would be lacking, as they did not cover any fiduciary duties.   
In instances where fiduciary duties were not covered it was necessary 
to ask the judges what their experience had been. Where statutory law, 
articles of association, and Islamic sources were failing to cover fiduciary 
duties it was important to highlight which resources judges turned to in order 
to determine cases. JUD1 mentioned that for fiduciary duties it was often the 
case that typical legal sources would fail to assist, and they would have to 
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refer to the fiqhh.645  He referred to code number ten of the Iranian civil law646 
that stated that all company dealings were acceptable as long as the actions 
were in line with company law and did not contravene the teachings of Islam. 
LAW6 agreed that in examples where law failed to provide the answers they 
would need to refer to Islamic sources (the Fighh). He stated that, if there 
were nothing in the law that could solve a particular case, the default solution 
would be to refer to the Quran and the Fighh.   
Having considered the existence of the current sources for fiduciary 
duties in Iran some interviewees were keen to see the status quo 
ameliorated. SHA3 accepted that it would be a step forwards to have 
fiduciary duties in statutory law, because in most articles of association they 
cannot be found. He also added that fiduciary duties would be useful in 
protecting shareholders, as there were a lot of uneducated people in senior 
positions who work as directors of companies. LAW1 supported this 
statement for the same reasons, adding that there should be statutory 
fiduciary duties because there were many examples where directors were 
making decisions for themselves instead of for their companies. LAW2 
reiterated the point and said that having no fiduciary duties had resulted in 
many cases of corruption in Iran. SHA3, much like LAW1, believed that, 
 
 “Directors occupy their positions for their 
own benefit as opposed to the company’s 
benefit.”   
 
																																																								
645The Fighh is the theory or philosophy of Islamic law based on the teachings of the Quran 
and the traditions of the Prophet. 
646  Iranian Civil Law 1922. Article 10 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher): Any private 
agreement that made by people is applicable until they are conflict with law. 
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He stated that their mentality was not one of having a duty towards 
the companies’ interest but of having opportunity to advance their own 
interest. When directors were out to further their own ends then potentially it 
would be damaging for companies. SCH2 remarked that, 
 
“There is no substitute to statutory law, 
especially in the case of fiduciary duties. It 
is not sufficient to merely include duties in 
the articles as in many cases it will be 
overlooked and they will vary from company 
to company leading to great 
inconsistencies. For something so 
fundamental statutory law is the only 
solution.”  
 
SCH3 also confirmed the fear that exists with the danger of not 
including fiduciary duties in company law. He argued that without these 
duties directors would be able to stray on to an undesirable path. SCH4 
highlighted the clear lack of fiduciary duties and expressed their importance 
in protecting the shareholders.  Amongst the legal professionals there was a 
general consensus that the addition of fiduciary duties to company law was a 
fundamental and urgent requirement. But the view of some of the directors 
and shareholders was that the addition of fiduciary duties would not 
necessarily be beneficial. SHA2 believed that even if they had fiduciary 
duties in law, most directors would not be aware of them anyway as nobody 
reads the statutory law in Iran. SHA3 confirmed this point warning that if 
fiduciary duties were added to statutory law, directors and shareholders 
would still not be aware of them. He stated that in terms of just and 
consistent decisions in the courts the addition of fiduciary duties would fulfil 
its purpose. DIR5 showed a lack of respect for current company law and a 
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disregard for the effectiveness of any proposed changes. The responses 
from SHA2 and DIR5 highlighted the issue that added changes to statutory 
law would not suddenly be common knowledge amongst business 
shareholders and directors so it was unlikely to change their understanding 
of their roles. LAW5 indicated that, 
 
 “Code number 51 of the Iranian Civil Law 
Code states that directors are regarded as a 
trustee of the shareholders’ assets.” 
 
LAW5 also said that directors were considered to be responsible for 
protecting the assets of the company as if they were their own. According to 
this way of thinking, the director would be accountable for fiduciary duties, as 
he would have the duty of protecting the asset. Clearly this would not be the 
same as providing for detailed fiduciary duties, but rather it would be an 
example of the concept of bestowing trusts in the director. It would however 
touch upon the essence of fiduciary duties, which in the reform of company 
law in Iran could be expanded upon. 
Another interviewee brought up the subject of revisions to company 
law highlighting that some years ago changes to company law legislation 
were submitted for approval to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. LAW6 
stated that, 
 
“Within the proposed changes to company 
law, there was no mention of the reform or 
addition of fiduciary duties, nor any part of 
directors’ duties.”   
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He was unaware why this was the case. He stated that the suggested 
improvements did not get passed anyway, as they were rejected when put 
forward to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In Iran the purpose of this 
body is to make sure new legislation is in line with Islamic principles. As long 
as the Islamic Consultative Assembly is in place it will be difficult for fiduciary 
duties to become a part of statutory law. 
Without fiduciary duties, certain issues continue to exist in company 
law. SHA1, a managing director and majority shareholder in a company, 
explained that his position allowed him ultimate control. When questioned 
about whether the minority shareholders in the company could trust him to 
look after their interests. He responded that, 
 
“if they do not like it they cannot do anything 
as they are the minority. If they do not like it 
they can sell their shares or just accept it.”  
 
He stated that a director/shareholder in this position had nothing to 
gain by having duties in place. Other shareholders however were greatly 
exposed and potentially other directors who had less say than the managing 
director also would be exposed. If the managing director were to act without 
concern for the company and/or shareholder interests then the other 
directors could be liable for the actions of this director who would be 
accountable to no one. SCH4 reiterated this point adding that great power 
was afforded to the board of directors and minority shareholders were left in 
a vulnerable position. There are no fiduciary duties in place to protect 
shareholders and particularly minority shareholders. SHA3 raised the risk of 
unqualified and uneducated directors not being accountable for their actions 
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under fiduciary duties as they are in theory free to make whatever actions 
and decisions they like without any fear of liability. LAW2 was of the opinion 
that having no fiduciary duties results in significant cases of corruption in 
Iran. He stated that, 
 
“Directors occupy their positions for their 
own benefit as opposed to the companies’ 
benefit. Their mentality is not of having a 
duty towards the companies’ interest but of 
having an opportunity to advance their own 
interest.” 
 
In conclusion, firstly, the lawyers, judges and scholars confirmed that 
fiduciary duties do not exist in any part of Iranian Company Law. As a result 
knowledge and understanding of fiduciary duties was low amongst 
shareholders and directors. They stated that without duties, appointments of 
directors were made on trust and were often family members. They added 
that companies were able to place duties in the articles however they 
acknowledged that many companies overlook carrying this out. Introducing 
fiduciary duties was a popular suggestion amongst many of the interviewees 
and without them they thought that issues between shareholders and 
directors would continue to exist and cause problems for businesses in Iran. 
5.2.2 Duty of Care in Iran 
The duty of care is one of the core principles of directors’ duties in 
many nations around the world, and it was an essential point on which to 
gain the interviewees’ perspective. It was interesting to find that many 
interviewees did not understand the general meaning of the term. LAW1 
stated that in Iran there was not such an expression as ‘duty of care’ but that 
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the concept of ‘trust’ between directors and the company did exist. LAW2 
added that, 
 
“Directors’ duties are not a core part of 
company law in Iran and in my professional 
career I have never focused on this area, I 
do not have any idea about the duty of 
care.” 
 
Other interviewees, whilst being aware of the concept of a duty of care 
also concurred in the argument that perhaps it was not required to the same 
degree in Iran as it was elsewhere. SCH1 mentioned that when companies 
were built up from family members and the controlling parties were 
principally family members then the issue of duty of care would be less 
important. SCH1 stated that, 
 
“The problem is less since the director is 
one of the shareholders and they all have 
the same goals. The director might have 
less knowledge if they got their position 
through the family or relation, but in regards 
to trust we can guarantee the duty of care 
as they are a family member.” 
 
Also, he mentioned, that when directors are not family members then 
there is a greater need for the duty of care. Many of the lawyers believed that 
the duty of care should have a place in statutory law. 
There was a consensus as far as JUD1, JUD2, DIR1, SHA2 and DIR2 
were concerned that it was paramount that the director would be accountable 
for the duty of care and that it would be wrong for it to be overlooked in the 
Iranian Company Law. DIR1 went on to state that without the duty of care 
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directors could be distracted from achieving company targets and 
safeguarding the company assets. He stated that this was a serious risk, as 
without the duty directors have no liability for the company’s welfare. DIR2 
agreed with this point adding that it was fundamental that one has the duty of 
care and without it the company would be built on weak foundations, as 
shareholders need directors looking after the business as if it were their own. 
DIR3 believed that the duty of care was one of the main duties that the 
director should have and without it the company could become insolvent. 
There was a strong point raised by several of the interviewees that the duty 
of care can encourage slow and cautious practices from directors. JUD1 
emphasised the importance of the duty of care, however added that this is 
fine up to the point where it starts having a detrimental impact on the speed 
of the director’s actions and a company’s functions. JUD1 said, 
 
“If the director always prioritises the duty of 
care then it will have a negative effect on the 
company’s interest. Directors need to work 
with speed to get deals done and the more 
barriers of care involved the slower they will 
be leading to wasted opportunities. Also if 
they are too careful in their decision making 
they will miss opportunities.” 
 
DIR3 provided a case whereby the speed of the director was impeded 
by the duty of care to the point that it caused issues for the company. A Bank 
had strong procedures in place for carefully managing different aspects of 
the business. This was due to a duty of care being inserted into the company 
constitution. In order to take necessary care in controlling expenses, the 
main director in Tehran made all orders for equipment required for the 
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business instead of allowing branch employees to make the orders. The 
result was that for minor things like stationery for the bank in another city, 
they had to wait a week to receive these items. In this situation speed was 
required for such purchases and the duty of care was a hindrance to efficient 
practices. Instead of the company receiving the stock requirements as and 
when needed, it had to go through a long process due to additional levels of 
care for company funds.  
SCH1 furthered this point by stating that the duty of care was 
necessary but risk taking by the director was also crucially important. If the 
director can balance these two (having risk plus duty of care) then that is 
ideal. LAW1 went one step further by adding that whilst the duty of care was 
useful, it did not necessarily mean that it needed to be a statutory law. He 
argued that it is likely to have a negative effect on shareholders’ interests, as 
the director might not take risks for the maximum interest of the company 
due to a fear of breach of duty of care. Whilst being of this belief, LAW1, 
when pressed further on the point, was unable to offer any alternative apart 
from stating that those who do believe it to be of importance are able to 
include it in the articles of association. LAW3 agreed on this point, stating 
that the most important duty of directors was to make profit for the company. 
Directors will potentially fail to pursue opportunities for the company and be 
able to excuse these failings by saying that they are exercising their duty of 
care. The duty of care therefore could be used as a shield to protect the 
directors rather than as a tool to protect shareholders. 
As noted by LAW4, directors in Iran are not bound by a duty of care at 
the moment and there are many examples in Iran whereby directors’ actions 
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are not in accordance with a duty of care. Should the duty come into effect in 
Iran, directors’ practices would have to change to meet the standards 
required of the duty. Also LAW4 stated, 
 
“In one case I recall, a company was 
registered as a finance company. This 
company appointed a director who was not 
an expert and was unskilled in that area. This 
director repeatedly exercised a lack of care, 
but there was no law in place to claim against 
the director. As far as I know this individual is 
still the director in that company.” 
 
Interviewees also commented that whilst there is not the duty of care 
in statutory law, there are laws that refer to care. LAW1 began by saying that 
in Iran, the law gives the court relevant authorities for applying the duty of 
care. SCH3 expanded on this point,   
 
“We have a general concept for this duty 
called Ghebte (Islamic term for ‘caring for 
your work and not going over board with 
duties)647  in our Islamic law, which is an 
Islamic source that is only used in extreme 
cases. It is not possible however to find this 
subject in any statutory law. For instance, in 
common law countries this duty is well 
known and documented. Frequently judges 
refer to this duty in relation to the actions of 
directors. Unfortunately we do not have any 
case law or statutory law on the subject.”  
 
SCH3 also stated that Khianat-dar-Emanat (Islamic term for the duty 
of care and morality) is part of Ghebte and is typically only used when cases 
are very serious and are not considered as minor breaches of the duty of 																																																								
647Ebn-e-Manzour, The Fighh Library in Arabic, Feghahat Madrese Publications (2015). 
Available Online, 
 http://lib.eshia.ir/40707/7/358/نيغلا [Accessed 10/08/2015]. 
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care. He clarified that it is rather for when directors have made dire decisions 
for a company and should have known better especially from a moral stance. 
LAW4 described the duty of care as a moral issue that every director should 
be accountable for. He went on to state that according to the Fighh the 
director is a trustee and is responsible for the welfare of the company and 
LAW4 said that, 
 
“The duty of care refers to a duty to look after 
a company, directors in Iran have this duty as 
they are placed as the guardian of the 
company under the Fighh.”  
 
SCH6 lamented that the duty of care does not form part of Iranian 
statutory law, but said at least directors are accountable for their care of 
companies under the Islamic sources. The duty of care is one of the principal 
duties for every director and in the Fighh, directors are accountable for how 
they look after their companies.   
In conclusion many of the interviewees did not have a strong 
knowledge of the duty and only knew of it in a basic form that exists in the 
Fighh. On the whole the interviewees thought that there was a strong 
consensus that the duty of care was important and deserved a place in 
statutory law in Iran. Several reasons were provided for why the duty should 
be included. Firstly it was suggested that it prevents directors from being 
influenced to act against the company’s interest, it prevents the company 
from being built on weak foundations and also it reduces pressure on 
directors which makes it less likely that a company would slide towards 
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insolvency. The greatest concern highlighted about the duty was that it could 
discourage directors from taking risks.  
5.2.3 The Business Judgment Rule  
The interviewees were asked about whether the Business Judgement 
Rule had any place in Iranian Company Law. There was a general 
consensus that this type of law did not exist in Iran, as SCH3 explained that 
the concept of good faith is not clear and there is not any kind of Business 
Judgment Rule. SCH3 was correct in his assessment, however it was 
important to ascertain whether there were any laws that touch on the concept 
of good faith. 
Several interviewees pointed out that Iran was not without any law on 
this subject and good faith was covered in certain areas of the law. DIR2 
mentioned that there are two useful articles on this subject, articles 125 and 
126 of the Iranian Constitution.648  These state that if the directors take any 
action outside of their duties, they can be held responsible. DIR2 stated that, 
 
“We also, have a rule ‘Ghaedeye Ehsan’ in 
the Fighh which is similar to the Business 
Judgment Rule in that if a director acts with 
good faith and for the interest of the 
company they should not be held 
responsible.” 
 
																																																								
648 Article 125 of Iranian Constitution [Treaties]: ‘The President or his legal representative 
has the authority to sign treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements concluded by the 
Iranian government with other governments, as well as agreements pertaining to 
international organisations, after obtaining the approval of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly’. Article 126 of Iranian Constitution [Planning, Budget]: ‘The President is 
responsible for national planning and budget and state employment affairs and may entrust 
the administration of these to others.’ 
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SCH2 agreed with this comment, stating that the law covers a similar 
concept in Islamic sources, and he further added that there was also 
something similar in Iranian Civil Law. 
JUD3 mentioned that according to article 171 of the Iranian 
Constitution649 the rule ‘Zarar-va-Zian be Taghsir’ sets out that if the director 
causes damages and harm through breaching their duties in the article of 
association then they should be responsible regardless of any good 
intentions or good faith. JUD1 was of the opinion that whilst directors may 
take actions in good faith, they are still responsible if these actions were 
carried out due to a lack of knowledge. JUD1 said, 
 
“We have a rule in Fighh, ‘Al’Amalo-bel-
Niat’650, which means ‘the intention of the 
action is important’. The principle is the 
requirement of a presence of good faith and 
good intention. The director should prove to 
the judge that their actions were made in 
good faith and if they are not able to do this 
then the culpability falls on their shoulders.”  
 
JUD2 stated that the rules that come from the Fighh, whilst they might 
seem applicable on the surface should not really be used in commercial 
instances. He said, 
 
																																																								
649Article 171 of Iranian Constitution [Liability of Judges]: ‘Whenever an individual suffers 
moral or material loss as the result of a default or error of the judge with respect to the 
subject matter of a case or the verdict delivered, or the application of a rule in a particular 
case, the defaulting judge must stand surety for the reparation of that loss in accordance 
with the Islamic criteria, if it be a case of default. Otherwise, losses will be compensated for 
by the State. In all such cases, the repute and good standing of the accused will be 
restored.’ 
650According to Hadith (sentence) from Mohammad, 630 CE (Common Era). 
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“These rules ‘Al-Amalo-bel-Niat’ 651  are 
applicable for humans in normal life but not 
for companies and commercial cases.”   
 
Outside of Islamic sources there is also a rule of good faith that exists 
in Maritime law. SCH2 who spent time working in merchant shipping in the 
Persian Gulf said,  
 
 “There is a rule in the ‘ Iranian Maritime 
Convention Act’ that states that a ship’s 
captain is required to care for the ship and 
its cargo within his professional role on the 
ship. It is his duty to do his upmost to 
prevent any damage being caused to the 
vessel or cargo. As long as the captain in 
charge carries out their role with good faith 
using their ability and skill, then they should 
not be held accountable.”  
 
The good faith element to this rule is similar to the one that is part of 
the Business Judgment Rule in that it exempts the captain from liability if 
they have acted in good faith. This law is unique to maritime law though and 
cannot be considered more than an example of a specific legal field in which 
the concept of good faith exists. 
Many interviewees were not in favour of adopting the Business 
Judgment Rule. JUD1 argued that having the Business Judgment Rule 
would have the potential to harm companies, for a director whilst acting in 
good faith can do great damage to companies, if they are not experts and 
free from responsibility for their actions. SHA2 agreed with this point adding 
that the rule is not in companies’ interests, and without director 
																																																								
651According to Hadith (sentence) from Mohammad, 630 CE (Common Era). 
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accountability, a director can misuse his position in the company by taking 
risky decisions. 
SHA4 stated that directors are in their position as they are meant to 
understand the decisions they take for the company. It is their job to predict 
occurrences in the industry and the circumstances in which decisions are 
made. They cannot be excused due to their good faith. SHA3 appreciated 
the merit in the rule, but struggled to believe it could be applicable in Iran. 
SHA3 said, 
 
“The role of the director is more transient 
here, they can be fired very easily. If 
shareholders believe a director is 
responsible for a poor decision, the 
Business Judgement Rule will not save 
them. There is insufficient control on 
directors as well so there is greater need for 
the law to hold them accountable for their 
actions.”   
 
SHA4 made it clear that he believed that directors should have a 
degree of fear of accountability for any poor decisions they might make on 
the company’s behalf. The Business Judgment Rule makes the directors too 
carefree over potentially damaging decisions. The profit of the company is 
always the priority and the director should be accountable for anything that 
jeopardises it. SCH4 stated that in theory the rule has merit in that it protects 
the director if decisions are made in good faith for the company’s interest. In 
his experience however, there are situations where directors should have 
been liable. In one case he said that a judge ruled in the director’s favour, 
when they should not have. He explained, 
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“There was a rice company whose director 
made a decision to export rice to Iraq. After 
some months the government of Iraq forbade 
Iraqi companies from having business with 
Iran suddenly. As the Iranian company had 
mass produced so much rice, they ended up 
selling most of it half price to get rid of the 
stock and they lost a considerable amount of 
money. It turned out that the director had 
been aware of the risk involved in the deal 
with the Iraqi company, however decided that 
it was worth the risk for the company’s 
interest. Surely he is liable if he was aware of 
the risk.” 
 
Of course, in this situation it is questionable whether the director had 
been acting in good faith and would have been saved by a Business 
Judgment Rule. 
SHA5 also provided an example that leads him to believe that the 
Business Judgment Rule could not be applicable in Iran. He stated, 
 
“I worked in a company that was building a 
general hospital in Tehran. After the project 
started it became apparent that they had 
spent less than expected on certain elements 
of the construction. The director had used 
cheaper materials to save the company 
money however the company eventually 
ended up losing the contract. The blame for 
losing the contract was placed on the director 
even though he claimed that his actions were 
made for the benefit of the company. The 
director was rightfully liable for that mistake.” 
 
Many of the interviewees however were in favour of the Business 
Judgement Rule. DIR1 who worked in a family company did not believe the 
rule to be applicable in family companies as decision-making is more 
collaborative. He strongly believed however in public and state owned 
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companies, the rule would be extremely important, as those directors are 
often fearful of taking risks. SCH6 seconded this point stating that it is 
especially important in government companies as directors are often not 
adequately qualified and will need protection of a Business Judgment Rule in 
case they make any mistakes. DIR2 agreed adding that business is about 
taking risks and that it is the director’s job to take these decisions to progress 
the company. He added that some risks do not go as planned and the 
director should not be liable if it goes wrong. 
DIR4 argued that the rule is only there to protect directors if they are 
unfairly being held accountable. Auditors652 still exist to investigate directors 
in case any faults occur through negligence or conflicts of interest. DIR3 also 
mentioned this point stating that the director should not be responsible if they 
act in good faith. He stated, 
 
“Without this rule, directors feel wary about 
taking risks to achieve the company’s 
target. If the director is innocent, it is not fair 
to make him responsible.” 
 
LAW2 added that no directors are perfect. Sometimes they can make 
a decision and not obtain the intended result for the company. There needs 
to be a margin for error, as directors will be weakened if they are punished 
for every mistake. And in the long term the company will suffer more for not 
having an empowered director.  
SCH4 suggested that directors needed the support of the law and that 
it is right that they receive it. He explained in Iran it is possible for directors to 
																																																								
652 ‘Auditor’ use for ‘internal and external control over management’. 
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win cases through the principle of good faith and that certain judges do allow 
the principle in their courts. SCH4 said, 
 
“This rule is not in our company law, but 
some judges support this rule according to 
the directors’ good faith for companies.” 
 
SCH 5 states that often directors’ mistakes can be classed as indirect. 
Issues occur in companies that are caused through the actions of 
employees, however due to the scale of the error the blame is attributed to 
the director. As directors are ultimately responsible for the company’s 
actions, they can be liable for anything that goes wrong in a company. In the 
interview with SCH1, he shared his experience of a case whereby the 
director could not prove that he did something for the company’s benefit with 
good faith. This director defended himself by stating that the company was 
under considerable pressure and no other director would have done a better 
job under the circumstances. In this case, the director was found to be liable 
for breach of duty of care in the articles of association. The Business 
Judgment Rule is needed in cases like this SCH1 argued. 
In conclusion the interviewees clearly conveyed the view that in Iran 
there is no Business Judgment Rule. It is possible to say though that the 
subject of good faith does appear in different parts of Iranian statutory law 
and Islamic law and can save a director from liability. The interviewees were 
split on their opinion as to whether it could be beneficial or detrimental for 
Iran to have the Business Judgment Rule. The shareholders were concerned 
about directors’ having more freedom to take risks whereas directors were in 
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favour of the added protection that the rule provides to allow them to take 
risks without fear of liability.  
5.2.4 Lack of Commercial Court and Coping Mechanisms 
In every jurisdiction there is the need for effective enforcement of 
breaches of duties, as without such systems in place the duties themselves 
have no power upon directors. The way the courts function is a core element 
of the enforcement system, as companies need to have faith in them to bring 
actions against directors. Having faith in the courts is only achieved by when 
the courts are reliable and efficient and consistent. It was important to learn 
how the interviewees understood the process and whether they believed that 
it was functioning to a satisfactory standard. The interviewees were first 
asked which courts were used for commercial cases in Iran. JUD1 described 
the judicial system as having many layers of courts. The constitution dictates 
that there must be civil courts, criminal courts and military courts. He went 
onto say that cases originate in lower courts and can be appealed to in 
higher courts. The highest court is the Supreme Court whose purpose is to 
review cases of capital offenses and rule on death sentences. JUD2 added 
that there are also the Revolutionary Courts and the Special Court. Both 
these courts are based on decrees made by Iran’s supreme leader 
Khamenei. They have never been incorporated into the constitutional 
clauses defining the role and structure of the judiciary.  
Many interviewees remarked about the non-existence of commercial 
courts. LAW1 stated,  
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“In Iran there is no specific commercial 
court and instead general courts are used”  
 
SCH1 agreed mentioning that in Iran there is not an expert court for 
commercial cases. Whilst in the past there was suggestion that it was 
required, in practice the implementation of commercial courts was never 
realised. SCH1 backed up the point that the courts were ineffective for 
commercial cases, stating, 
 
“They are not specific to commercial cases 
and they lack the expertise to rule on 
commercial cases.” 
 
SCH2 also agreed, stating that unfortunately the courts are not 
proficient in Iran as they fail to specialise in company law and often they fail 
to assign a sufficiently knowledgeable judge to preside over cases.  
With the interviewees having established that there were no 
commercial courts, it was necessary at this juncture to uncover what coping 
mechanisms the system has developed to survive. The first coping 
mechanism was to develop the expertise of certain judges in the general 
courts for specific fields, such as company law.  
SCH2 stated that in the last 15 years there had been an improvement 
of the knowledge of certain judges for specialist cases. For cases that pertain 
to a certain field of company law, there will be a referral to a specific judge if 
there is one with appropriate knowledge and experience. Whilst this is not 
uncommon, often even allocated judges will not be sufficiently 
knowledgeable about a subject matter.  
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The second coping mechanism that many interviewees remarked 
about was the courts using delays or adjournments to gain time to allow 
themselves to become more informed about a subject matter. SCH3 and 
SCH6 also stated that the courts do not have enough knowledge to solve 
complex commercial cases and their solution was to delay the cases until 
such time as they can make a decision. SCH4 stated, 
 
“The court for commercial cases always 
draws things out. When it is like this more 
frequently than not, the delay causes more 
problems than the reason you are in court.” 
 
LAW1 reiterated the same concern, stating that legal proceedings in 
Iran were long and expensive due to judges’ lack of familiarity with 
commercial cases. LAW1 said, 
 
“Throughout my twenty years experience, it 
is very rare that commercial cases will be 
resolved successfully in court.” 
 
SCH3 was of the view that if the courts had more expertise they could 
deal with cases on time. SCH4 firmly agreed with this point stating that in 
European countries there are specific courts for commercial cases making 
proceedings more straightforward and quicker. LAW2, much like SCH3, 
made comparisons with Europe stating that Iran obtained its commercial 
code from France but not the framework of the courts. LAW2 believed that, 
 
“We do not have the court system in place to 
make decisions on our law. I had a case that 
was opened 18 years ago in the court and 
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has not been resolved by now. In different 
courts, similar commercial cases are decided 
totally differently.” 
 
DIR1 spoke of the effects that delay has on companies, and stated 
that, 
 
“When the case in the court takes time, that 
delay damages the company and the 
problems become more complex to solve.” 
 
JUD3 explained that for company cases, it is natural that it takes a 
long time to get the result. He currently is the judge in a case that has been 
open for ten years. He said, 
 
“It is necessary to arrange for experts on 
different matters, which can take a long 
time. These experts have to first be 
selected, then they have to prepare their 
findings and a date has to be arranged to 
hear their findings. Always there are delays 
after delays.”  
 
The third coping mechanism is the increasing popularity of arbitration. 
SCH1 stated that since the introduction of the 1997 International Arbitration 
Law in Iran, arbitration has become a less expensive and quicker process. 
Many other interviewees supported the usefulness of arbitration. LAW3 
stated that from a professional point of view, it is more practical using 
arbitration to solve disputes and circumventing the courts. SCH2 furthered 
this point by adding that now it has become standard practice for the joint 
stock companies to use arbitration as a means for resolving issues as 
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opposed to the court. JUD2 added that in smaller cities, arbitration is a better 
solution for commercial cases. JUD2 stated that, 
 
“All the best courts are in Tehran, in smaller 
cities the courts available are of lower quality 
and you stand a better change with an 
arbitrator” 
 
DIR3 was of the belief that in many cases arbitrators are more 
knowledgeable and experienced than the judges as they have often become 
specialists through experience in certain fields of disputes. Moreover, he 
added that they are less expensive and considerably quicker than the courts.  
It is article 282 of Civil Procedure Law that sets out basic 
requirements for arbitrators in Iran. Arbitrators are selected from members of 
the general population who put themselves forward for the job. It is a general 
requirement that they possess a good understanding of law, as the basis of 
all their decision-making should be based on law. Often though, the typical 
applicant from the general public has a superficial understanding of company 
law. Articles 469 and 470 of Arbitration Law in Civil Procedure Law in Iran 
sets out that the person must be a minimum of 25 years old. In any case the 
arbitrator should disclose any connection they have with either party. If the 
arbitrator has any bias then they should abstain from the role and pass the 
case onto an alternative arbitrator. There is a requirement that arbitrators’ 
prior experience cannot include that of someone who has professionally 
practiced law. Judges and lawyers are not able to become arbitrators. If the 
two parties in the case cannot agree on one specific arbitrator then they 
should both select one. Once there are two arbitrators in place, those two 
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can choose a third. Three arbitrators are classed as a board of arbitrators 
and are useful in instances of disagreement of arbitrator choice.   
SCH3 mentioned that it has become commonplace to include in the 
articles of association that legal disputes will be settled through arbitration. 
SCH3 said, 
 
“Large professional companies have 
recently started to include the use of 
arbitration in their articles of association. 
Obtaining a resolution of a matter through 
the court can harm the company’s interest 
due to delays. Arbitration is handled by 
experts, familiar with commercial cases, 
who can deal with issues quicker and better 
than the court.” 
 
The final coping mechanism is settling disputes internally without the 
assistance of the courts. In Iran the interviewees remarked that many cases 
do not go to court, as companies do not have any faith in the court being 
able to fulfil its function. DIR2 explained that often the most cost effective 
way of closing a dispute is to settle. Once it is clear that a case is going to 
take a long time to resolve, reasonable parties will choose to settle, 
especially if it is causing issues for the businesses’ operations. An alternative 
as SCH6 pointed out, is that many company cases are solved through the 
traditional method of empowering either the eldest member of the company 
or an independent third party to make a decision on a dispute within a 
company. 
DIR2 showed a degree of frustration in speaking about the courts. He 
stated that in his company they never take matters to the court, as it is not an 
intelligent way to resolve a matter. He said, 
	214	
“It is slow, expensive and you can not trust 
it to give you a just outcome. We do not use 
the court at the moment nor will we use it in 
the future.” 
 
SHA4 concurred with DIR2, stating that his colleagues, who also 
direct companies, had advised him not to solve his issues through the courts. 
JUD1 advised that in Iran today the standard first step for resolving disputes 
is for the shareholders to attempt to agree on a resolution internally within 
the company. If this proves to be unsuccessful then the second step would 
be escalate the claim to an arbitrator. If arbitration were unsuccessful then 
the final option would be to refer to the court.  
In conclusion, the interviewees confirmed that there are no 
commercial courts in Iran and that instead general courts are used. These 
courts are on the whole under-performing and are not effective. The absence 
of commercial courts contributes to having many judges who are not 
sufficiently experienced or knowledgeable for the cases and this results in 
many delays. Arbitration has become increasingly popular and many 
companies try to settle disputes outside the court. What this means for 
directors duties is that cases on the subject matter are often not being dealt 
with as they should be which can lead to the incorrect outcome, especially if 
matters are resolved internally within the company or they go to arbitration. 
Without all cases being properly managed by a commercial court, there is a 
danger that outcomes will be inconsistent. 
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5.2.5 The Role of Judges 
A key instrument in the legal process is a competent judicial institution 
that the public can rely on to determine decisions in line with the law of the 
country. Judicial outcomes have a significant role in deciding breaches of 
directors’ duties, as a thorough understanding from judges on the matter 
should produce the consistency that is required. It is important to firstly 
analyse whether the judges are carrying out their role effectively and the 
public are satisfied with them. Attention should also be focused on the path 
to becoming a judge and whether this process prepares judges suitably. The 
judgement making process will then be looked at to see how decisions are 
made and finally attention will be given to any issues that currently exist with 
the system. 
The first point raised with the interviewees on the subject of judges is 
how competent judges are and whether they can be trusted in their position. 
Not one shareholder, director, lawyer or scholar responded in the affirmative. 
A key complaint of judges is that they are not sufficiently experienced and 
knowledgeable to make decisions in line with the law. SCH1 claimed that it is 
rare to come across a judge who is suitably educated and has the relevant 
expertise. In his opinion, Judges are appointed according to their political 
and religious connections. DIR4 attested that judges do not have an 
adequate grounding in company law. Also, he said, 
 
“For me, I should have some experience 
related to my job if I am to do some 
managing in a company, but the judges do 
not seem to have any experience.” 
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DIR3 added that from his experience as a director and having a 
degree in law, he was yet to see a judge who was sufficiently knowledgeable 
and experienced to make fair decisions. LAW1 also agreed with this point, 
adding that if one wants to complain about any breaches, achieving a correct 
decision in line with the law was difficult, as the judge often did not have 
sufficient understanding of the law and business to be able to adequately 
understand the situation and make a correct decision. LAW2 backed up the 
point further by contesting that judges were not proficient enough to make 
logical, correct and fair decisions. He said, 
 
“Proving the breach of directors is difficult 
and also conflict of interest is difficult to 
prove and therefore judges struggle with 
these cases as they fail to adequately grasp 
the situations and apply law to reach 
decisions.” 
 
The opinion of the scholars supported the criticisms made by the 
shareholders, directors and lawyers. SCH1 believed that judges’ unfamiliarity 
with the commercial context of cases and the understanding of which laws 
are the most appropriate for such cases was the reason that court 
proceedings were often long and expensive. SCH2 was of the opinion that 
judges were not very familiar with company law in comparison with other 
forms of law. SCH3 was of the same opinion that, 
 
“Company law is complex in Iran and in 
order to give good decisions the judges 
must be very experienced and 
knowledgeable in the field of company law. 
Unfortunately, our judges do not have 
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sufficient opportunities and time to become 
experts in commercial law. If judges 
properly understood commercial law, it 
would solve half the flaws of the company 
law in Iran. The lack of understanding of law 
by judges is more serious than the lack of 
company law.” 
 
There was a clear consensus amongst the interviewees that practising 
judges were insufficiently knowledgeable and experienced.  
The next point considered was whether there is suitable academic 
training in place to become a judge. JUD1 revealed that at the time when he 
became a judge the minimum age requirement was 22 years old and the 
only academic requirement was that one has completed a bachelors degree 
in law. In his case, following the completion of his degree in law at university, 
he became a judge at the age of 25. Of his entire undergraduate course 
there was only one module on company law and that was the extent of his 
company law experience. JUD1 said, 
 
“When I first started there were cases that 
arose where I felt out of my depth and 
sometimes even lost.” 
 
As SCH1 pointed out, the process these days to become a judge had 
changed. The main criteria is passing an examination which is only open to 
attendees of the judiciary course at the Judicial Sciences University in 
Tehran or those who have studied Islamic studies at university. SCH1 said, 
 
“Needless to say neither will adequately 
prepare a student to be a judge for 
commercial cases. An academic foundation 
	218	
in Islamic sources will assist students for 
family legal cases or criminal cases, but for 
company law it is less useful. For judges of 
cases involving company law, I expect it 
would be far more useful to study at the 
judicial school, but even still it is far from 
sufficient preparation to make company law 
judgements.”  
 
The third point the interviewees responded to was the decision 
making itself. SHA3 shared his first hand experience of a case where the 
judge made an incorrect decision due to a poor understanding of companies 
and shareholders’ legal identities. He, as a shareholder, was forced to 
personally discharge his company’s liability due to a judge’s ruling. This error 
was due to a lack of knowledge of the law.  
Another type of error that judges have been making is deciding 
judgements according to their own tastes as opposed to the law. DIR2 stated 
that despite all judges having to base their decision-making on company law, 
decisions lack consistency. He added that you see examples whereby in 
similar cases that deal with the same principles, judicial decisions were 
different. JUD1 confirmed this point, by stating that they were the people 
entrusted to make the right decisions when the law is not specific enough. 
Errors in judgments have also frequently come about due to the Islamic 
principle of siding with the weaker party. In cases where the law is on the 
side of the stronger party, the judge has ruled in favour of the weaker party. 
DIR1 who works in a bank went to the court to settle a matter that was 
causing the bank problems. He believed the reason the judge ruled against 
the bank was because he thought that the bank was wealthy enough to pay 
the amount claimed.   
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DIR1 explained that errors of judgement were made sometimes when 
there was an external factor influencing the decision of the judge. SHA2 
stated that if you do not have enough money and good connections with 
someone in the courts, you would struggle to get a favourable decision or a 
decision at all. He went on to say that he knew of a case where someone 
successfully paid an amount of money to the judge in order for the judge to 
rule in his favour. In that example the person who brought the action 
continually had issues with the trial date being postponed. It was brought to 
light that the opposing party had been bribing the judge to force the court to 
continually delay the hearing. The official reason for the delay was that the 
judge was out of the country on annual leave, however it transpired that the 
opposing party had paid for the judge to take this leave of absence in order 
to keep delaying the case. SHA4 refrained from providing examples, 
however he was in agreement that judges were including irrelevant factors in 
their decision-making and producing incorrect and unfair judgments. He 
stated that it was not only bribery that encourages judges to be biased, it was 
also fear of higher authorities. DIR3 provided the example of the case of a 
well-known bank (the interviewee did name the bank) that was accused of 
permitting loans that failed to comply with standard protocols. He said that 
there was more than enough proof to demonstrate corruption however the 
judge ruled in favour of the bank due to its connections. LAW3 stated, 
 
“Sometimes I have had cases where it was 
very clear that the law was on my side 
however due to the opposition being a 
public company with state elected directors 
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I lost the case as the judge chose to side 
with the company which was state owned.” 
 
LAW4 supported the claim that judges often favour particular 
companies. He stated that if the judge were to face a governmental company 
or even a private company with powerful connections, he definitely would 
demonstrate bias toward the powerful party. This has often proved to be the 
case when judges feel there is state involvement. LAW5 provided an 
example from his own experience, 
 
“A colleague had an agricultural project to 
make a man made ‘green area’. He worked 
on it spending six billion Iranian Rials.653 The 
company that hired him was a government 
company and it refused to pay the whole 
amount offering a payment of half of his 
claim. The colleague sued and the judge 
ruled in favour of the governmental company 
despite having contracts in place for the 
amount owed and the work to be done.” 
 
SCH1 provided an explanation for the instances where government 
backed companies receive support. SCH1 said, 
 
“Specific groups like the Army of the 
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and 
Basij 654  are exempt from liabilities that 
normal directors face. The Army of the 
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution has 
powerful links in finance, government and the 
military. In companies run by these people, 
the judges have fear of repercussions if they 
provide a negative decision.  As more than 
60 per cent of the economy is run by these 																																																								
653 137107.40 pounds. 
654 Basij is ‘a Paramilitary Volunteer Militia’ established in 1979 by order of the Islamic 
Revolution's leader Khomeini. 
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kinds of companies, such as all 
telecommunication companies, Petro-Pars 
company (PPL), lots of agricultural 
companies, etc.” 
 
Apart from these external factors influencing judges’ decision making, 
one of the most debilitating aspects to the judiciary process is, as mentioned 
earlier, delays. SHA1 provided an example from her former role as an officer 
of the court, where it was her job to gather information about a case and 
provide her opinion as to how the case should be determined. In most of the 
cases she was involved in, the judge delayed cases due to the court’s 
difficulty in making a decision with certainty. SCH1 and LAW1 further 
supported this statement by suggesting that the reason the court 
proceedings are often long and expensive is due to the judge’s unfamiliarity 
with cases. SHA5 further added that delaying could be a tactic to make 
parties resolve cases outside the court. SCH1, SCH3 and LAW3 all agreed 
that judges do delay cases for this purpose.  
In conclusion, all of the interviewees besides judges had damning 
points to raise about the quality of judges today in Iran, branding them 
insufficiently educated and experienced to be placed in the position of 
authority that they hold. Modern education procedures and training for 
judges were criticised and they were suggested of being susceptible to 
external pressures such as bribery and influence from higher authorities. 
Again the outcome is much the same in that cases of directors’ duties are not 
being adequately managed. It is a fundamental requirement for consistent 
judgment making that judges in charge of cases of directors’ duties are 
suitably experienced, educated and knowledgeable to handle the cases. 
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Without these criteria being met, they will not be able to make the correct 
decisions.  
5.2.6 Inconsistent Judicial Interpretations  
Having now considered the role of judges, the next step is to look at 
the orders made and what impact this has on directors’ duties. The 
consistency of judicial decisions is a key ingredient to a successful legal 
system and through the doctrinal research it has been called into question 
whether judges are interpreting the law consistently. It was important to hear 
from the interviewees to see whether they believed this to be the case and if 
not, what was happening. 
SCH1 believed that the law is not sufficiently precise and this results 
in the judges finding it hard to interpret the law. SCH1 said, 
 
“Many aspects of Iranian Company Law can 
be interpreted in different ways. In a lower 
court the judge might decide a case through 
his interpretation of the law, which then gets 
overruled in a higher court due to a more 
senior judge having a different 
interpretation. Overturned judgments are 
not uncommon.” 
 
SCH4 stated that many of the 600 articles in Iranian Company Law 
produced in May 1932 were too vague in their translations, allowing for 
subjective interpretations. Subjective interpretations produce inconsistent 
rulings by judges. The judges mainly agreed with this point, with JUD3 
stating, 
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“The result is that we, the judiciary, are 
widely considered to be one of the Islamic 
Republic’s most dysfunctional institutions.” 
 
LAW2 offered a possible cause of the problem. He argued that the 
root of the problem is that judges have too many different sources of law to 
draw upon. LAW2 stated, 
 
“Our company law is originally imported from 
France and it is mixed now with Belgian and 
Islamic law. It is too muddled up as judges 
have options for which laws they want to use 
to base their decisions on.”   
 
SHA1 in contrast suggested that the fault lies with the judges. He 
stated that if there was a higher standard of judges in Iran who were all well 
educated and experienced, there would not be the same variety of 
interpretations. He added that the established, experienced judges were 
making correct decisions however the younger ones were out of their depth, 
making incorrect judgments. LAW1 suggested that the simplest solution was 
that all law on duties should form part of the Iranian Company Law, as it 
would prevent judges interpreting the law in different ways.  
In conclusion it is clear that the interviewees believed the judges are 
interpreting the law in an inconsistent way producing varying judgments for 
similar cases. One cause suggested by SHA4 was that the company law 
translated from the original French codes was translated in such a way as to 
produce vagueness. Another cause suggested was that there were too many 
sources of law which had led to confusion as to which were the most suitable 
sources for particular cases. The last suggestion was that the standard of 
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expertise and experience of judges varied considerably from one to the next. 
The interviewees when asked about solutions suggested simplifying the law 
by having all company related law provided for in one document, namely in 
statutory law. Directors’ duties naturally would be included in this document, 
which would greatly limit the inconsistency of judicial interpretations. 
5.2.7 Weak Legislation  
As has already been seen in Chapter 3, the legislation on directors’ 
duties in Iran is weak. The interviewees were asked for their opinion on the 
current legislation to gage how functional the existing code is considered. It 
was hoped that their responses on the subject could offer a professional 
perspective as to the current state of it and whether it is able to fulfil its 
function. 
The first clear message from the interviewees was that legislation for 
directors’ duties is not sufficiently modernised to deal with the issues that 
present themselves in cases today. LAW3 stated that Iranian Company Law 
is very old and it fails to fulfil the function they require it to. SCH2 stated that 
there was no doubt that company law was in need of an update, as there 
were serious gaps in the legislation. SCH3 agreed, stating that over the 
passing of time it would be necessary to amend the law to ensure that it is in 
keeping with the changes in the country’s economy and society. He added 
that in Iran’s case there had not been any updates. SCH4 mentioned that 
Iran had many different articles in codes and it would take a lot of time to 
update, but it was overdue and necessary.  
SCH1 stated that there were many weaknesses in company law and 
that it required amending and updating to make it more in line with business 
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activity that operates today as opposed to when the law was written. SCH5 
agreed with this point adding that Iran’s Company Law was old and it was 
not in harmony with either the economy or with society. JUD1 added that it 
was 80 years since the law had changed. He attributed the reasons for this 
failure to be due to the fear of the new law not being successful and the lack 
of qualified experts to assist a successful reform of the law. SCH2 stated that 
the law was exceptionally out of date and also remarked that it had never 
been satisfactory. He added that not only is company law out of date but also 
it was translated poorly from the original French codes.   
After this clear message that the law is out of date and there are no 
revisions in the pipeline, the natural question to ask the interviewees was 
whether there was anything that was preventing these updates. The 
interviewees made it clear that the lack of updates was not the fault of 
legislators but rather that proposed amendments were rarely getting passed. 
JUD1 stated that the committee that oversee updates to the law fears 
updating it since the time of the revolution. They fear that if they change the 
law it might make it worse.  
SCH2 feared the influence of the Islamic Consultative Assembly,655 
the religious committee responsible for approving, tweaking or refusing any 
suggested law reforms. SCH2 said, 
 
																																																								
655 The Guardian Council of the Constitution is an appointed and constitutionally mandated 
12-member council that wields considerable power and influence in Iran; The Iranian 
constitution calls for the council to be composed of six Islamic faqihs (expert in Islamic Law), 
‘conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day’ to be selected by Khamenei 
(Iranian Supreme leader), and six jurists, ‘specialising in different areas of law’, to be elected 
by the Iranian Parliament from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the 
Judicial Power ‘Powers and Authority of The Islamic Consultative Assembly’. 
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“One day if there is desire to change the 
law, there is great risk that amendments will 
not be what the country’s economy needs. If 
any laws are put forward that are deemed 
not to be in keeping with Islam, they are 
rejected without providing reasoning for 
their decision. Typically the only laws that 
are passed are watered down and twisted 
to meet the criteria of the committee.” 
 
SCH3 echoed the same ideas, stating that they wanted to update and 
improve the law a while ago, however the Islamic Consultative Assembly did 
not accept it and failed to provide a reason.656  It was suggested that if the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly had accepted this, there could have been 
great improvement of codes. SCH3 said, 
 
“I was invited to the committee of law makers 
to amend and change the law which I agreed 
to. The team working on the changes were 
all experts in their fields and we spent great 
amounts of time and money developing the 
proposed amendments. In the end the 
proposal was declined by the Guardian 
Council, and the laws put forward were not 
implemented. The reason for the failure was 
that the amendments were not in line with the 
Islamic principles of the regime and the 
Guardian Council.”   
 
SCH4 stated that the last update to company law was in 1969, not 
that long before the revolution. This update touched on some aspects of 
public and private joint stock companies. Since then the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly had not accepted any reforms. JUD2 made the point that whilst 
there was a desire to make reforms a few years ago, the addition of 
directors’ duties was never included in the plans.   																																																								
656See Chapter 3, section 3.3.3: Legislation Reform. 
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Without any updates and without directors’ duties being included in 
the law, companies either operate in ignorance or try to find solutions in 
another way. The most common solution, as SCH5 stated, was including 
duties in the articles of association. Companies’ articles have become the 
main source of law governing companies. He added that if there was 
statutory law it would be easier for people to follow and practices would be 
greatly ameliorated. Furthermore, it would protect those involved in 
companies who were not sufficiently knowledgeable to produce articles of 
association that are all encompassing. SCH5 said, 
 
“As for directors’ duties, they belong in 
statutory law as they are one of the 
fundamental pillars of company law. As it 
stands today the law on them is weak and 
imprecise and the result is that no directors 
know about their real duties.” 
 
SCH5 argued that the system would function much better if 
everything were to be covered in the law. SCH4 stated that laws should be 
found within company law not just in articles of association. If all directors 
knew about their duties, company practises in Iran would be revolutionised. 
Moreover, apart from the articles being the main source of law, with 
the law being so silent about the role of directors, there is little knowledge in 
Iran about many aspects of the position. JUD1 argued that there was not 
even a specific definition of directors and what their role consisted of. There 
was not a clear understanding as to what was the difference between 
executive and non-executive directors. There are different types of 
companies in Iran and it should be the case that the role of the director 
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differs between these, however without clear duties directors are not able to 
know the parameters in which they can operate. Also, the lack of updates to 
the law has resulted in limitations to companies that should no longer exist. 
JUD1 further added that under Iranian Company Law, it was not possible to 
have single shareholder companies, and this was circumvented by the use of 
people acting as token shareholders to allow the companies, which were 
effectively one-shareholder companies, to operate. Recently in Iran, some 
labour law has been translated from Swiss law. The translation was not 
adapted to account for the Iranian economy and the law failed, and in the 
process many businesses became casualties of this failure.  
There were further criticisms of the limitations that emerged as a 
result of the lack of updates. LAW1 stated that it was necessary to include 
the rights of shareholders in Iranian Company Law, as these were not 
adequately provided for in the law that exists today. Moreover, he added 
that, there was no mention of joint ventures, which has become a staple 
feature of all modern nations’ company legal code. DIR1 stated that the 
Iranian code was silent on the issue of derivative actions. This makes the job 
of the lawyer considerably more difficult as it puts a lot of emphasis on the 
articles of association being watertight. In cases where the articles were not 
comprehensive, minority shareholders would not be well protected. 
SCH4 stated that currently directors should be selected from one of 
the shareholders. He stated that this principle is archaic and should not exist 
in today’s legal code as it would force shareholders to appoint someone who 
is often unqualified to be the director. SCH2 agreed with this point stating 
that the law is out of date since it was introduced in the civil code. He added 
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that in France this was amended when a new law was introduced making 
allowances for single shareholder companies. In Iran, there was no such 
amendment and businesses still have to work within these confines, having 
at least two shareholders. In reality there are businesses in Iran that are 
family businesses where one person owns the company, however appoints 
other family members as token shareholders to bypass this law.   
LAW3 stated that as it stands today directors are poorly controlled and 
might abuse the law in many ways but the law might be totally silent. There 
should be clear directors’ duties in place to make them liable for their actions. 
A further point added by LAW3 was that he believed there should be 
stronger legislation regarding who can set up companies. He stated that it 
should not be that easy to set up a company and that there should be 
requirements as to how little investment is needed to do so. Having clear law 
for this is necessary. 
SCH2 stated that adapting the law to suit the economy and society is 
standard practice outside of Iran. SCH2 stated, 
 
“Our law in the beginning came from French 
code and was not adapted for Iran. It was 
copied and pasted and has proved in many 
circumstances to be unsuitable.  
Amendments that the French legal system 
has made over the years, the Iranian system 
has failed to make. The result is that Iranian 
civil code still resembles law from Napoleonic 
times when it was introduced.”  
 
SCH6 believed that the lack of legislation for company law was the 
principal reason companies did not trust the court. SCH6 said, 
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“The lack of strong legislation behind judges 
prevents them from making decisions 
adequately and it results in companies’ 
preference for arbitration or solving matters 
outside the court.” 
 
SHA2 agreed that it certainly would be an improvement to have all the 
main points accounted for in law, but warned that this would not solve the 
culture of corruption. He said, 
 
“Even if we have the law, it will not be for 
everybody. People in high positions can 
escape it with bribery or through their 
connections.” 
 
SCH6 concurred stating that companies do not follow the letter of the 
law, but rather they follow the board of directors. He suggested that when 
there is such poor knowledge of the law by shareholders and directors 
typically shareholders just trust the directors to use their judgement to keep 
the company on a good and legal path. DIR1 explained that there was a 
considerable amount that needed addressing and that in one interview it 
would not be possible to go through it all. He said that law on directors’ 
duties is completely non-existent. He further added that he hoped that new 
law would protect shareholders and especially minority shareholders as 
many issues occur in this subject area regularly. DIR1 added that Iran was at 
a tricky juncture. Whilst it was clear that changes needed to be made it was 
important to select the most intelligent method and manner of making these 
changes. DIR1 said, 
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“People are stuck between these four 
options,  
1. Do not change law, bad experience of this 
in the past. 
2. Total reform, delete what exists and 
replace it with new law.  
3. Instead of changing it totally, get the 
experience of the past and modify it to fit, 
following the example of France, Egypt and 
Singapore. 
4. Instead of changing all of it, just change it 
case by case.” 
 
Most interviewees agreed that the current issues could be addressed 
in legislative reforms. They further concurred that should these issues be 
changed and amended then there would be huge improvements in how the 
whole legal system operated for company law. With all these shortfalls in the 
legislation at this point it would be necessary to hear from companies about 
how they cope with such little legislation and also from judges about how 
they make decisions without the law on which to base decisions.   
LAW3 stated that companies are required to have articles of 
association and the more ‘savvy’ companies have extremely extensive 
articles to make up for the lack of legislation. JUD3 admitted that many more 
points should be addressed in law however there is a culture of companies 
managing to cope with the law as it is and he said, 
 
“The shareholders know best for themselves. 
They are able to put the points they need in 
the articles of association for the company.” 
 
SHA4 agreed with this point stating that she believed the law to be 
sufficient. She added that the articles of association contain all the needed 
points and any points that are lacking can be changed at the next meeting. 
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LAW2 suggested that it would be much better if the law were more coherent 
and accounted for everything as opposed to leaving the responsibility to 
shareholders and the articles of association. Normally clients would refer to 
the law if there were nothing in place in the articles of association. The law is 
seen as a secondary resource compared to the articles. The same 
interviewee stated that if the law were adequate, it would improve things 
greatly. Whilst the articles of association are a useful tool, they are typically 
created by the principal shareholders, who might structure the document to 
suit their interest. Updates to the law would solve many of these issues and 
could make the coverage of duties fair for all parties. 
The judges too are limited by the lack of legislation. DIR2 mentioned 
that the duty of the judge in court is to produce a result based on law. If there 
is no point of reference in the law, then they have to use the Fighh. JUD2 
also stated that the first resource for commercial matters judges use is the 
law and secondly they may refer to the Fighh or other Islamic sources. The 
Fighh is used as a core component of civil law for which there are many 
provisions on which the Islamic law is precise. JUD3 seconded this point 
stating that the Fighh is sufficient enough to answer most cases and he 
questioned whether there is the need for any more legislation. Nevertheless, 
according to DIR2 the role of the judge becomes significantly simpler if there 
is the law in place that can be referred to on a consistent basis for making 
determinations. Cases that are similar will always be resolved in the same 
way and it will be possible to have consistency.  
In conclusion it is clear from the interviewees that company law in Iran 
is dated and has not been modernised with updates. Remarks are made that 
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whilst the economy and society has changed over the years, the company 
law has failed to respond and move with the times. Reasons suggested for 
the lack of modifications is that there is fear that new legislation amendments 
will be successful and also that there are questions as to whether there is the 
professional expertise to put such changes into place. There have been 
efforts made to put forward improvements to the relevant authorities to make 
updates to the law however these have been unsuccessful. Should updates 
be put forward again there is need to completely update directors’ duties and 
enforcement. 
5.2.8 Family Companies  
It is apparent from the existing research that family companies are 
exceptionally common in Iran and this was further confirmed by the 
interviewees. Family companies often are run differently from other 
companies, and it is the purpose of this section to understand what 
differences do exist and whether there are any issues that impact upon 
directors’ duties.   
5.2.8.1 Family Companies are Common 
All the interviewees remarked that family companies are an incredibly 
prevalent feature of Iranian commerce and that most companies in Iran have 
been developed from family companies. DIR1 mentioned that from his 15 
years experience more than 70 per cent of all companies he encountered 
were family companies. LAW3 said, and SCH1 agreed, family companies are 
most prevalent in cooperative and joint stock companies. JUD1 stated that 
more than 70 per cent of the private joint stock companies are family 
companies. SCH1 furthered this point by stating that he understood there to 
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be about 700,000 private joint stock companies that are family companies. 
LAW4 and JUD2 explained that apart from large companies and 
governmental companies most companies are family companies. LAW5 
stated that from his experience the majority of his clients are either family 
companies or involved in family companies. DIR3 said, 
  
“Our company is a family company, my friend 
runs his father’s company at the moment as 
well. Also, another friend of mine works at a 
very well known car company, which is a 
family company too. It is common to meet 
people who are involved in family 
companies.” 
 
In contrast to the majority of interviewees who stated how prevalent 
family companies were in Iran, SCH3 stated that whilst there were many 
family companies in Iran, it seemed to be becoming less common. 
5.2.8.2 Trust in Family members  
It was important for the researcher to next ascertain why family 
companies are so common in Iran. DIR3 stated that installing family 
members in the main positions within a company is beneficial for the future of 
the business as it becomes easier to have trust. SHA1 agreed with this point 
stating, 
 
“We cannot trust in directors who are 
strangers. We just trust in those who have 
large shares in our company and our family 
members. We should be the ones running 
our company.” 
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SHA4 remarked that for the security of the company and the 
company’s best interest, it is better to have family or relatives as the 
members of the company. SHA4 stated, 
 
“It is easier to control the company, there 
should not be any conflict of interest as 
relatives should be trustworthy, and there 
should not be any need to go to the court to 
solve issues as it should be easier to 
communicate with relatives. When a 
company employs a stranger, after quitting 
the job they might do something in conflict 
with the company’s interest through 
knowledge of the company secrets.” 
 
SHA5 stated that employing relatives is very popular among 
companies. Sometimes a person might not be able to afford to start a 
company on their own that is why they get some investments from relatives, 
as they can trust them for assistance in making the company profitable.  
5.2.8.3 Connected or Qualified Directors in Family Companies? 
The first questionable component of the practice of building family 
companies is that the reason for selecting certain people to occupy key 
positions is due to them being a member of the person’s family. This 
reasoning has nothing to do with capability to carry out the role or experience 
of carrying out similar roles. SCH6 stated that the most important positions 
were occupied by individuals who had obtained them through their 
connections as opposed to skill and merit. SHA5 was also aware of the 
practice and stated that it was common that people use family connections to 
get important positions even if they lack the qualifications for the role and do 
not have the skill for that job. This opinion was supported by DIR4 and DIR5 
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who stated that the vast majority of people in key positions in Iran got there 
through their political or family connections. If you do not have any family 
connections you will never achieve any high position in a company. DIR3 
offered the example of himself who is currently the manager of a bank. He 
explained that he obtained his first job in the bank because his father had 
been the manager for 30 years. DIR3 said, 
 
“That is why the same bank trusted me and 
gave me the job the first time. Most of the 
time for being the manager of big companies, 
you should have some connections and more 
importance is placed on these connections 
than your skill.” 
 
DIR1 explained that the standard procedure for recruiting new staff 
was to consider the manager’s relatives and then the relatives of the current 
staff. This strategy is used instead of advertising the job.  
JUD1 stated that it is common to see directors lose their jobs as the 
shareholders replace them for the purpose of installing a family member. 
JUD1 said, 
 
“In many cases, the majority shareholders 
decide to remove a director without any 
logical business reason. In one case I know 
of the shareholders removed a director 
because one shareholder wanted to replace 
him with his own son.” 
 
DIR3 who works in a state company admitted that they have used 
family connections for hiring people for sensitive and important positions. 
SCH3 furthered this point about state companies, adding that in almost all 
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cases they select the close relatives or family member of the relevant 
Minister. So, the recruitment for senior positions depends on an individual’s 
connection to the Minister rather than their capability. LAW6 who also had 
experience of government companies confirmed that people were using their 
political, family and friendship connections to get the role of director. DIR5, 
who is currently the director of a state company, said, 
 
“I can see this weakness and it is so common 
to select important staff according to the 
interest of the director rather than any other 
requirement. If you can employ a good friend 
to the company, you know they will support 
you and be loyal.”  
 
DIR2 lamented that unfortunately in Iran, they do not separate family 
and friendship from business. Until there is a redefinition of these 
boundaries, companies will always be limited by these practices. 
LAW1 provided an example where a customer came to him to write up 
the articles of association of a new company. The director knew so little 
about the company that it was very difficult to understand exactly what was 
needed to be included because the director was uninformed. It was clear that 
he was a puppet of the main shareholder and had obtained the role through 
connections. JUD2 stated that unfortunately, many wealthy people who 
incorporate companies are not educated and they do not use educated 
people as a director. Also, many educated people are not wealthy as well 
and they cannot control a company or be appointed as a director of the 
company.  
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The next questionable component of family companies is token 
appointments. When setting up a business there are certain requirements in 
the Iranian Company Law that stipulate that there must be more than one 
shareholder, that there must be a company auditor and that every five years 
it is necessary to change the director.  SCH2 stated that for registering the 
company, a person would typically appoint a family member as an auditor. 
This person might not even know about the company’s name or existence. 
JUD2 stated that it is common that both directors and auditors are family 
members and do not have enough skill to run the company. SCH2 stated 
that most of the time companies have one person in control, the principal 
shareholder. If you look at all the other appointments like the auditor you find 
they are artificial. For instance, DIR5 stated that there is a well-known car 
company, which is a family company that installed the wife of the director as 
the company auditor. DIR1 stated that there are many companies in Iran in 
which the shareholders and directors are made up of the wife, the children 
and the relatives of the real company owner. SHA5 said, 
 
“I know a company where the wife has had 
periods when she has acted as the official 
director. This person has zero basic 
education and cannot even read and write. 
She knows how to do a signature, which is all 
her husband needs.” 
 
JUD3 stated that most family companies in reality have only one 
shareholder. According to Iranian Company Law, it is a requirement of all 
companies to have at least two shareholders. 657  That one shareholder 
																																																								
657Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 94 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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appoints a family member they can trust to be a nominal second shareholder 
to meet the legal requirement. In practice though the company is run by the 
one shareholder and the second person is just asked to sign the odd 
document every once in a while. LAW3 was familiar with this practice and 
stated that they needed to use family members as token shareholders 
otherwise they cannot run their businesses on their own. He said, 
 
“I had a case where the main shareholder 
had appointed his 12 year old child as the 
second shareholder. This is illegal, which the 
man learned, however it is an example that 
people are forced into these practices by the 
law which does not suit them.” 
 
In conclusion, the interviewees clarified that family companies form a 
large proportion of registered businesses in Iran. The issue with placing 
family members in positions of power is that more often than not they will not 
be qualified if they obtained the position based on their family connections. 
Many interviewees agreed that the default way to obtain a high position in 
Iran was to use your family, political and friendship connections. Standard 
recruitment procedures in many companies are to speak to relatives and 
friends as opposed to advertising a job in the traditional way. Having 
unqualified relatives appointed to positions they do not deserve, can result in 
dire consequences for companies. It is also commonplace for family 
members to be appointed in an artificial way, which allows one person to 
maintain complete control of a company as if it were a single shareholder 
company. The present company law rules force directors to become 
inventive with their company structure, which leads to token appointments of 
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relatives who in fact are not involved in the day to day running of the 
company.    
5.2.9 Unqualified directors in companies  
Within the debate of the effectiveness of directors’ duties in Iran it is 
also necessary to look at who becomes a director, their degree of expertise, 
how the appointments are made and what effect this is having on 
companies. From speaking to the interviewees there was an overall 
response that most appointed directors are unqualified for their positions. 
LAW2 stated that directors were unfamiliar with their duties and that they did 
not know what responsibilities they had in the company. DIR2 furthered the 
point by adding that the title of director does not necessarily indicate that a 
person is worthy of such a role. Often there is no test, no interview, no 
training and the selection process is non-existent. DIR2 said,  
 
“The director should have appropriate 
experience and knowledge. He or she should 
at least have the necessary training in 
running the finances of a company.” 
 
DIR5 stated that often it is the case that the directors do not have 
enough experience and this can lead to them harming the company and 
shareholders’ interests. Several interviewees suggested situations in which 
the wrongful appointment of directors led to issues within companies. LAW1 
mentioned that he was involved in a case where there were two people that 
had a company and one of them had the company money in his personal 
account and there was nothing in the law to control the situation. LAW1 
argued that there should be safeguards in place against a director doing this, 
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and also against someone becoming a director who is not aware that this not 
permitted.   
LAW4 stated that it is common for companies to end their existence in 
a negative manner. There are many bankruptcies and many companies are 
dissolved. The majority of the time the cause of the issues is the action of an 
incapable director who has been appointed according to either family or 
political connections. 
Apart from a consensus that directors are unqualified, the 
interviewees also agreed that the requirement of directors to be selected 
from the shareholders is having a detrimental impact on companies. DIR3 
stated that the decision to limit the selection of directors to just shareholders 
was based on good intentions. The reality for companies though is that 
limiting the pool of candidates to select from has become a weakness for 
them. LAW2 agreed and said, 
 
“In Iranian Company Law, directors are 
appointed from the shareholders. This has a 
detrimental impact on the choice of director 
as it limits the candidate selection to a small 
group. Naturally the level of expertise of the 
director will not be to the required standard 
unless a shareholder happens to be 
sufficiently experienced to take on the role.” 
 
SCH1 made the point that there is no requirement in Iran that 
directors have a minimum standard of expertise. The only requirement that 
directors should possess is having shares in the company. SCH2 stated that 
it should be the other way around. Firstly directors should be appointed on 
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merit and once they develop and succeed in a role, they should be able to 
become a shareholder. SCH2 said, 
 
“In other countries, first he or she becomes 
director and then that person might invest in 
the company and purchase shares. Being 
rich enough to be a shareholder does not 
qualify them to be a director.” 
 
DIR3 stated that the main issue that comes from having one of the 
shareholders as a director is that they will always put their own interest 
ahead of that of the company or the other shareholders. DIR3 said,  
 
“Majority shareholders will pick the individual 
that will pursue their interest most. That is 
how they understand the selection 
process.”658 
 
DIR5 reiterated this point stating that directors do not realise they are 
meant to be working for the best interests of the company, they see the 
company in more personal terms and consider themselves to be working for 
the majority shareholders. 
DIR3 made the point that it is possible to select the non-executive 
directors from outside of the shareholders, which can help to create a board 
of directors with a balanced skillset. He furthered the point by stating that, 
certainly the practice of favouring family members and running the company 
for majority shareholders is not unique to Iran and it happens in small 
companies all across the world. If they are installed as directors though they 
will be liable for any breaches towards the company.  																																																								
658 Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 107 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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In state owned companies interviewees believed that there were many 
unqualified directors who had been appointed in their roles through their 
connections with those who were in political power. LAW1 stated that in 
governmental companies the selection of directors is made according to 
taste and there are extremely lax controls on their monitoring. LAW2 said 
that,  
 
“It is common for appointments of directors 
to be made according to politics. When you 
look at the experience of some directors 
you realise they are the son of someone 
important or a relative of someone in 
government. It is all fixed.” 
 
LAW6 argued that in business in Iran, it is all about politics. He 
explained that, 
 
“I was a lawyer who advised the government 
on navigation issues in the Persian Gulf 
during the years 1997 to 2005. In August 
2005 there was a change of president in 
Iran659 and in many sectors the advisors to 
the former regime became obsolete and new 
ones were appointed. I, like many others, 
was not invited to advise for the government 
again. Instead of selecting the most qualified 
people for jobs, the government makes 
appointments in line with their taste.” 
 
In conclusion, the interviewees revealed it to be commonplace to have 
vastly unqualified directors at the helm of companies. With there being no 
duties in place many directors have no reason to adhere to any duties. One 																																																								
659 Iran’s 9th presidential election, Mohammad Khatami, the previous President of Iran, 
stepped down on 2 August 2005 and the election led to the success of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. 
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of the reasons why directors are often unqualified is that directors can only 
be appointed if they are one of the shareholders. This limits the pool of 
candidates and reduces the opportunity to select a sufficiently qualified 
individual. Another element that produces unqualified directors is that in 
family companies relatives are often appointed. Having unqualified directors 
greatly increases the need for duties as those individuals are more likely to 
steer the company in to harms way through error.  
5.2.10 Separation of powers 
From research documented in Chapter 3 it has been established that 
Iran has a theocratic government that involves itself in business and law. 
Apart from the government there is another political institution that involves 
itself in business, which is the Army of the Guardians. This is a religious 
organisation controlled by the office of the Islamic supreme leader, 
Khamenei. 660  It was important when speaking to the interviewees to 
understand the extent to which these two bodies affect on cases of directors’ 
duties. 
It is clear from the interviewees that certain directors are not subject to 
the same rules as other directors. Due to the involvement of the government 
and the army of guardians in companies the directors who are appointed in 
these companies have political duties before company duties.   
Directors are often installed in companies with some agenda from the 
government. Instead of working in the company’s interest they are doing 
favourable deals for the government and thus abusing the company’s 
investment. They are installed to promote government interests using the 																																																								
660See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 State-owned Companies. 
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company they direct as their tool. When these actions are discovered, often 
the director is excused and in many cases relocated to a different company. 
It is not right that all directors are not subject to the same duties. 
SCH5 suggested that in governmental companies, directors who are 
appointed through their political connections are more important to the 
government than the roles they occupy. If they abuse their position for self-
interest or if they do something that is not in the company’s interest, the 
government turns a blind eye. SCH5 stated, 
 
“If there is a tender process, the director will 
select the contact he prefers to win the bid as 
opposed to letting the market dictate the 
highest paying or most suitable candidate.” 
 
There is not a desire in these companies to hold directors accountable 
for duties like there would be in a normal private company.   
Decisions on duties can be affected due to the courts’ vulnerability to 
the pressures of both the government and the army of guardians. According 
to the interviewees, both institutions are able to exert political influence on 
the courts. LAW3 shared his experience of being involved in a case between 
a private company and a governmental company. The governmental 
company had clearly acted unlawfully and the law was on the side of the 
private company. The actions of the governmental company had been in line 
with the government’s interest though. All the advisors in the case made 
arguments in favour of the governmental company and in the end, 
unsurprisingly, the judge ruled in favour of the governmental company. JUD2 
stated that, 
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“The court would always side with the 
government. If there is a case with the 
government or the Army of Guardians, the 
judge will not be able to rule against them.” 
 
DIR4 stated that judges are pressured to rule in the interest of the 
government. The directors in the governmental companies are often fearful 
that in the event that the company brings an action against them, the judge 
will be biased towards the company. DIR2 stated that the law is meant to 
favour the weaker party. In most cases this practice is carried out in judicial 
decision-making, however when governmental companies are involved, this 
rule is superseded by the court’s loyalty to governmental companies. LAW3 
stated that it is extremely common that the judge makes a decision in favour 
of the governmental company, even when the right is with the director.     
SHA5 explained that in his opinion judges favour the benefit of the 
government even if the law does not. In the companies that are not 
governmental companies, they too can receive favourable treatment from 
judges if they have connections with the political personnel that can influence 
the judge. SHA5 said, 
 
“Our company intentionally avoids dealing 
with governmental company or companies 
that have governmental connections as we 
know that in the court we will lose the case.” 
 
SCH2 added that he thinks that the courts are on the side of the Army 
of Guardians and that they help it expand. SCH2 said, 
 
“It controls billions of dollars and they have 
grown to be so powerful. I know lots of 
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judges in important cases change the 
decision for the political and religion reasons 
to appease the Army of Guardians.” 
 
LAW6 explained that the Army of the Guardians of Islamic Revolution 
direct many important projects and also they are exempt from the law. They 
have the support of the supreme leader and the army and they are both 
political and religious. The judges are fearful in making any decision against 
them in the court as they organisation has the power to impact upon their 
lives.  
JUD1 argued that the directors of governmental companies are aware 
of the influence the government has with the courts. This makes them more 
cautious as they believe that should the company accuse them of anything 
then the court will not treat their case fairly; they will be found liable whatever 
case they might have. JUD1 said, 
 
“They might be afraid of taking risks as they 
can easily be punished for little errors and 
the judge will not support them.661 X was a 
public figure frequently in the Iranian media. 
He used his platform to stress his opinion 
that directors should not be taking large 
risks with governmental companies, but 
rather their job is to manage them safely 
and protect them from harm. He was 
publicly in favour of controlling directors and 
reducing risk taking.” 
 
In conclusion the interviewees made clear arguments that both 
governmental companies and army of guardian companies often have 
directors that do not adhere to duties and have less regard for duties than 
																																																								
661 From 1989 until 1998. 
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directors of private companies would. Also judicial decisions on duties of 
directors of private companies are often influenced when the government or 
army of guardians pressurises judges.    
5.2.11 Inspectors and Auditors 
The role of inspectors and auditors is paramount in the successful 
operation of companies as it allows shareholders to understand how their 
businesses are being run. Periodic reports from auditors should alert 
directors to any breaches from directors or any incidences of 
mismanagement of businesses. The interviews revealed that there was a 
strong understanding of the role of auditors from all the interviewee groups. It 
would appear that auditors have a broader role to play in Iran compared to 
auditors in western countries. SCH1 understood that auditors should provide 
some control to ensure that directors are doing their duties. DIR1 stated that 
the auditor should report all of directors’ breaches in the general meeting. 
DIR3 added that the auditor is in place to expose the negligence of the 
directors only. LAW2 stated that the auditor is responsible for controlling the 
director,  
 
“The auditors are there to stop the director 
acting against the articles of association 
and Iranian Company Law”. 
 
JUD2 remarked that whilst auditors’ purpose is to control directors, 
one must remember that auditors do not have anyone controlling them. The 
first point highlighted by the interviewees is that auditors are needed in Iran 
as many directors place their own interests before that of the companies. 
	249	
DIR4 suggested this to be the case, saying that he knows many fellow 
directors who act predominantly in their own personal interests, or those of 
their family’s as opposed to in the company’s best interest. Whilst agreeing 
with this point, DIR2 added that without proper auditors, directors would 
abuse their position. He had experience of this as a shareholder of a 
company. Whilst in this role a co-shareholder in the company was occupying 
the position of director and his wife had been nominated to be the auditor. 
The director breached many of his duties, misusing the company’s asset662 
and also dealing outside the company for his personal interest. Naturally with 
his wife as an internal controller, none of the breaches were reported to the 
other shareholders. Therefore, his wife had also breached her duties as she 
was the auditor and had not reported the director’s breaches. 
SCH3 stated that in Iran there is not any law to control the exploitation 
by directors of corporate opportunities. The concern is that auditors are 
selected from the majority shareholders, and in private joint stock companies 
the auditors are from a member of the controlling family. The closeness of 
these relationships can result in these auditors failing to adhere to their 
duties stringently. JUD1 added that there is serious control from auditors in 
some companies, but typically in family companies these positions are 
artificial.  
The second point discussed by interviewees is that auditors can often 
be corrupt. LAW5 stated that of course it is the obligation of the auditor to be 
professional and exercise their expertise. The issue occurs however when 																																																								
662 Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 133 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher): The executive 
and non-executive directors cannot do any deal such as company deal that competing with 
the company. In other words, every director who breaches this law and his or her breach 
harm the company is responsible to all that breaches. Harm in this section means effecting 
in the companies’ interest. 
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instead of acting in the best interest of the company, the majority of them act 
in the interest of the director due to their personal relationships. He went on 
to mention that most of the time the auditors do not report the conflict of 
interest of directors and this ends up resulting in many cases on this subject.   
SCH3 stated that in Iran the auditors are corrupted as they get their 
salaries awarded by the directors. In other countries, such as the UK and 
France, the auditors are independent and this allows them freedom in their 
decision-making. Directors often have power over auditors in Iran and if the 
auditors are not on their side, the directors can force them out. SCH3 said, 
 
“In Iran, auditors are not selected according 
to their skill and abilities. Their selection is 
more based on connections and friendship, 
and it results in them controlling every part of 
the company by themselves.”  
 
DIR2 added that the principal issue is that the auditors are not 
independent as they receive payment from the company which is essentially 
the root of the corruption. He went on to state that there is one tool to catch 
the miscreant director and that is the auditor, who is vulnerable to being 
corrupted by the director. DIR5 stated that of the directors that he knows, 
most act for the interest of themselves, family and friends as opposed to the 
company.  
SCH6 stated that in Iran, selecting the auditor is a ceremonial action 
because the role in most cases will not be performed as it should be to check 
on directors, but rather it will be carried out under the supervision of the 
director. SCH6 stated that if the auditors fail to correctly assess the 
company, the minority shareholders would not be able to challenge the 
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actions of the director, as all the breaches would have been concealed. 
Auditors have the power to cover up all breaches of directors. Frequently 
when auditors are selected, the director chooses the person who can best 
assist them in keeping control and concealing their errors. 
Unfortunately Iranian Company Law does not give clear duties and 
responsibilities for auditors. Often reports are first shown to the director 
before reaching the shareholders, permitting the director to influence them 
before they are made public. 
In conclusion, from the interviewees’ responses it has been possible 
to learn that there is concern over how auditors are carrying out their roles in 
Iran. There was a common opinion that directors often put their own interests 
before those of the company, which increases the need in Iran for the auditor 
to carry out their role with integrity and honesty. There also seems to be a 
common theme that auditors are frequently connected to directors or 
shareholders in a way that makes them biased and not sufficiently 
independent in judgement. In governmental companies, there is often a 
degree of corruption as directors with connections are often exempt from 
unfavourable audits due to their connections. Auditors in practice have no 
duties and responsibilities, and it is perhaps in this extent that their roles do 
not demand the performance that Iranian companies require of them. 
Breaches of directors’ duties are considerably more likely to be reported if 
auditors are independent and perform their jobs correctly and it is for this 
reason that their role is so crucial in regards to duties. 
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5.3 CONCLUSION  
The interviews highlighted a host of issues concerning directors’ 
duties both directly and indirectly. Firstly, fiduciary duties do not exist in 
Iranian Company Law and can only be found when they are included in the 
articles of association. Cases of breaches of duties that get brought to court 
are determined with the Islamic sources such as the Quran and the Fighh. 
Due to these Islamic sources not providing a broad scope of duties, there are 
many examples of incidences that would be classed as breaches of duties in 
other jurisdictions that are not breaches of duties in Iran. For instance a duty 
to act in a company’s best interest gets regularly breached in Iran as several 
interviewees reiterated that directors occupy their positions to further their 
own interests. Also shareholders are for the most part powerless to claim 
against breaches of the duty of care. This is demonstrated by LAW4’s 
example of the company that could not claim against a director who 
repeatedly breached their duties. Many interviewees called for the 
introduction of some form of the Business Judgment Rule, as directors need 
more security in their risk taking due to them at present being liable for 
mistakes that are made with good intentions.   
Commercial cases in Iran are dealt with in general courts and there 
are many issues with the process including delays and inconsistent 
judgments. With the courts not being popular, arbitration has emerged as a 
popular alternative for settling commercial cases. Judges are often 
insufficiently educated and experienced to occupy the positions they do and 
many adjust their judgments through bribery. Duties can only be effective if 
shareholders have the confidence to use the courts to settle cases. 
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Concerns over the quality of judges, delays in the courts and the fear of 
judges being susceptible to bribery are currently preventing cases from 
reaching courts.   
Company law is in need of being updated. Many areas of directors’ 
duties were listed as points that need updating and improving. The 
interviewees highlighted that the main obstacle impeding legislation reform is 
the reluctance of the authorities to allow any updates to be introduced. The 
Islamic Consultative Assembly has developed the reputation for wanting to 
keep the law as it is. 
Family companies often have inexperienced directors and auditors 
who lack knowledge. This is due to family members being appointed on the 
basis of being relatives rather than their ability to do the job. The directors 
appointed often are unaware of directors’ duties, which can lead to breaches 
of duties that are included in companies’ articles.  
 One reason put forward as to why directors are often so 
inexperienced and unqualified is that that the pool of candidates available for 
the role is legally limited to the shareholders in the company.  
Another reason for this occurrence is that there is a culture in Iranian 
commerce of appointing friends and relatives to vacant positions. As there is 
already a relationship of trust in place, it is convenient and safe to appoint 
someone who they know well and can rely on.  The risk of these connected 
appointments is that in practice, these individuals will struggle with their roles 
and their decisions and actions can lead to cases of negligence through 
directors’ lack of experience or knowledge.  
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Separation of powers has a detrimental impact on directors’ duties in 
Iran. This is due firstly to directors of governmental or army of guardian 
companies having to take into consideration the interests of the institution as 
well the company. Also, the directors of governmental companies are often 
afforded considerable freedom, to the extent that the government turns a 
blind eye if they help their political connections gain contracts or pursue 
opportunities that further their own interests. 
By not having any laws surrounding corporate opportunities, auditors 
are needed even more to monitor directors. Issues with auditors however are 
common due to auditors not being independent from the companies.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN EVALUATION OF IRANIAN LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM  
 
6.1 Introduction  
Having completed the doctrinal and empirical studies, the research 
has arrived at the point of enabling there to be an overall assessment of the 
state of directors’ duties in Iranian law. From the examinations of law and 
practice in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 it was possible to see clear issues that 
are causing problems for Iran. Chapter 3 raised some apparent flaws in the 
Iranian law and the empirical study documented in Chapter 5, involving first 
hand testimony, affirmed these flaws and raised other issues. These data 
obtained from both the doctrinal and empirical studies will be used to provide 
an evaluation of the law and then it will be employed to enable the research 
to adopt a positive approach to ameliorating the current state of directors’ 
duties in Iran.    
In regards to directors’ duties, there is a failure in Iranian law to define 
or even provide for the role of company directors, the liability of directors and 
the rights of shareholders. When considering practices in other countries it is 
possible to understand that there are examples of jurisdictions that over the 
years have made changes to their practices and their experience can hold 
many answers for Iran.   
One of the aims of this chapter is to assess whether it is possible to 
draw solutions for the shortcomings in Iranian legislation from the practices 
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of other jurisdictions that we considered in Chapter 2, either through adoption 
or adaption.   
Each section will consider the current legislation in place, the issues 
that exist in Iran, possible solutions as how to improve the situation and 
finally the application of these potential solutions.   
Initially the subject of legal transplantation will be considered in 
section 6.2, examining the effectiveness of the practice. The shortcomings of 
the practice will be examined along with the benefits, and there will be a 
consideration of examples of its success in different jurisdictions. The 
application of legal transplantation will be considered in relation to the Iranian 
situation and how effective it could be as a means to reform the law.   
Section 6.3 will consider the general duties of directors and what the 
broad issues are in Iran in relation to these duties. Following this basic 
development of general duties, the chapter will focus on fiduciary duties in 
section 6.4. Next there will be an examination of the issues that are faced by 
directors in Iran as a result of the law not being thorough enough. Solutions 
will be put forward as to how the law could be improved. This will be followed 
by an overview of the application of these legislative reforms.   
The duty of care will be dealt with in section 6.5. The problems that 
result from gaps in Iranian law will be mentioned and after this the chapter 
will provide an insight in to what solutions can be brought forward to improve 
the duty of care. Once recommendations have been made, the application of 
the duties will be considered. The Business Judgment Rule will be focussed 
on in section 6.6, where the issues of good faith in Iran will be assessed. 
Section 6.7 will consider enforcement in Iran with a consideration as to 
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whether it can be improved, before moving on to company audits in section 
6.8. Section 6.9 will consider the extent to which the courts and judges 
impact upon directors’ duties. Next there will be an examination of legislative 
limitations in section 6.10. Finally conclusions will be drawn from the chapter, 
which will include suggestions on improving the state of directors’ duties in 
Iran.  
6.2 Transplanting Law 
Transplanting law from one jurisdiction to another is a process that 
occurs today in many countries with emerging markets that seek to adopt 
tried and tested law from other jurisdictions. Legal transplanting dates back 
to ancient times, when Solon of Athens educated himself in the laws of other 
Greek states in order to carry out social reform. 663  Nowadays, it is 
jurisdictions such as France, Germany, the US and UK that are the most 
highly regarded as sources from which many countries have transplanted 
elements to form their own code of directors’ duties.664  From the jurisdictions 
considered in Chapter 2, we can see that over the years Hong Kong has 
transplanted duties and aspects of law that relate to duties from the UK and 
China has transplanted laws from various jurisdictions into its own code.665 
Transplanting can be considered useful for countries in need of 
adding a particular legal concept into its legislation. When law is functional 
and successful in one country, it can potentially serve another country in the 
same way, or at least it can assist a country to develop its own code based 																																																								
663H. Cisse et al, The World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development (World Bank Publications, 2012), 163. 
664 P. Mantysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance: Shareholders as a Rule-maker 
(Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2006), 380-400.  
665 Chapter 2, section 2.4.2. 
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around the same concepts. It is not necessary to consider the source of the 
law in the foreign jurisdiction, as it is the concept and the functionality of the 
law that will determine its success or failure. Of course, there is no stipulation 
on transplanted law that requires a host country to adhere completely to the 
exact template set by the source country.666  
Another reason that legal transplanting is popular in emerging 
economies is that there is desire to have legal systems in place that are in 
line with international conventions. This is a result of globalisation and the 
need for economic development to fall into line with standardised 
conventions of what legal systems should be like. This also exists in other 
fields such as environmental protection and human rights values.667 The 
effect is that, 
 
“The economic development, democratisation, 
and globalisation have today so sharply 
increased the number of legal transplants that 
at least in developing countries, most major 
legislation now has a foreign component”.668  
 
6.2.1 Issues that exist with Transplanting 
The principal issue with transplantation is that jurisdictions vary from 
one to another and it can be challenging to make the new laws fit into a 
system which was not the system for which the new laws were designed. 
Many sceptics of legal transplantations believe that the flaws extant in the 
practice make it likely that transplants will not function as intended and will 																																																								
666 H. Cisse et al, The World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development (World Bank Publications, 2012), 116. 
667 H. Cisse et al, The World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development (World Bank Publications, 2012), 165. 
668 Ibid.  
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fail to be as successful as they were in the originating country. Montesquieu 
noted, 
 
“the political and civil laws of each nation 
ought to be only the particular cases in which 
this human reason is applied. They should be 
adapted in such a manner to the people for 
whom they are framed that it should be a 
great chance if those of one nation suit 
another.669” 
 
Kahn-Freund and Legrand agreed with this point adding that, the 
ingrained difference in the legal systems of countries means that it is not 
possible to simply transplant law. Simply moving a set of rules from one 
place to another does not work, and they will no longer be the same rules.   
The established theory of path dependence puts forward the 
argument that when a country updates a law, the reform will reflect that 
country’s own historical, social, cultural context.670 This theory originated in 
the 1980s and is based around legislation updates being produced as a 
means to address specific issues that exist in that jurisdiction’s code as time 
passes.671 Each jurisdiction will follow its own path and the social, economic 
and political environment will dictate what code needs updating and how it 
should be reformed. This idea criticises the notion of transplanting legal code 
from one jurisdiction to another arguing that law only suits the country in 
which it evolved. Any other country that transplants it will lack the historical, 
social, economic and political path that led to its advent.   																																																								
669 H. Cisse et al, The World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development (World Bank Publications, 2012), 165. 
670 J. Stanley Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a 'rule of Law' in 
Vietnam, (Melbourne: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 23. 
671  M. Dietrich & J. Krafft , Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm ( Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 263. 
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Path dependence theorists argue that the ‘one-size fits all’ approach 
will not work when emerging markets copy and paste the law from mature 
markets.672 
 
 “Copying a code from one country to another 
without analysing the details of a corporate 
governance system or considering the 
applicability to a specific country’s judicial 
system or ensuring effective enforcement, 
will not bring the expected benefit and reform 
to the country.” 
 
Transplantation usually occurs when countries with weak legal 
systems adopt a code or provisions of it that has proved to be effective in 
other jurisdictions. Despite the introduction of transplantations, path 
dependence theorists argue that differences between systems will continue 
to exist because pre-existing social and political forces are what shape the 
legal code. The result will be a host country with a new code that does not 
have the framework in place to apply it in the same way as in the originating 
jurisdiction.  
When considering borrowing, applying or adapting the law from one 
jurisdiction to another it is necessary to consider that it will have to be 
applicable despite the different political system, markets, legal system, 
governmental institutions, history and company structures regarding 
shareholdings and directorships.  
It is also argued that the structure of the law that pre-exists in a host 
country will often determine whether law can or cannot be transplanted. 																																																								
672 A. Keay & J. Zhao, ‘Ascertaining the Notion of Board Accountability in Chinese Listed 
Companies, Ascertaining the Notion of Board Accountability’, Hong Kong Law Journal, 45 
n2 (2016) 29-32. 
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Bebchuk and Roe provide the example of a proposal to transplant a new 
code for ownership structure. Certainly, the initial ownership structure in a 
country will influence any proposed new law. Parties who benefit from the 
initial ownership structure will seek to impede any changes and if these 
people are in positions of influence, they will be able to affect the outcome.   
6.2.2 Solutions to Transplanting in Iran 
Path dependence is not a theory that is universally subscribed to and 
many countries have arguably carried out transplantations successfully. Most 
countries that wish to modernise their legal system and align their law with 
more advanced systems will consider the implementation of the law of other 
places. 
China’s legal system, as an example, has been through considerable 
transitions at different stages of its life and it began over 2000 years ago as 
an aboriginal legal system. At the beginning of the twentieth century it was 
replaced due to the need for a legal system that would allow the nation to 
take part in a globalising international economy. The new political wave in 
Chinese politics that ushered in the People’s Republic of China led to the 
abolition of this new law and it was replaced with transplants from the legal 
code of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, when China distanced itself from 
the Soviet Union in the 1960s the legal code in place in China had to be 
changed again. Since this moment, China has not borrowed from one 
jurisdiction but rather it has borrowed from many and adopted a legal system 
that has tried to be open to international business. 673  This form of 
																																																								
673 H. Cisse et al, The World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development (World Bank Publications, 2012), 173. 
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transplanting that China subscribes to, is known as selective 
transplantation.674   
Reforms to the law must adhere to conceptual values in order to be 
approved, and the Chinese approach led to the following criteria: 
− Transplanted laws and mechanisms must be matched with Chinese 
culture, political ideology and government agenda. 
− Transplanted laws must solve problems that are faced by Chinese 
society. A targeted approach that identifies issues faced and marries it 
with law that can be transplanted.  
− Laws must be studied by China’s legislative, administrative and 
judicial agencies in relation to the Chinese social environment and the 
requirements of a proposed legal update. Implemented laws must be 
installed in line with decrees of Chinese sovereignty. 
− Transplanted laws must be compatible with other laws already within 
the legal framework. Potential transplants must be studied to make 
sure that they integrate well with the legal system.675  
This approach of selective transplantation has allowed China to 
successfully integrate a significant amount of law from different sources and 
the foreign law has been tailored to fit into the Chinese legal framework.676  
Iran would benefit from applying a similar approach to China when it 
comes to transplanting law. Much like China, Iran has considerable factors to 
consider when deciding how to integrate foreign legislation into its system. 																																																								
674 H. Cisse et al, The World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development (World Bank Publications, 2012), 173. 
675 R. Petrov & P. Elsuwege, Legislative Approximation and Application of EU law in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union: Towards a Common Regulatory Space? 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2014), 244-245. 
676H. Cisse et al, The World Bank Legal Review: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development (World Bank Publications, 2012), 175. 
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Incoming company legislation must fit alongside existing legislation without 
conflict. Moreover, it must take into account the types of companies 
operating in Iran and how new legislation will be used differently from the 
jurisdiction the law is transplanted from. A particular transplanted law might 
work well in one jurisdiction with an open economy but in Iran where the 
majority of companies are state owned enterprises it might have to be 
amended considerably.   
6.2.3 Transplanting in Iran 
When transplanting law to Iran, one particular condition that is important 
is that the transplanted laws and mechanisms must be matched with Iranian 
culture, political ideology and the government agenda.  
At present there is already an authority that decides on potential legal 
updates. The Islamic Consultative Assembly has previously refused 
legislation updates that do not adhere to the Islamic principles of the regime. 
Whatever is proposed through this study of duties must conform to these 
principles or risk being ignored totally.  Whilst this is certainly a limitation to 
what can be suggested, it is reality and that must be accepted. 
A further condition that would prove useful would be to acknowledge that 
transplanted laws must be compatible with other laws already within the legal 
framework. That is, potential transplants must be studied to make sure that 
they integrate well with the legal system.  
In terms of duties in Iran, much of the law is fragmented. Certain 
principles exist in the Islamic code, in companies’ articles and some are in 
statutory law. Any law proposed needs to be simple, straightforward to 
implement and should supersede any half-measures that already exist.   
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6.3 General Directors’ Duties 
Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 highlighted the fact that the state of 
directors’ duties in Iran is lacking in many areas and it fails to adequately 
cover many eventualities. There is no part of Iranian Company Law that 
addresses directors’ duties and instead the coverage is reduced to a few 
clauses and articles, some found in Iranian Company Law and others in 
Islamic sources, and they only indirectly address duties. Iranian Company 
Law also has not been regularly updated, and little reform has occurred since 
1968. Furthermore, enforcement is weak in Iran as the structures are not in 
place for shareholders to have the necessary easy access to bring an action 
against miscreant directors.   
6.3.1 Issues that exist with duties in Iran 
The first issue that requires discussion is that presently the only way 
for shareholders to make sure that directors are liable for duties is to include 
them in the articles of association. There is no other source of law in Iran that 
sets out a complete series of duties and ultimately the responsibility is left to 
the shareholders. 
The result of this practice is that many companies fail to adequately 
include fiduciary duties and the duty of care.677  The reasons for failing to 
include adequate duties or not including them at all is due to shareholders 
carrying out this job themselves without the necessary level of knowledge.678 
If the shareholders do not seek legal assistance in the drafting of the articles, 
it is quite possible that a suitable set of duties will not be included. Due to 
this, there is a lack of consistency in the country as to the extent to which 																																																								
677 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4: Lack of Commercial Court and Coping Mechanisms. 
678 Ibid. 
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duties are imposed on directors. Certain companies’ articles of association 
might focus on particular duties rather than others and this will result in an 
imbalance of coverage of the various duties. Equally there is no guarantee 
that a solicitor who prepares the articles will provide an appropriate provision 
of duties that matches the needs of the company.   
The second issue regarding duties that emerged from the empirical 
research was that many directors and shareholders interviewed were 
unaware of the nature of directors’ duties, and what they were and what they 
purported to do. For instance, DIR3 admitted to not knowing what duties 
were, however he also admitted that he was unaware of most legal 
obligations he had towards his company.679  SHA2, SHA3 and DIR5 all 
expressed the point that as long as you do your job, you do not need to pay 
attention to these things.680  For the Iranian companies that do not have 
duties in the articles of association, it is arguable that understanding duties is 
irrelevant, as those directors are not bound by duties. In the cases where 
there are directors who are bound by duties but are unaware, these directors 
will conduct themselves without any realisation of the liability they carry for 
their actions. For these directors it is crucial that they have an awareness of 
their duties as their actions may differ if they have an understanding of what 
they legally should and should not do. For their own personal welfare it is 
important, as they could make decisions without understanding the legal 
consequences of their actions. For the business’ welfare it is important as 
awareness of the duties might encourage them not to pursue a course of 
action that could cause damage to the business.   																																																								
679See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4: Lack of Commercial Court and Coping Mechanisms. 
680Ibid. 
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6.3.2 Potential Solutions  
Both issues highlighted in the last section can certainly be addressed 
to some degree by one solution. Iran could follow the example of many 
jurisdictions, including those jurisdictions considered in Chapter 2, and 
introduce duties into its statutory law.   
 The problem of company articles not including duties or the provisions 
contained being inadequate would be resolved, as all duties would be set out 
in sections of statutory law. This would result in all directors in every 
company having the same parameters of liability throughout the whole 
jurisdiction. This would also be a fairer state of affairs. 
The inclusion of duties in statute will also lead to their acceptance as 
compulsory principles/rules of company law. It is likely that this advanced 
status will increase awareness amongst legal professionals and it is possible 
this awareness over time will reach directors and shareholders.  
Realistically however, within the professional circles of directors and 
shareholders there is not considerable exposure to legislative reforms. DIR2 
stated that,  
 
 “I do not believe any business shareholders 
read the statutory law in Iran. As both a 
shareholder and a director, I was not aware 
what legal duties I have towards my 
company.”681 
 
Considering the practices of other countries, the Hong Kong example 
provides an insight into a jurisdiction that introduced duties into statutory 
																																																								
681See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4: Lack of Commercial Court and Coping Mechanisms. 
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law.682  Much like Iran prior to the introduction there had not been statutory 
duties (although there were in common law and in equity) and there was a 
considerable lack of awareness amongst shareholders and directors of what 
they were or why they might be important. The duties were adapted from the 
UK model (the Companies Act 2006 duties) as they are some of the most 
well regarded common law duties that exist.  
Following their introduction in Hong Kong in a legislative reform, there 
was no significant change in the practices of company directors as there was 
no real chance for them to become aware of the new law.683  Shareholders 
too had no knowledge of the update unless their lawyers had informed them. 
In Chapter 2 considering the practices in Hong Kong after the introduction of 
the statutory provisions, it was revealed, 
 
“Less than 40 per cent of directors in Hong 
Kong understand their fiduciary duties and 
legal responsibilities, and the remainder 
give them low priority.”684 
 
Solutions for improving awareness of duties can be to inform the 
public through national media coverage of high profile cases of breaches, or 
to set up educational courses to teach directors about the new legislation. In 
Hong Kong the latter was adopted and courses were introduced by the 
Institute of Directors.   
It is even possible to suggest that there is greater potential for 
shareholders and directors to be more aware of duties with the present 
practice whereby the onus is on initial shareholders to include them in the 																																																								
682 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4: Lack of Commercial Court and Coping Mechanisms. 
683 Ibid. 
684 Ibid. 
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articles of association (in large companies this is not applicable). Certainly 
this active role in the creation of the articles would increase a shareholder’s 
awareness of duties included. Should the shareholders include duties, it is 
likely that they will inform the directors of the duties as well as it is in their 
interest for their directors to be aware of them. With this being the case, it 
could be argued that it is not necessary to include them in statutory law as 
both directors and shareholders have greater accessibility to the fiduciary 
duties if they exist in the articles. The limitation to this is that it is only when 
the company is formed that the articles will be created and during the life of a 
company the shareholders and directors will often change. Apart from the 
initial shareholders and directors there will not be any increased awareness 
of the duties. 
6.3.3 Application of these solutions 
Directors’ duties would have to be introduced into law as an 
amendment to Iranian Company Law 1968. Rules governing directors are 
currently in part one, section six (article 107 to article 143) and duties should 
be located within this section. This approach will create a universal standard 
of duties across Iran and it will lead to increased consistency in judgments in 
cases of duties. Judges will still be able to interpret the law when applying it 
to a case, however there will be a far greater chance for consistency if all 
directors are subject to the same duties.  
In broad terms, there is no reason that the instalment of new duties in 
Iran would not gain approval from the Islamic Consultative Assembly as long 
as the suggested laws were in keeping with Islam. From the interviews there 
was consensus amongst judges that the introduction of duties in statutory 
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law would greatly assist them and the government would certainly benefit 
from greater ability to control directors of state owned companies.   
In terms of generating awareness for new imposed duties, Iran should 
use the tools it has at its disposal to get the message publicised. In Iran, due 
to the media being controlled by the state, it is within the powers of the 
government to broadcast footage of high profile cases of breaches of duties 
on television to educate the public about the liabilities of directors.  
6.4 Fiduciary Duties in Iran 
As it is possible to see from Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 there are some 
Fighh principles that provide for duties that are akin to fiduciary duties. Firstly 
within the Fighh there is a principle that relates to agents acting within the 
scope of their authority and in the best interests of his or her principal. This 
broadly covers the general fiduciary principle of the director acting within 
their powers.685  
Moreover, within the Fighh there is a principle that relates to trust686 
which could be considered as a basis for a duty of loyalty. LAW5 mentioned 
that code number 51 of the Iranian civil law states that directors are regarded 
as a trustee of the shareholders’ assets. Also, directors are considered to be 
responsible for protecting the assets of the company as their own property 
and acting loyally by the Fighh. In the Fighh there are principles that refer to 
trust and loyalty,   																																																								
685 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1 General Law on Directors and Section 3.4.2 Duties of 
Loyalty. N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 2.188. 8.27, 2.283. 
686 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 15. 92: “God commands justice and good-doing…. 
And he forbids indecency, dishonesty and insolence”; Quran 22:38: “…God does not love 
anyone who betrays his trust and its bereft of gratitude…”. N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy 
Quran (Munich: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), VIII, 180; 11:85. 
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“…And if one of you deposits a thing on 
trust with another, let the trustee discharge 
his trust and let him fear God. Conceal not 
evidence: for whatever conceals it, his heart 
is tainted with sin and God knows all that 
you do.687” 
 
“-Give back the trusts to their legal owners, 
and when you judge between people, judge 
with justice.688” 
 
“Of those we created are people who guide 
by the truth, and by it act with justice.689” 
 
“…God does not love anyone who betrays 
his trust and it’s bereft of gratitude…690” 
 
The regulation of conflicts of interest is also included in article 133 of 
Iranian Company Law. Essentially this code dictates that directors should not 
have a personal interest in a company transaction and they should not be 
involved in a transaction that competes with a company transaction.691 
Equally, they should not issue personal loans from the company to 
themselves692 and they should not enter into any business dealings with 
other directors in their personal capacity.693  
Having considered what fiduciary duties Iran has in place, it is now 
necessary to see what problems exist in Iran as a result of the lack of 
provision of fiduciary duties. After each issue is examined, it will be 
																																																								
687 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 2.283. For more cases refer to N. Shirazi, Descent 
of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015),9.4. 
688 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 4.28. 
689 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 8.180. 
690 N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 22.38. 
691 Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 133 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
692Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 132 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
693Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 129 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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considered what legislative changes could be made to ameliorate the 
problem and how successfully the new legislation could be applied.  
6.4.1 Fiduciary Issues that exist in Iran 
The first issue to be considered is the existence of self-dealing and 
even corruption perpetrated by company directors. Corruption is an endemic 
characteristic of Iranian commerce. From both the doctrinal research in 
Chapter 3 and the interviews in Chapter 5 it is clear that cases of corruption 
are commonplace. It is possible to identify two types of corruption, the first 
being corruption of directors favouring their own interests ahead of the 
company’s interests. The second is through company decision-making being 
based on political factors as opposed to business factors.   
The first type of corruption was brought to light by SHA3, LAW1, 
LAW2 and LAW4,694 who mentioned that directors, through not being bound 
by duties of loyalty in the articles, are free to direct the business they operate 
as they choose.695  LAW2 was of the opinion that, 
 
“Directors occupy their positions for their own 
benefit as opposed to the companies’ benefit. 
Their mentality is not of having a duty 
towards the company’s interest but of having 
an opportunity to advance their own interest.” 
 
The interviewees highlighted several cases, which serve as useful 
examples of corruption where directors had acted inappropriately.  
Firstly, DIR2 had an experience where he and a friend were co-
shareholders of a company. They had agreed that the friend would be the 																																																								
694 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.10: Separation of powers. 
695 Ibid. 
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director of the company and they both nominated the friend’s wife as the 
auditor. Within the role of the director, the friend misused the company’s 
assets696 and also executed deals in his role as director for his personal 
interest. As his wife was the internal controller, none of the breaches were 
reported to the other shareholders.  
Secondly, DIR1 provided an example of corruption in his own family 
company. Many years ago his brother was the director of the company and 
during his directorship the company was not doing particularly well however 
it was clear that the brother personally was becoming richer through evident 
personal expenditures.  It transpired that the brother had set up a personal 
consultancy firm where he would provide other companies information and 
guidance on how to do well in the same industry as the company. In reality, 
he was using his position as director of a well-known company to gain clients 
and then he would give out information about the company to, essentially, 
company competitors.  
Both these examples are of directors subjugating the interests of the 
company to further their own interests. The first case is through the director 
using the company asset to gain a personal advantage and the second case 
is through using their position and company secrets to earn profit for 
themselves personally.  
In terms of corruption of directors in state owned companies, LAW4 
stated that the relationship of the state owned company director with the 
government provides them with advantages in the market that directors of 																																																								
696 Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 133 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher): the executive 
and non-executive directors cannot do any deal such as company deal that competing with 
the company. Every director who breaches this law and his or her breach harm the company 
is responsible to all that breaches. Harm in this section means effecting in the companies’ 
interest. 
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private companies do not have. When large state contracts are available, 
directors of state owned companies are in a privileged position to acquire the 
contracts for their business before the opportunity reaches the market. This 
advantage in the market is a result of the willingness of the government to 
prioritise their relationships with the state owned companies.   
Furthermore, DIR3 who works in a state company admitted that he 
only recruits new employees through his family connections. This policy is 
not appropriate in that his family will be benefitting from his position as 
director at the expense of the company having the most qualified employee. 
SCH3 furthered this point, stating that in almost all state companies they 
select the close relatives or family member of the relevant Minister. The 
recruitment for senior positions depends on an individual’s connection to the 
Minister rather than their capability. DIR5, who is currently the director of a 
state company, said, 
 
“I can see this weakness and it is so common 
to select important staff according to the 
interest of the director rather than any other 
requirement. If you can employ a good friend 
to the company, you know they will support 
you and be loyal.”  
 
In Chapter 3 it was highlighted that since the revolution in Iran a lack 
of appropriate surveillance and monitoring systems allowed managers to 
abuse their power and steal from the businesses they ran.697  Common 
offenses have been pocketing salaries from non-existent employees, setting 																																																								
697N. Bozorgmehr, ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Wary of Threat to Business Interests’, 
Financial Times (2015). Available online: 
https://www.ft.com/content/e88a1dae-2096-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79 
 [Accessed 20/09/2015]. 
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up fraudulent sales contracts and transferring funds to favoured 
individuals.698 
The interviewees also highlighted that it is common for directors of 
state owned companies to subjugate the companies’ interests for political 
benefits. For instance, if there is a tender process, the director will select the 
contract he prefers to win the bid as opposed to letting the market dictate the 
highest paying or most suitable candidate. Sometimes, the director might 
personally benefit from the transaction through receiving a bribe or other 
times it might be done for political reasons. 
In the event that the director of a state owned companies is suspected 
of wrongdoing, then often the state intervenes and re-positions the director in 
another company. Often the state protects those who are considered within 
the inner circle of the state. LAW1 stated, 
 
 “When one of the directors of a state owned 
company is suspected of corruption they just 
switch his position from one company to 
another company instead of charging him.” 
 
In Iran, there is no particular company law legislation that deals with 
theft from companies by directors. Any cases in which a director steals from 
a company will be classed as a criminal offence and the law stipulates that 
guilty parties can be sentenced to between five to twenty years in prison and 
receive up to 74 lashes.699 Certainly directors could be liable for criminal theft 
																																																								
698K. Crane & R. Lal, ‘Iran's Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities’, Rand 
Corporation (2008). Available online:  
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG693.pdf 
[Accessed 21/09/2015] 
699Iranian Penal Law 2012. Article 498 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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under the general criminal law should serious cases of theft from the 
company become apparent.700 
The second issue to be considered is how external forces are able to 
influence directors’ judgments. The most common forms of this are in family 
companies and state owned companies. In Iranian family companies it is 
common that the director’s judgment can be affected by their sense of duty 
to their relatives as well as to the company. When directors are making 
important decisions for the company, they may allow individual family 
members to contribute their opinions due to a sense of duty to the family 
members. This can often lead to the company suffering, as individual family 
members will make judgments based on their own interests as opposed to 
company interests.701 This can be the case when there are dominant family 
members who try to manipulate the director to pursue a certain cause.  
DIR2 for example who runs a Gilsonite702 company had to recruit a 
new member of staff for an administrational role within his office. Whilst the 
role was not going to determine the success or failure of the business, it was 
an important role, which involved sending invoices out to customers and it 
required a degree of good organisational skills. The wife of DIR2 pleaded 
with him to employ her brother, an individual who had struggled to hold down 
jobs for longer than a few months.  Reluctantly DIR2 employed the relative 
on the advice of his wife. The relative quickly started making and the other 
employees in the company suggested to DIR2 that this individual was unable 
																																																								
700 Iranian Penal Law 2012. Article 498 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
701 Ibid. 
702 Gilsonite, or Asphaltum is a natural, resinous hydrocarbon found in the Uintah Basin in 
northeastern Utah. This natural asphalt is similar to hard petroleum asphalt and is often 
called a natural asphalt, asphaltite, uintaite, or asphaltum. 
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to do the job. Several further chances were given to the brother in law, but 
each time a new problem occurred and eventually DIR2 had to dismiss him.   
Accommodating the interests of family members can often take 
priority, even if those accommodations are not in the best interests of the 
company. Against the director’s better judgment they may permit members of 
the family to be paid salaries even if they contribute little or no work to the 
business. Some members can have the belief that they are entitled to 
salaries just through being a family member. If this is the custom in a family 
company, it may be difficult for a new director to end this custom. 
In family companies, the directors are likely to be faced with an 
internal conflict. They are meant to be working for the prosperity of the 
company as any director should, however their judgment can be clouded by 
their sense of duty and loyalty to their family. Law is required to discourage 
directors from allowing the judgments of others to influence them in their 
decision-making.  
In state owned companies, there is a common trait of directors having 
to balance the interests of the state alongside the interests of the company. 
The risk here is that state interests take priority over the interests of the 
company and the director permits the company’s interests to be disregarded. 
DIR4 explained how he believed this to be the case, stating that 
directors are often installed in companies with some agenda from the 
government. Instead of working in the company’s interests they are doing 
favourable deals for the government and thus abusing the company’s 
investment. When these actions are discovered, more often than not the 
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judge excuses them and rules in their favour due to pressure from the 
government. 
This example demonstrates that in certain state owned companies, 
the role of the director is not to promote the success of the company, but 
rather to manipulate the position of the company to assist the government’s 
agenda. This influence of the state on the director’s role is significant and 
directors’ judgment is considerably affected by the relationship. 
6.4.2 Potential Solutions  
When dealing with the endemic culture of corruption, for instance, the 
current law in Iran is insufficient and the only tool at the shareholder’s 
disposal is to include duties of loyalty in the articles of association. The 
solution moving forwards is to have new duties of loyalty in statutory law that 
are comprehensive and cover all acts of self-dealing and corruption including 
bribery, misappropriating company funds and pursuing opportunities of 
personal gain at the expense of the company. 
When considering law that could be transplanted, it is worth 
considering the UK duties of loyalty. Section 175 of the Companies Act (UK), 
‘duty to avoid conflicts of interest’, section 176 ‘duty not to accept benefits 
from third parties’ and section 177 ‘duty to declare an interest in proposed 
transactions or arrangements’ are all geared towards preventing corruption 
and conflicts of interest. They are also geared towards working in the 
company’s best interests as opposed to one’s own as well. 
When considering how directors can be subject to influence from third 
parties any new law introduced on the matter would be the first of its kind. 
Having law in place that states that it is the duty of the director to promote 
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the success of the company and to exercise independent judgment would be 
a significant improvement in protecting the welfare of companies.  
It is my suggestion that amendments are made to the Iranian 
Company Law 1968. As set out in Chapter 3, there is article 142, which 
articulates that duties should be included in the articles of association. Also, 
conflicts of interest are dealt with in articles 129, 130, 131, 132 and 133. 
Negligence and the duty of care are referred to in articles 141 and 114.  
These duties in place are far from adequate for their purpose and I suggest 
that they be removed and replaced by UK duties 172 and 173.703  
 By having the duty to exercise independent judgment directors will 
become liable for making damaging decisions based on wishes of third 
parties and not what is best for the company. Including a duty to promote the 
success of the company directors will mean that directors will be obliged not 
to allow external pressures to dictate any company decisions. When put into 
the context of state owned companies, the director would be liable if they 
were to allow state agenda to dictate any business strategy. Equally, in 
family companies, directors should not allow any family members to draw 
salaries if they do not contribute to the success of the company. In cases 
where the director is the majority shareholder or controller of the company 
this duty is unlikely to be able to impact on their decision making process 
unless the company was going into liquidation where there would be 
influence from third parties such as creditors.  
The reality is that whilst these duties will help, it is likely that these 
practices of third parties interfering will continue to a degree. As family 																																																								
703 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3 Duty of Care. 
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companies and state owned companies are integral components of Iranian 
commerce, it is always likely to be the case that external pressures will 
continue to be placed on directors to influence their decision-making. It is 
crucial to withhold any ability for directors to avoid these proposed duties and 
for this reason it is necessary that the new fiduciary duties I have proposed 
be mandatory.  With them existing as mandatory statutory code it will not be 
possible to override them by any means including in the company 
constitution.704 
6.4.3 Application of these duties 
As previously mentioned these new suggested fiduciary duties would 
have to come through into law as an amendment to Iranian Company Law 
1968 in part one, section six. 
With these duties in place, there would be statutory law to prevent 
conflicts and directors engaging in self-dealing. By having these precise 
duties in statutory law, it will be easier for judges to refer to them and make 
more consistent decisions in cases. This is a vast improvement on the 
current law of duties of loyalty that are scattered throughout Islamic law, the 
articles of association and statutory law.  
The success of the duties would be based on the new fear that 
directors would have of an action being brought against them. This would be 
a sufficient deterrent in many cases to encourage a director to refrain from 
pursuing situations for their own self-interest. Whilst this deterrent will exist 
for all directors, it will not always be successful in deterring all directors from 																																																								
704 C. Bruner, ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. Business 
Entities’, Research Handbook on Fiduciary Duties; A. Gold & G. Smith eds, Research 
Handbook on Fiduciary Law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 12. 
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pursuing conflicts of interest and the reality is that corruption will still 
continue. As SHA2 stated, despite having all the principal duties of loyalty 
accounted for in law being a significant improvement, it will not be possible to 
solve the culture of corruption by this alone. 
SHA2 went on to say that even if the law were in place, it would not be 
for everybody. People in authoritative positions would still be able to escape 
it with bribery or through their connections. In state owned companies it is 
likely that corruption from directors would still continue in many forms in 
instances where individual directors are supported by the state. 
As also already mentioned it is likely that influence on directors from 
third parties will also continue as state owned company directors are 
controlled by the state and are effectively answerable to the state. In family 
companies there will be cases where the duties will be overlooked in many 
instances as family interests may take precedence in the directors’ mind. 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly should approve these duties as 
they can be considered modern day functional versions of the former Islamic 
principles. It should be considered that whilst the Islamic principles have 
merit, they are not comprehensive enough for judges to use to make 
consistent judgments.  
6.5 Duty of Care in Iran 
From Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 it is accurate to say that there is some 
basic provision of the duty of care in Iran. The closest broad duty of care can 
be taken from the Fighh where principles are interpreted to mean that a 
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director should act to the best of his or her ability in the best interests of the 
company and in a rational manner as a responsible director would act.  
Within this appraisal of how a director should act, the phrase ‘in a 
rational manner as a responsible director would act’ suggests an objective 
standard of care is required of directors.  
Also in the Fighh is the Khianat-dar-Emanate (Islamic term for ‘the 
duty of care and morality’) a rule that is part of Ghebte, which is typically only 
used when cases are very serious breaches of the duty of care. This rule is 
essentially for when directors have made decisions for the company and 
should have known better, often when the decision can be questioned from a 
moral stance. 
Another element of the duty of care is mentioned in article 141 of 
Iranian Company Law where the subject of negligence is treated. When a 
threat to the value of the company’s share arises, it is the duty of the director 
to inform the shareholders of this risk to the company’s share value. If they 
fail to inform the shareholders, this is considered negligence.705  Articles 58 
and 59 also mention a similar point, that in instances where there is damage 
to the company’s assets or value that will reduce the value of shares, the 
director must organise an emergency meeting of the board to establish what 
the company’s intentions are.706 
6.5.1 Duty of Care Issues that exist in Iran 
The first issue is that at present there is no liability for negligence from 
directors for general damage to a company from reckless decision-making. 
Without any form of liability, directors can take whatever risks they like 																																																								
705Iranian Company Law 1968. Article 141 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
706Iranian Company Law 1933. Article 59 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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without having to face any repercussions for their actions. Shareholders 
therefore are risking their investments on the judgment of directors. 
LAW4 provided an example of a case he recalled whereby a company 
was unable to bring an action against a negligent director. 
 
“a company was registered as a finance 
company. This company appointed a director 
who was not an expert and was unskilled in 
that area. This director repeatedly exercised 
a lack of care, but there was no law in place 
to claim against the director. As far as I know 
this individual is still the director in that 
company.” 
 
It is not uncommon for non-expert directors to be appointed, however it is 
expected that in moments where they are lacking required knowledge in 
making a decision they must seek professional advice to help them make 
informed decisions.   
When appointing the director the shareholders are making the 
decision and it is arguably their fault if they appoint someone who does not 
exercise an appropriate level of care for the company. Shareholders can 
make these mistakes of judgment and appoint someone who does not reach 
their reasonable expectations. If they appoint someone who is not 
adequately experienced and skilled, whilst they are not liable for the damage 
to the company, they are arguably culpable indirectly for the damage.  
SHA3 provided the example of a company that ran a shop selling 
Jewellery.  He was a shareholder in the company and he appointed a friend’s 
son to be director and to run the shop. Every month the shareholders would 
receive a bank statement, which would be their way of supervising the 
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director. One month the takings were considerably lower than the 
shareholders expected and they asked the director what had happened. The 
director explained that he had closed the shop for two weeks and gone on 
holiday, as it was Iranian New Year. When asked why he did not get an 
employee to work instead, he said he did not think they should have to work 
during the New Year either. The shareholders considered this as a 
uncultured act of negligence and decided to replace the director. SHA3 
explained that if the director was not from a friend’s family they might have 
tried to claim against him.  
SHA1 mentioned an example where he had shares in a public 
company. The shares were very steady for several years and one day they 
dropped in value considerably. It transpired that the director had lost several 
large contracts to a rival company and the business was seriously affected 
as a result. The director had known about the possibility of losing these 
contracts for several months and failed to tell anybody. As a result of the bad 
effect on the company the director lost their job, there was no action brought 
against them. 
Without safeguards in place to be able to bring actions against a 
director, the only tool at the shareholders’ disposal is to dismiss the director, 
which is an incredibly common practice. One of the shareholders, SHA2 
stated that the power to easily dismiss a director and maintain that control 
reduced the need to have any duty of care in place. Whilst shareholders 
have this power, it is not the same as having the ability to claim against a 
director for having breached a duty. Dismissing a director will not return any 
lost funds for company damage a director may have caused. 
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The second issue is that there is a culture of appointing family 
members or social or political connections as directors in Iran. Many 
interviewees agreed that the default practice in getting a high paid job in Iran 
is to use your family, political and friendship connections. Without using 
these connections, the empirical data indicated that it is not easy to rise to a 
good position. The issue with this practice is that family members who are 
gifted these positions will lack the necessary attributes to fulfil their role 
successfully and this can cause harm to a business. For this reason, this 
issue increases the need for a comprehensive duty of care.   
The third issue is that directors should be liable for shirking their 
responsibilities. Harm can be caused to a company from directors failing to 
manage the business responsibly. Shirking responsibilities can come in the 
form of, for instance, not attending to the company’s finances and failing to 
appropriately manage employees. In all cases the director is effectively 
deciding to deliberately not take actions that they know they are required to 
take. Equally directors may not carry out a responsibility due to lack of 
understanding of their responsibilities. This has the same effect and damage 
as shirking however the director’s liability will be determined on the basis of 
whether they should have understood that they had that responsibility.   
6.5.2 Potential Solutions  
All three issues raised can be improved by holding directors liable if 
they breach a comprehensive duty of care that is included in statutory law. 
As a basis this would protect companies that fail to include a duty of care in 
the articles of association or include poorly drafted provisions dealing with 
care.  
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The first issue of holding directors liable for negligence will have a 
significant impact on the practices of directors. At present, without a proper 
duty of care in place, directors do not have any personal consequences for 
damaging decision-making. As soon as personal risk becomes a 
consideration they are likely to take more care in their actions. When 
referring back to the example of the Jewellery store director, the prospect of 
being liable for lost earnings for two weeks would certainly have forced this 
director to keep the shop open.  
Negligence can only be combatted by forcing directors to adhere to an 
objective standard as well as a subjective standard of care. If only a 
subjective standard of care was applied to the duty, Iranian directors who are 
not qualified or experienced would be able to avoid liability due to them not 
being experienced or qualified.   
In the UK and Australia directors have a duty to exercise reasonable 
care, skill and diligence, which is applied with a dual objective and subjective 
standard. This dual standard is key to imposing the liability, as directors are 
held accountable for what they should have done in the situation based on 
their own experience and ability and also what a reasonable person 
appointed to the position of director would have done in the situation. It is my 
suggestion that this dual standard based on the UK Duty of Care be included 
in part one, section six of Iranian Company Law 1968. 
The second issue is that there are a high number of unqualified 
directors causing harm to companies. All directors that are appointed need a 
degree of motivation to refrain from taking certain risks that might damage 
the businesses they direct. Having duties attached to the role will in some 
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cases make candidates for the role of director consider whether they are 
prepared to accept the liability that comes with the role.    
The ideal solution would be for shareholders to only appoint qualified 
directors who would obtain their position based on merit. This is however 
unachievable and in reality appointing directors based on connections is a 
global phenomenon and it is not unique to Iran. In the UK there are plenty of 
family companies that become successful with their appointments of family 
members as directors. In Hong Kong, a jurisdiction with many family 
companies, if a family member does not fit the criteria then someone who 
does is appointed.707 However, in the event that there is a family member 
who is a good match who possesses the required qualities then it is common 
for that person to be appointed. Even appointed family members who might 
lack certain attributes can be instilled with values, vision, passion for 
business and abilities to build loyalty with key owners, customers, suppliers 
and employees. 708 China is an example of a jurisdiction that, much like Iran, 
has a cultural trend of appointing unqualified directors based on connections. 
709   The solution of installing a duty of care into statutory law in 2005 to 
make directors liable for damaging decision making has not had a significant 
impact on encouraging unqualified directors to not accept appointments that 
could burden them with liability.   
Holding directors accountable for shirking their actions through a 
statutory duty of care has the potential to make a significant impact on 
improving management practices. If directors realise that they are liable for 																																																								
707 J.A. Davis, Managing the Family Business: Firing the CEO Article, Harvard Business 
School (2014). Accessed online: http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/7394.html [Accessed 
13/04/2015]. 
708 Ibid. 
709 Ibid. 
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failing to properly manage the employees and address all their 
responsibilities then they will be more attentive to these responsibilities.  
It is also critical to prevent directors having the ability to amend the 
articles and override the duty of care.  In the UK Companies Act  
 
“any provision in a company’s articles that 
purports to exempt a director of a company (to 
any extent) from any liability that would 
otherwise attach to him in connection with any 
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust in relation to the company is void.” 710 
 
A provision of such should be included in the proposed update to Iranian 
Company Law as it renders the duty of care mandatory as directors are 
prevented from bypassing it through an update to their company’s 
constitution. Although it will be possible to authorise or ratify actions that 
amount to a breach of the duty of care, it will not be possible to alter the 
nature of the duties themselves by any means.711  
6.5.3 Application of these duties 
Overall when considering the issues that exist and weighing up the 
potential benefits against the queries over suitability it becomes clear to see 
that Iran would greatly benefit from incorporating the duty of care into 
statutory law. The most suitable model as already mentioned is the UK duty 
to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence with a dual objective and 
subjective standard. This transplant has been adopted in several jurisdictions 
including Hong Kong and also recently in Kenya. The dual standard is 																																																								
710 C. Bruner, ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. Business 
Entities’, Research Handbook on Fiduciary Duties; A. Gold & G. Smith eds, Research 
Handbook on Fiduciary Law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 12. 
711 Ibid. 
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needed in Iran, as there are potentially many cases of unqualified directors 
breaching their duty of care that would pass the subjective assessment but 
fail the objective assessment.712  
SCH4 provided the example of the rice company whose director 
decided to mass produce rice in order to export it to Iraq knowing that it was 
possible that trade with Iraq could be forbidden in the near future. When the 
trade restriction came into place the director decided to sell the stock half 
price to a different purchaser and the company ended up making a loss. The 
risk taken by the director was high as the consequence for the deal not going 
in their favour was a significant financial loss for the company. When the 
shareholders claimed for negligence, the director was excused because he 
passed the subjective standard. If there were a dual standard applied in this 
case, the director would not have passed the objective standard, as a 
reasonable person would not have taken such a considerable risk. 
Whilst it has been raised that there are aspects to the duty of care that 
could be detrimental to Iranian company practices, these are not sufficient to 
merit not introducing the duty. There is the risk that due to a duty of care 
some directors may take fewer major risks through fear of liability. In reality 
though it is more likely that in such scenarios directors can obtain permission 
from shareholders to pursue such risks, which would absolve them from 
liability. In terms of shirking responsibilities, the duty of care can only assist 
in raising the standard of directors’ conduct. 
In China there is a lack of desire from shareholders to change their 
practices and bring duty of care cases forwards. It is possible that Iran could 
																																																								
712 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 Duty of Care in Iran. 
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pass down the same route after introducing the duty of care. For real change 
to occur the duty would have to be brought in along with strong enforcement 
that will demonstrate to businesses that the duties work and that they are 
there to help. As previously mentioned, the government has the power to get 
media coverage of these updates and news stories of cases of breaches are 
the most powerful way of getting the message of reform across. 
6.6 The Business Judgment Rule  
The Business Judgment Rule is not provided for in Iranian law and 
directors who are liable for the duty of care in company’s articles need 
protection when they have acted in good faith. The concept of good faith 
does appear in different parts of Iranian law. At a basic level Article 125 and 
126 of Iranian Constitution Law insist that directors must not act outside of 
their duties. Islamic sources have a closer rule ‘Ghaedeye Ehsan’ as 
mentioned in Chapter 5 that exempts a director from responsibility if they 
have acted in good faith.713 There are however two other Islamic rules, which 
are mentioned in 5.2.3 that contradict this rule. ‘Zarar va Zian be Taghsir’714 
is interpreted by judges as articulating the notion that if a duty in the articles 
is breached and harm is caused to the company then the director is liable 
regardless of good faith. Judges use this rule in Iran to hold directors 
accountable for their duties. 
This text does not refer to a director or his breach however judges 
interpret the law in relation to directors’ duties, as it is the closest Islamic 
source on the subject. Similarly to this rule there is also ‘Al’Amalo bel Niat’ 																																																								
713See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3: The Business Judgment Rule.  
714 Ibid. 
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which states that the person must prove the good faith or he or she is subject 
to liability. 715  The contradiction is potentially a source of confusion for 
decision makers. Furthermore, JUD2 highlighted,  
 
“The Islamic rule (Al’Amalo bel Niat) 716  is 
applicable for humans in normal life but not 
for companies and commercial cases.”   
 
“God commands justice and good-doing…. 
And he forbids indecency, dishonesty and 
insolence.717” 
 
In contrast to JUD2, it was stated by SCH4 that the concept of the 
Business Judgment Rule does have support from legal professionals in the 
context of Iranian Company Law, 
 
“The Business Judgment Rule is not in our 
company law, but some judges support this 
rule according to the directors’ good faith for 
companies.” 
It was evident from the interviewees’ revelations that there are certain 
laws that touch on the subject of the Business Judgment Rule, however 
there was debate as to how relevant and applicable they can be in 
commercial cases.   
6.6.1 Issues With Duty Of Good Faith 
The law that currently exists in Iran is not sufficiently comprehensive 
and it fails to protect directors from unfair claims of breach of duty of care.  
																																																								
715 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3: The Business Judgment Rule. 
716 According to Hadith (sentence) from Mohammad. 
717  N. Shirazi, Descent of the Holy Quran (Munich: Createspace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 15: 92. 
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Through not having adequate provision of law on good faith, certain issues 
have arisen in Iran. 
Firstly, the interviewed judges found that the current Islamic principles 
that provide law on good faith are difficult to apply due to them not being 
clear and succinct. This lack of clarity leads to inconsistency in determining 
cases from one judge to another.  
Secondly, the current law does not prevent against directors’ 
decisions being challenged by the courts. Judgments based on hindsight 
question the decisions of directors as opposed to the decision making 
process. SCH1 provided an example where a director was found liable for a 
decision that damaged their company.  The director argued that whilst he 
could see that he had made a wrong decision, in the moment he made it he 
had a limited amount of information and it seemed like the correct decision. 
Law on good faith is ineffective if it does not prevent the courts from second-
guessing the decision making of directors. 
Thirdly, good faith law should provide directors security to pursue risks 
for the benefit of their companies. From the interviews it became clear that 
many directors in state owned companies choose not to pursue risks in fear 
that the companies will hold them responsible should those risks fail to prove 
successful. Good faith law in Iran is lacking in that it does not provide 
directors the necessary security to allow them the freedom to pursue such 
opportunities.   
Fourthly, when the proposed duty of care comes in to place that is 
based on a dual objective and subjective standard, directors will have 
increased accountability for their decision making process.  This is of 
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concern for those directors who are appointed based on family or social 
connections as opposed to merit. Unqualified directors who acquire their 
positions based on connections are more at risk of failing to meet the criteria 
of the objective standard of care in cases of negligence. The decision making 
process that they practice might be less thorough than that of a reasonable 
person in the same circumstance who has the knowledge and experience of 
someone who can be expected to occupy the position of director.718 The 
existing law on good faith would not assist directors against a more robust 
duty of care.  As defences of good faith are often unsuccessful in Iran719, 
stronger law on good faith would be required if the proposed amendments to 
the duty of care are introduced. 
6.6.2 Potential Solutions  
There is a need in Iran to amend the law on good faith in order to 
alleviate the four issues that have been identified.  The current good faith law 
based on several Islamic principles can be replaced by a more 
comprehensive and clear set of regulations in a business judgment rule that 
should be located within the statutory duty of care reform proposed in section 
6.5. This code would be based on the Australian model of the business 
judgment rule.  The Australian model dictates that a director who makes a 
business judgment in good faith fulfils their duty of care, skill and diligence 
if:(a) he or she does not have any interests in the subject of the business 
judgment; (b) he or she is well-informed about the company subject to the 
degree he or she rationally considers to be appropriate; (c) he or she 																																																								
718 Hicks & Goo's Cases and Materials on Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 385. 
719 H. Tehrani, ‘Trade Law’, Dehkhoda Publication Press, 2.1 (1997) 175-176. 
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reasonably believes that the judgment is in the company’s best interest.720 
By including a business judgment rule based on the Australian model, the 
law on good faith would immediately be clear and straightforward for judges 
to apply.  
The issue of second guessing directors’ decisions would also be 
solved by the introduction of a business judgment rule.  Essentially, the rule 
prevents directors’ decisions being challenged unless it can be proven that 
making such a decision does not fit within the Business Judgment Rule.721  
Part of the rule is to assume that the director is more knowledgeable than the 
courts at making decisions for their business.722 The business judgment rule 
is applicable as long as the officer took reasonable steps to become 
informed about the matter, had a rational basis for their decision and did not 
have a conflict of interest between their interests and those of the 
company.723  
A business judgment rule would also provide a safeguard for directors 
against unfair persecution, which is an issue for many directors of state 
owned companies who currently fear taking risks. The majority of 
interviewees agreed that the rule would be beneficial in Iran, adding that they 
thought it would ease the fears of the director over their accountability and 
allow them to focus on doing their jobs as opposed to worrying about 
possible liability for mistakes. Directors are not to be regarded as insurers for 
																																																								
720  M. Legg, D. Jordan, ‘The Australian Business Judgment Rule after ASIC v. Rich: 
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Online, and Global Environment, (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2014), 732. 
	294	
businesses and they should be permitted to act without fear of liability 
affecting their judgment.724 
 Whilst the benefits to solving this issue are evident, certain 
interviewees had concerns that should directors be granted greater freedom, 
they would abuse it and risk the security of the businesses they direct. Whilst 
it is understood that business risk is a fundamental component of business 
growth, the shareholders interviewed felt that having fear of liability for 
selecting the wrong risks is equally crucial. In the current business context of 
Iran, shareholders do not have enough trust in their directors that they will 
consistently make the right decisions and protect the business.   
The issue of protection for directors from any unreasonable liability 
when the proposed duty of care comes into place will be solved by the 
introduction of a business judgment rule within the duty of care legislation. 
The rule will provide a mechanism for directors to defend themselves against 
unfair challenges of their decision-making where they have acted in good 
faith in the best interests of the company. It’s existence within the duty of 
care legislation will balance out the need for the director to be empowered to 
make decisions with the need of the business for the director to be always 
accountable.725  
6.6.3 Application of Business Judgment Rule in Iran 
The rule should be applied in the form of a subsection of the 
suggested duty of care. This status for the rule is suitable as it is essentially 																																																								
724 Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on The Basis of Directors’ Duties in 
Delaware: The Result of The Game (part 1), 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1297, 1302-03 (1995) (the rule 
was developed to give boards of directors significant protection and discretion in making 
business decision).) 
725S. Bainbridge, ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’, Vanderbilt Law 
Review, 57.1 (2004) 83-84. 
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a qualification to the duty of care in that it is a tool for directors to defend 
themselves when an action is brought against them for breach of the duty of 
care.   
In Australian Company Law, the Business Judgment Rule is 
thoroughly established and has been in practice since 1999. Whilst it has its 
critics the rule is regarded as functional in that it serves the purpose of being 
a tool for defending directors.  Australia’s success in its application of the rule 
does not necessarily mean that Iran would enjoy the same success should it 
follow suit. Iran essentially would be superseding the Islamic principle of 
good faith that exists in ‘Ghaedeye Ehsan’. 
6.7 Enforcement of Directors’ Duties 
In Iran, it was not until 1968 that derivative actions were first 
mentioned in company law, despite general company law first being 
introduced in 1924. The new law consisted of two articles. Firstly, Article 276 
of the Iranian Company law 1968 set out that a shareholder who owns at 
least one fifth of a company’s shares would be able to bring a claim on behalf 
of the company against the board of directors or the director if they fund the 
claim themselves. If the director were to lose the claim, the director would 
pay the cost of the claim to the company. Article 277 Iranian Company Law 
1968 sets out that these provisions cannot be overruled by anything inserted 
into the articles of association of a company incorporated after the provision 
came into law.  
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6.7.1 Issues with enforcement of duties in Iran 
Articles 276 and 277 make derivative actions possible in Iran, but 
despite the power to bring an action existing, it is still a difficult task for 
minority shareholders.  This is firstly due to the court and lawyers’ fees that 
minority shareholders have to personally finance. Secondly, any shareholder 
who has less than a 20 per cent share of the company is not entitled to bring 
an action. In 2011, an attempt was made to reform the law. Legislators put 
forward to the Islamic Consultative Assembly four articles that dealt with 
derivative actions. The principal point would permit the derivative action to be 
brought by any of the minority shareholders against the directors. Also it was 
suggested that the minority shareholder should be exempt from paying the 
court fee when they claim against the director or the board of directors.726 
These reforms were not embraced however and the law is still as it was in 
1968 however as the updates were never accepted by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. Iran’s enforcement is in desperate need of reform as 
without an effective method of bringing actions and claiming against 
directors, there is no way to hold directors accountable for their duties.   
6.7.2 Potential Solutions  
The UK example of private enforcement, which allows for derivative 
action and oppression (unfair prejudice) action, is the most logical model that 
Iran can follow. The derivative action in the UK differs from the Iranian one in 
that it is contained in the main statutory source of company law and all the 
code is set out in one part. There are also clear instructions concerning the 
																																																								
726 Iranian Company Law 2011 (Amendment). Article 93 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher) 
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procedure for bringing an action and the stages involved to guide 
shareholders on the process.   
Public enforcement is also considered as a possible solution to 
improve Iran’s enforcement practices. This type of enforcement is where a 
public authority has the task of identifying instances of breaches of duties 
and bringing actions against directors. This method is arguably successful in 
some jurisdictions, the best example of which is Australia as documented in 
Chapter 2. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is the 
body by which breaches of directors’ duties are regulated. The role of the 
Commission is to educate the public and increase awareness about 
enforcement. They are also responsible for monitoring, enforcing and 
administering compliance under the range of corporate governance 
provisions included in the Corporations Act. When required they are also 
consulted on law reform in relation to corporate governance. 727 One study of 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission reported by Michelle 
Welsh recommended that, 
 
 “Enforcement action by the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission was 
a significant component in encouraging 
companies to engage in complying with the 
law, and therefore discouraging 
misconduct.728 
 
 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission as a public body is 																																																								
727M. Berkahn, Regulatory and Enabling Approaches to Corporate Law Enforcement (Deakin 
University, 2003), 134. 
728 M. Welsh, ‘New Sanctions and Increased Enforcement Activity in Australian Corporate 
Law: Impact and Implications’, Common Law World Review, 2.1 (2012) 134-136. 
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better placed than shareholders to bring actions against directors due to their 
experience, skill and resources. Having a public body carry out this role 
greatly increases awareness of enforcement, which deters directors from 
risking breaching their duties.729    
When Public enforcement is practiced however, for its effective 
functionality, the authority that carries out this work must be independent of 
the state. In contrast to the Australian model of public enforcement, the 
Chinese model has been less successful due to the influence that the 
government wields over the public authority.730  When considering public 
enforcement as a potential option for Iran to improve its current enforcement 
practices, the weaknesses of the Chinese model are relevant. 
It can be regarded that there is a fundamental lack of independence 
between the listed companies and the state enforcement agencies.731 The 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC), the main enforcement 
agency is, 
“Susceptible to political influence, local 
protectionism and other forms of 
corruption”732  
 
 
          The Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) can be 
influenced by the state in cases that involve SEOs or companies that have 																																																								
729H. Jackson & M. Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-
based Evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics, 93.1 (2009) 207-208.  
730Ch. Ding, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial Development: The Chinese 
Experience ( Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 77. 
731 Ch. Ding, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial Development: The Chinese 
Experience ( Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 77. 
732 Ibid. 
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some governmental ownership. When the state has an interest in a 
company, they are likely to decide that an action against the director will 
have a negative effect on the image of the business. One commentator said 
that, 
 
“If the government were suddenly to expose 
all of the fraudulent and illegal behaviour in 
the listed companies, it could cause a stock 
market crash and a potential loss of a large 
amount of State assets.733” 
 
           As a result of this weak enforcement China struggles to deter 
company directors from breaching their duties, as there is not the concern 
from directors that there is an authority that will enforce the breaches.734  
In Iran it would be likely that if public enforcement were introduced at 
the moment, a public authority would not be permitted sufficient 
independence to operate without allowing the government influence to affect 
their work.735 In Iran if one takes the example of how the government impacts 
upon the various levels of the judiciary, then it would suggest a public 
authority would receive pressure from the government in much the same 
way.   
																																																								
733 Ch. Ding, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial Development: The Chinese 
Experience ( Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 77. 
734  Q. Liu, ‘Corporate Governance in China: Current practices, Economic Effects, and 
Institutional Determinants’, CESifo Economic Studies, 52.2 (2006) 415-453. 
735 A. Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 207. 
See also R. Jones & M. Welsh, ‘Toward a public enforcement model for directors’ duty of 
oversight, Vanderbilt Journal of Trans, 45 (2012) 343. See also A. Keay, ‘The Public 
Enforcement of Directors' Duties: A Normative Inquiry’, Common Law World Review, 43 
(2014) 89. 
	300	
6.7.3 Application of Enforcement in Iran  
Reform of enforcement is fundamental as directors’ duties can only be 
applied if there are robust enforcement mechanisms there to allow 
shareholders to bring actions. Iran should continue on the route of private 
enforcement and it will need to reform article 276 and 277 of Iranian 
Company Law. The reform that was proposed in 2011 would be suitable in 
enhancing derivative actions to allow minority shareholders to bring actions 
without any barriers. The removal of the requirement of a 20 per cent 
shareholding to bring actions will make a considerable difference, as it will 
allow all shareholders to bring actions regardless of the amount of shares 
that are held. Minority shareholders are limited in the same way in China and 
the same issues occur there as a result. The removal of the fee that 
shareholders must pay to bring the actions has the potential of increasing the 
number of actions brought forwards as it is one less barrier that they will 
encounter.   
The Islamic Consultative Assembly must have their response 
acknowledged however and the reform must be redrafted to render it more in 
keeping with the Islamic principles of the regime. This can be achieved 
through correspondence with the Islamic Consultative Assembly to establish 
the exact grounds of their disagreement with the proposed legislation 
update.  
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6.8 Auditing  
In Iran the directors select auditors and they are employed by the 
company to perform their function of delivering an objective and unbiased 
view of specific elements of a company. Under article 54 of Iranian Company 
Law directors periodically have to send financial statements to the auditor 
after which the auditor will make an assessment of their findings for the 
board of directors .736 Essentially the role of the auditor is to assess financial 
statements and make sure they are free of material misstatement, whether 
due to fraud or error. They are also meant to develop an understanding of 
the companies they audit and make sure no malpractice occurs. 
Overall, the role of the auditor is important for keeping directors on 
track and accountable. For shareholders, the audit is a report that will be 
looked at annually that should flag up whether there have been any 
breaches of duties. There were several areas of potential reform that were 
mentioned in this section, all of which have merit. The example of China 
having implemented new legislation for auditors has also provided an 
example of reformed law on auditors that has not been successful and can 
be learned from. 
6.8.1 Issues with Auditing   
Issues with auditing occur when the practice of providing shareholders 
with accurate assessments of the accounts and corporate governance of 
their companies is replaced by inaccurate assessments. This can only occur 
when auditors are not sufficiently qualified, skilled and experienced or 
because they have a reason not to provide accurate assessments. 																																																								
736 Iranian Company Law 1933. Article 54 (Tehran: Didavar Book Publisher). 
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The first issue with auditors in Iran is that they lack sufficient 
independence to be able to successfully fulfil the role they are intended for. 
The director appoints the auditor and from this position they can select 
someone who they can influence. This relationship is open to corruption, as 
directors can appoint an auditor who will cover up their breaches. Frequently 
when auditors are selected, the director chooses the person who can best 
assist them in keeping control and concealing their errors. 
 Often in family companies there is a common tendency to appoint 
family members, a practice that produces a conflict of interest. In Iran it is 
exceptionally common and perfectly legal for a family member to occupy the 
role of auditor in a relative’s company. Allowing these appointments 
immediately negates the authority of any audit and it goes against the 
principles of effective internal control, independence and conflict of interest.   
  Also the dependence of the auditor to the director comes in the form 
of their financial dependence to them. Auditors receive their payment from 
the directors and they might fear that their fee will not be settled if they do not 
produce a report that the director approves of. Often reports are first shown 
to the director before reaching the desk of the shareholders, permitting the 
director to influence it before it is made public. 
A legislative issue of the auditing in Iran is that there is no 
specification that auditors need to assess the corporate governance 
mechanisms of the company. At present whilst it is common to assess this, 
due to it not been required by law, many auditors do not make any 
assessment of corporate governance.  
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6.8.2 Potential solutions  
The solution for having an effective auditing process is to have 
auditors that are independent who have no personal connection to directors 
and whose professional remuneration is not dependent on them.  
When addressing who can and cannot be an auditor, the UK code 
stipulates that family members cannot be appointed to the role.737 The new 
Chinese legislation prevents candidates with conflicts of interest from being 
appointed as auditors and stipulates that they must be independent.738   
One solution offered by Hong Kong is to force the director to 
periodically send off a Corporate Governance Report when they deliver the 
accounts for audit.739 Within this Corporate Governance Report directors 
must set out that they have taken measures to ensure internal control. The 
first step is to carry out relevant internal controls to safeguard shareholders’ 
investments and the company’s assets. The second is to annually scrutinise 
the effectiveness of the internal controls in place and file a report about the 
preparation of the corporate governance report. This report will include all 
elements of business practice from finances to operations.740  
																																																								
737 APB Ethical Standard 2 (Revised), ‘Financial, Business, Employment and Personal 
Relationship’, Financial Reporting Council (2010). Available Online: 
 https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/ES-2-(Revised)-Financial,-business,-
employment-and.pdf  [Accessed 22/05/2016]. 
738L. Hua et al , ‘Main Principles and Practices of Auditing Independence in China: A 
Multifaceted Discussion’, Asian Social Science, 6.7 (2010) 4-8. 
739 U.A, ‘Internal Control – the UK Corporate Governance Code’, Outlaw.Com (2010). 
Available Online: 
 http://www.out-law.com [Accessed 22/05/2016]. 
740UA, ‘Internal Control Review on Corporate Governance’, Crowe Horwath (HK) CPA 
Limited (2017). Available Online: 
http://www.crowehorwath.net/hk [Accessed 22/05/2016]. 
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6.8.3 Application of these solutions   
To apply new legislation that requires auditors be independent from 
directors, a section would have to be added to Iranian Company Law. The 
Chinese stipulation that all auditors must not have any conflicts of interest 
should be adopted as it is comprehensive and it is better suited to Iran. 
In the UK, Australia, Hong Kong and China the task of appointing 
auditors is assigned to the shareholders. The introduction of this rule in 
China is yet to be proved successful however as there are still many family 
members being appointed as auditors.741 This is predominantly due to the 
number of instances where the shareholder is the director and can select an 
auditor who they can influence. 
6.9 Courts and Judges  
Through the doctrinal research and the interviews there was a clear 
message that the courts and Judges in Iran are performing below an 
acceptable standard in commercial cases. There are several issues that 
have been highlighted by the interviewees that have resulted in many 
businesses losing faith in the courts and choosing alternative methods for 
resolving disputes. Without companies using the courts to solve their 
disputes, the law in place will fail to serve its purpose. These issues will be 
addressed in order to find potential solutions so that the courts can address 
cases of directors’ duties efficiently and effectively.   
																																																								
741K. Yong & J. Wiley & Sons, Due Diligence in China: Beyond the Checklists (Singapore: 
John Wiley & Sons Singapore Pte. Ltd, 2013), 6-10. 
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6.9.1 Issues with the Courts and Judges 
A concern put forward by the interviewees is that commercial disputes 
are dealt with in general civil courts instead of being referred to designated 
commercial courts. Commercial cases can be exceedingly complex and the 
infrastructure around a case needs to be in place to allow for the appropriate 
processing of a case. Much of the Iranian Company Law was borrowed from 
French Civil Code, however the structures of processing cases were not 
borrowed. France has about 230 commercial courts. 742 It was argued by the 
interviewees that there is a contradiction of process between the law and the 
courts due to a failure to borrow the French court structure that accompanied 
the code.743  The interviewees expressed great frustration at the lack of unity 
between the law and the courts. SCH3 and LAW2 both made this point with 
the latter stating, 
 
“We do not have the court system in place to 
make decisions on our company law. In 
different courts, similar commercial cases are 
decided totally differently.”744 
 
Besides not having commercial courts, companies that bring cases 
forwards are let down by the calibre of the appointed Judges. Judges have 
been deemed by the interviewees to be insufficiently equipped in terms of 
knowledge, experience and education to serve in the position of authority 
that they hold. Shareholders, Directors, Lawyers and Scholars from their 
professional experience all had damning points to raise about the quality of 																																																								
742 P. Herzog & M. Weser, Civil Procedure in France (Columbia: Columbia University, 2014), 
144.  
743 Ibid. 
744 Ibid. 
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judges today in Iran, questioning whether they are capable of dealing with 
complex issues that form the subject matter of commercial cases.  Without 
experienced and well-qualified judges in place, companies expose 
themselves to a considerable risk in taking cases to court, even if the law is 
on their side. Without having confidence in judges to consistently make 
decisions in line with the law, many companies that would ordinarily seek to 
take matters to the court might refrain through concern over the added risk of 
not being able to depend on judges to rule in line with the law.  
Moreover, it is clear that Judges can have difficulties remaining 
impartial in instances where they are offered bribes. Several interviewees 
stated that they did not trust judges to provide fair judgments, as they 
believed many to be susceptible to corruption. The interviewees provided 
several examples of how through payments or favours to judges, people had 
won cases or had cases intentionally delayed.  
One weakness of judges that can be exploited is that they only earn 
modest salaries when compared with other legal professionals. The 
possibility of bribery is certainly increased through Judges not being in such 
a financial position that bribery can appear so appealing.  
Another instance where judges are susceptible to being influenced is 
when the state exerts pressure on them. Both the government and the army 
of guardians have a reputation for influencing judicial outcomes in their 
favour. Judges have fear that their careers might be jeopardised if they do 
not follow the instructions of these powerful factions. With such a high 
proportion of companies being run by the state and the army of guardians, 
there are regularly instances where cases are influenced. 
	307	
 Another issue that has emerged over time is that the courts are no 
longer the primary method of resolving commercial disputes. Interviewees 
voiced their frustrations over the length of time taken for cases to be resolved 
through the courts and their concern over the inconsistencies of court 
judgments. As a result of this unreliable service the popularity of the courts 
has reduced. Arbitration has increased in popularity at the same time and is 
viewed by many as a genuine alternative to using the courts. Interviewees 
listed the attributes of arbitration to be its efficiency and the competence of 
the arbitrators.  
 The rise in popularity of arbitration is also due to the legislature in 
1997 passing the International Arbitration Law, which made the process of 
arbitration quicker and less expensive. This law being passed is most likely a 
consequence of the commercial court’s struggle with its case volume. The 
result has been the relief of pressure on the courts as the responsibility of 
deciding cases has been shared with arbitrators.   
6.9.2 Potential Solutions  
 Improving the processing of cases will be best achieved by 
introducing commercial courts. This change should result in an improved 
standard of dealing with commercial cases through greater efficiency in 
carrying out the administrative operations of receiving and processing claims. 
The expertise of judges working in commercial courts will improve at a 
greater rate than if judges continue to work at civil courts moving between 
commercial cases and other kinds of civil cases. Each court’s reputation will 
also be a reflection of the public perception of the standard of judges working 
at that court, which will increase the court’s requirement to appoint the best 
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candidates as judges. It is also the case that the record keeping at the 
commercial courts would be improved, which would enable greater analysis 
of received cases, decisions and results. This is not to suggest that Iran 
should adopt case law like the common law countries, but only that keeping 
a record of what cases are received and the judge’s ruling should allow the 
court to monitor the consistency of verdicts.  
As one scholar (SCH2) mentioned, there is an attempt at present to 
allocate commercial cases to suitable judges who have experience in the 
specific field. Provided this allocation of Judge is correctly organised, there is 
no reason this practice is not a perfectly adequate solution to a lack of 
commercial courts. Many interviewees though, who have plenty of 
experience with these judges, are still left dissatisfied with the suitability of 
assigned judges. Commercial courts would be able to better allocate judges 
to cases, as the courts themselves will be in charge of the allocation. Having 
the assignment of these cases dealt with through one body will improve this 
aspect of the case processing chain. 
In order for Iran to produce high calibre judges for the courts both the 
academic courses and the selection process needs to be addressed. Firstly, 
the academic requirement to become a judge is set at the achievement of a 
higher education qualification of at least a bachelor’s degree either in Law, 
Islamic Law or Islamic Studies. Whilst Islamic law forms part of Iranian Law, 
entering the profession without any knowledge of statutory law will result in 
new judges being ill prepared. In comparison with France, which is also a 
civil law country, in order to meet the academic requirements, applicants 
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must have a higher education qualification in Law, which is a Masters 
degree. 
The principal reason why young judges in Iran are deemed to be ill 
prepared is due to the courses that they are being taught at university. They 
are principally being trained in sharia law and they are learning very little 
statutory law. One interviewee, JUD1, explained that during his studies he 
only took one module on company law. This interviewee was a company law 
judge who further admitted to feeling out of his depth when he first started 
mentioning that he often even felt lost in cases. This level of preparation is 
incomparable to that of a judge in other jurisdictions. In the UK an entry level 
judge would have had years of experience as a legal practitioner and training 
as a judge prior to practicing.   
The selection process to become a judge can be reformed to make 
sure that only the most suitable candidates are selected to become judges. 
The first requirement is the age restriction that only permits those who have 
the appropriate qualification who are over the age of 22 to become judges. 
Secondly, applicants must fit the character profile set by the Council of 
Justice. Amongst the specification requirements, one must be a Shia Muslim, 
believe in sharia principles, be an Iranian citizen, complete military service, 
have soundness of mind and have completed Itjihad.  
Many interviewees agreed with this point claiming that there is a bias 
towards appointing more religious candidates. One of the interviewees, 
SCH1, stated, 
 
“It is rare to come across a judge who is 
suitably educated and has the relevant 
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expertise. In my opinion, Judges are 
appointed according to their political and 
religious connections.” 
 
All jurisdictions should have a thorough vetting process, however in 
Iran the focus of the vetting is to make sure that the future members of the 
judiciary believe in the Islamic principles of the government.   
It is necessary to remove the incentive for judges to accept bribes. 
Whilst the natural solution is to pay judges sufficiently so that they have a 
comfortable enough lifestyle that they are not tempted by bribery, it is 
unlikely that the judiciary will follow this course as they are already financially 
constrained.745  
In order to safeguard judges from the pressures to favour state owned 
companies or army of guardian companies there would have to be increased 
separation of powers. The pressure to make decisions in the state’s interest 
would be reduced if these bodies did not have the power to affect the careers 
of the judges.  
Moreover, restoring the courts as the principal means of resolving 
cases can be achieved by increasing the court’s efficiency and reliability. The 
unacceptable level of delays to commercial cases will have to be addressed. 
Whilst often reasonably, judges in Iran might adjourn cases for time to allow 
expert witnesses to make statements, they also often delay cases to give 
themselves more time as they struggle to fully understand some cases. 
These delays are caused by lack of knowledge of commercial cases. The 
solution could come in the form of introducing commercial courts, as it would 																																																								
745 T. Beck et al, ‘New Tool and New Test in Comparative Political Economy: The Database 
of Political Institutions’, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 15.1 (2000) 165-
176. 
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be expected that the judges working in these courts would become experts 
on different forms of commercial cases.  
6.9.3 Application of these Solutions   
There should be new regional commercial courts introduced in Iran to 
solely address commercial disputes. All new commercial disputes will be 
referred to and processed by these courts. Judges that operate in these 
courts will solely treat commercial cases and new cases that arise will be 
assigned to the judge with the most experience in that field. This should 
result in judges becoming experts in their chosen area of commercial law. 
The example of China is useful when considering the implementation of 
commercial courts. It too had a similar situation in regards to a common 
trend of judges delaying cases and a lack of efficiency in processing cases. 
China has now had commercial courts in place many years746, however it still 
suffers from a low rate of judicial efficiency especially in regards to the 
delivery of judgments.747  In China the most common cause of reduced 
efficiency of the courts is judicial delay of cases. Often cases that continue 
for years without court decisions end up being resolved after companies 
have gone bankrupt or have illegally extracted all the valuable assets.748 This 
example suggests that introducing commercial courts will not solve all Iran’s 
problems although it certainly will improve the situation. 
The selection criteria for judges should also be reformed in order to 
improve the standard of new judges. The first stage of the selection process 																																																								
746 T. Beck et al, ‘New Tool and New Test in Comparative Political Economy: The Database 
of Political Institutions’, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 15.1 (2000) 165-
176. 
747 Ibid. 
748J. Chen et al, Implementation of Law in the People's Republic of China (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002), 62. 
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is having a suitable qualification. At present a suitable qualification can be 
either a degree in Islamic studies or in law. This restriction should be 
amended to allowing only those who have a degree a law. Removing the 
ability for students of Islamic studies to become judges would result in 
candidates with a greater knowledge of statutory and general law as well as 
Islamic law.  
 Once candidates have the academic requirement they must pass a 
competitive examination that is mainly based around sharia law. Again, it 
would be an improvement for this examination to be focused as well on 
statutory law to challenge a more broad understanding of the country’s legal 
framework. 
 Passing this examination at present demonstrates that applicants are 
ready to become judges. In other jurisdictions however there is an additional 
step, where a successful examination allows applicants to enter an 
‘academic institution for the education of Judges.’  In France for example 
successful candidates are admitted into the national college of the judiciary 
and are appointed as assistants to judges.749 This extra level of training 
under the supervision of practising judges would help new candidates to 
develop the practical skills they will need to become competent judges. The 
researcher suggests that colleges of this nature are developed for the 
purpose of educating legal professionals. Apart from having practical courses 
for prospective judges, the colleges could also offer practical courses for 
other types of legal professionals.   
																																																								
749 ‘UA, ‘Legal Professions, France’, European Justice Website (2013). Available Online: 
 https://e-justice.europa.eu/home.do?plang=en&action=home [Accessed 04/06/2016]. 
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 The French example is that of a civil law jurisdiction and it is worth 
considering the practices of common law countries as well as they differ 
significantly in their appointment of commercial judges. In the UK judicial 
posts require a relevant legal qualification 750  which to attain, one must 
complete a three-year degree and follow this up with a training contract or 
pupillage. At earliest, in order to satisfy these criteria, one must be usually be 
at least 23 years old. There is the additional requirement to have acquired 
either five or seven years experience in practice as well, which will take 
applicants to at least 28 years old. In practice lawyers do not become judges 
until they have much greater experience than the minimum required save in 
very exceptional cases. In order to be selected to become a judge, one must 
receive an invitation from the Judicial Appointments Commission, which puts 
forward candidates that in their opinion have the required attributes. This 
system dictates that only the most capable recognised legal professionals 
are selected. 
The UK process in reduces the need to have strict official guidelines 
about who can become a judge. For this reason there is no upper or lower 
age limit apart from the statutory retirement age of 70 for all judges.751 
Applicants should be able to offer a ‘reasonable length of service’ – usually 
at least five years.752 In reality though the Judicial Appointments Commission 
is unlikely to invite candidates under the age of 35 as there will be many 
other candidates who they can appoint that are in their 40s and 50s who will 
																																																								
750  UA, ‘Becoming a Judge’, Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (2008). Available Online: 
www.judiciary.gov.uk [Accessed 23/04/2015]. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Ibid. 
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be vastly more experienced.753 Australia has adopted a similar system to the 
UK. Invitations to the bench are only offered to those who have reliable 
reputations as high performing barristers or, on occasions, solicitors. To 
accrue such a reputation usually takes professionals at least into their late 
30s by which time they have amassed a great deal of experience in litigation 
and in the courtroom.754 Iran can learn from practices in these common law 
countries as these examples of UK and Australia produce judges of a high 
calibre. The vocation of being a judge in common law countries is in most 
cases well paid and it is a position of great status. In Iran however this is not 
the case as the salaries of judges is typically inferior to those of lawyers and 
any status to the position is diluted by the public perception that the courts 
are dysfunctional. Lawyers of distinction would not be sufficiently incentivised 
to leave their roles to become judges in Iran.  
Restoring the courts as the principal means for resolving commercial 
disputes would be achieved by improving the service and the faith 
businesses have in its ability to resolve cases. As has already been 
mentioned the introduction of commercial courts will assist in increasing 
efficiency. Improving the standard of judges will also be an integral 
component in restoring the courts as the principal means for resolving cases.  
																																																								
753UA, ‘Annual Report 2009/10, Independent Selection of a Modern Judiciary’, Judicial 
Appointment Commission (2010). Available Online: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/248050/0219.
pdf [Accessed 17/04/2016]. 
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Process’, Attorney General’s Department (2012). Available Online: 
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6.10 Legislative Limitations  
There are certain legislative rules that are limiting Iranian companies 
from having company structures that suit their needs. Company law has not 
been updated regularly in Iran and companies have to adhere to the law that 
is in place, regardless of how out of date it may be. There are two examples 
of these legislative limitations that will be considered in this section. The first 
is the requirement that directors must also be shareholders and the second 
is that all limited companies must have a minimum of two shareholders.      
6.10.1 Issues with legislation 
In Iran there is a legal requirement according to article 72 of Iranian 
Company Law that any candidate who becomes a director must also be a 
shareholder of the company. 755  This requirement however is more of a 
limitation as shareholders are forced to select the director of a company from 
amongst themselves. The only other option is for companies that want to hire 
someone who is not a shareholder to allot them a share to bypass the 
qualification requirement. This is the case with all non-governmental 
companies. In companies where the government has a controlling share the 
director will be selected by an employee of the government to represent the 
government’s share in the company. 756  Reforming this law would allow 
shareholders to recruit directors who have the best skillset and experience to 
run companies without having to allocate them shares.   
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 Another limiting legal requirement in Iran is that all limited liability 
companies are required to have a minimum of two directors. As a result of 
this companies that would ordinarily have been single shareholder 
companies appoint token shareholders to meet the legal criteria. As SCH2 
stated, 
 
“In practise there are businesses in Iran that 
are family companies where one person owns 
the company and appoints other family 
members as token shareholders to bypass this 
law.” 
 
The interviewees made it clear that there are many cases of this in 
Iran where there are individuals running companies on their own, who 
appoint token second shareholders to circumvent the law and allow 
themselves to keep running the company as they wish. As DIR1 added, 
 
“In Iran there are many companies where the 
wife and the children are selected as a 
shareholder and a director. These companies 
do not have real board meetings annually 
they simply get their wives and children to 
sign a document now and then when 
required.” 
 
6.10.2 Potential Solutions   
Iran can learn many lessons from the case study countries that have 
all encountered this issue at some point. In the UK and Australia, there is no 
statutory requirement for directors to hold shares in the company. 757  In 
Australia it was required that directors have at least one share in a company 																																																								
757 A. Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 134-
136. 
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however the Company Law Review Act 1998758 repealed the section on the 
grounds that it had no merit.759 Also in the UK the law required that directors 
must own a share qualification in order to hold their position. `This law was 
however removed and it is now regarded as out dated and limiting.760 
Mayson, French & Ryan state that, 
 
“It was also common for a company’s 
articles of association to require its directors 
each to hold a certain number of shares in 
the company. Share qualifications are now 
much less common and the model articles 
of association in SI 2008/3229 do not 
mention them.761” 
 
China and Hong Kong also have no statutory requirement for directors 
to have shareholdings in the company.762  In both jurisdictions however the 
law does not stop shareholders including such a requirement in their articles 
and it is not uncommon for companies to do so.763 
In order to address the appointment of token shareholders the solution 
would be to allow single shareholder companies to exist. In western 
countries the policy of not allowing single shareholder companies was 
phased out during the nineteenth century, as companies were able to get 
around the rule by having token second shareholders with small stakes and 
no economic or voting interest in the companies. China provides a more 																																																								
758 Section 223(1) of the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth) required the director to obtain 
the share qualification in the company within two months from his or her appointment, or 
such shorter time as stated in the constitution.  
759 J. Cassidy, Concise Corporations Law (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006), 192. 
760 J. Cox, Business Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), 27. 
761D. French et al, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 444. 
762G. Minkang, Understanding Chinese Company Law (Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 
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recent example of a jurisdiction that has addressed this issue.764 Before 
permitting single shareholder private companies, China permitted companies 
to exist that only had one shareholder as long as that shareholder was a 
state entity. As a result of their experience with single shareholder 
companies of this type, in 2005 single shareholder companies were 
introduced in an update to Chinese Company Law.   
In Iran there are many companies that should be single shareholder 
companies that operate with token shareholders. The solution is to reduce 
the minimum number of shareholders to one. 
6.10.3 Application of these Solutions     
It is clear from all the example countries that there is a consensus that 
it is not practical for companies to have a requirement that directors must be 
shareholders as well. It is therefore necessary to remove article 72 from 
Iranian Company Law to prevent this restriction on companies from 
continuing.   
Unlike the UK and Australia, Iran would not require any law that 
stipulates that Shareholders are not able to include in the articles of 
association a restriction that limits the choice of a director from being 
amongst the shareholders. For Iran, it is perhaps best to follow the approach 
of China and Hong where companies are allowed to include the requirement 
in their articles of association. This would allow the flexibility to include the 
rule in the articles for companies who want to keep the directors being 
selected from within the shareholders.765   																																																								
764B.L. Liebman & C.J. Milhaupt, Regulating the Visible Hand?: The Institutional Implications 
of Chinese State Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2015), 46-47. 
765Ibid. 
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Amending article 107, which specifies that the minimum number of 
directors a limited liability company can have is two, is the way to allow 
single shareholder companies to be permitted in Iran. It is necessary to 
reduce the minimum number of shareholders to one to allow companies to 
be formed by individuals who wish to operate companies on their own.   
6.11 Conclusion 
The chapter focused on issues that exist with the duties of directors, 
potential solutions that can address the issues and also the application of 
such solutions. The principal theme that arose when considering directors’ 
duties in company law was that despite whatever legislation was in place, it 
was all out of date, insufficiently comprehensive, too divided between 
different sources and generally not fit for purpose. 
Suggestions for possible reforms of the law and reforms of 
mechanisms in place have been offered as potential solutions. The 
suggested reforms are targeted at the weakest elements of the law on 
directors’ duties and on enforcement and auditing. Having considered legal 
transplantation at the beginning of the chapter it has also been possible to 
actively consider the application of any legislation updates.  
In terms of transplantation, it has been suggested that Iran should 
apply a series of conditions for transplanting modelled from the Chinese 
system. Of greatest importance would be the need to make sure that new 
legislation is in keeping with current legislation and that it can integrate 
successfully. Furthermore there is a need to make sure that new legislation 
is in line with the culture, politics and government agenda.  
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 This research proposes a series of general duties that should be 
included in Iranian Company Law part one, section six between article 107 to 
143. Within this series of duties, Iran should replace any current statutory law 
that relates to fiduciary duties with a transplant of five fiduciary duties from 
UK law: ‘duty to avoid conflicts of interest’, ‘duty not to accept benefits from 
third parties’, ‘duty to declare interest in proposed transactions or 
arrangements’, ‘duty to exercise independent judgment’ and the ‘duty to 
promote the success of the company.’ These duties will assist in providing 
comprehensive legislation that tackles corruption and influence from third 
parties. Also it is suggested that a dual standard duty of care, skill and 
diligence should be transplanted from UK law with the addition of the 
Australian Business Judgment Rule.  The inclusion of the Business 
Judgment Rule in this duty of care would mean that there is adequate cover 
for both shareholders and directors should any action of breach of 
negligence be brought.  
 A reform of the enforcement mechanisms is also suggested in the 
form of amending two articles of Iranian Company Law to allow all 
shareholders greater ease in bringing actions against directors. Iran will need 
to update article 276 and article 277 to allow for any shareholder, regardless 
of the size of their share, to bring an action on behalf of the company at a 
cost to the company. In order to achieve improved supervision of directors 
there should also be a law that stipulates that auditors must be independent 
from directors and that they have no conflicts of interest. At present there are 
very few actions brought against directors from the shareholders. This is 
mainly because directors are not bound by many duties within the current 
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law, but also it is because the mechanisms are not in place to bring actions 
against them. Once new legislation is in place for directors’ duties, as has 
already been suggested, then shareholders will need to be able to use it and 
bring actions against directors when breaches are made. In the event that 
the board of directors does not bring the action, then derivative actions allow 
the shareholder and the minority shareholders to bring actions on its behalf. 
This will vastly improve the powers of minority shareholders who are 
currently greatly exposed. With the introduction of the duty of care in Iran, 
there would also be great benefit in including the Business Judgment Rule 
alongside it in the same code. Iran could greatly benefit from more protection 
for both shareholders and directors. Whilst the duty of care is principally to 
assist shareholders, the Business Judgment Rule will protect directors for 
unjust claims against them.   
A reform of the infrastructure of the courts is also suggested. Regional 
Commercial courts should be introduced to deal with high numbers of 
commercial cases that are brought forwards in Iran. These courts will have 
assigned judges that solely deal with commercial cases and this focus 
should increase efficiency and reliability. 
 Two other legislative reforms that are suggested are the alteration of 
the minimum number of shareholders in a limited liability company from two 
to one and also the removal of article 72 that specifies that directors must 
also be shareholders in the company. These two amendments allow single 
shareholder companies to exist and will allow shareholders to select 
directors from a far wider pool of candidates.   
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  The updates to the law will have to undergo assessment from the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly. The updates will have to be inline with the 
Islamic principles of the regime in order to achieve approval. Any legislation 
updates that fail to meet their requirements will fail to meet approval. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research has involved a detailed study of directors’ duties in Iran, 
something that has not been attempted previously. The thesis has 
progressed through the course of six chapters each consolidating an integral 
part of the study to be able to arrive at this point where overall conclusions 
may be drawn. These can be relatively brief given the points made in the 
previous chapter, which assessed the overall state of duties in Iran and 
proposed some areas for reform.  
The introductory chapter identified the research question that formed 
the basis around which the study was structured. The question presented 
was, should directors’ duties in Iran be modified, and if so in what way? In 
order to answer this question the introduction also set out several aims to 
guide the study. The first aim was to identify and articulate the existing 
company law in Iran as it applies to directors’ duties. Once this could be 
established, the second aim was to identify any weaknesses and problems in 
the way in which directors’ duties function in Iran. With these issues 
identified, the final target was to suggest solutions and improvements that 
could be implemented and this would include consideration of the situations 
in other jurisdictions that might be said to have, in many ways, superior 
practices in place.   
Chapter 2 examined the role and nature of directors’ duties in broad 
terms. It explained how there are various types of directors. It stated that the 
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rationale for imposing duties upon a director is a means for ensuring the 
company’s well being. It added that the duties are firstly a regulatory 
measure to deter directors from committing an act of wrongdoing. Secondly 
they are in place to ensure compensation from the director in the event of 
any wrongdoing. Thirdly it can be considered that duties are in place as a 
guide for directors to follow to assist them carry out their roles appropriately. 
Directors’ duties cover duties of loyalty and duties of care. These duties are 
owed to the companies for whom the directors act. Whilst the duties are 
owed to the company as a whole, it is often held that this means the 
shareholders are included within this definition. Shareholders are able to 
claim against directors on behalf of companies and even minority 
shareholders are able to do this through derivative actions.  
In Chapter 3 the thesis focused on Iran and explained that the legal 
code is principally adopted from French civil code and has been placed 
within a Shia Islamic framework. Statutory company law was first developed 
in the 1920s and has only received minor amendments up to the present day. 
The greatest impact on company law is the increased reliance on Islamic law 
since the 1979 revolution. Where the statutory law conflicts with the Quran or 
the Fighh it is routinely the Islamic ruling that prevails due to it being a source 
of higher authority. The 1932 Act of Iranian Company Law is the main source 
of statutory law for companies and between articles 107 to 143 there are 
rules relating to directors. In terms of duties of loyalty article 118 sets out that 
directors must act within their powers with the scope of that power being 
deferred to the articles. Articles 129 to 133 are dedicated to specific conflicts 
of interest however they are too specific to cover a broad range of conflicts. 
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Overall the articles in place in Iranian Company Law do not adequately 
provide for duties of loyalty. The duty of care is addressed in articles 141 and 
114 where it is set out that companies can bring actions against negligent 
directors. The articles fail to set out any meaningful guidance for directors to 
follow. The principal article on duties within Iranian Company Law is article 
142 that dictates that directors’ duties will be contained in companies’ articles 
of association.   
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to set out the framework for the 
empirical research and consider the theory that underpins the use of semi-
structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the means 
for data collection as they were considered the most effective method for 
extracting information on complex and specific subjects and for enabling the 
research question to be addressed. It was possible to identify suitable 
interviewees through the existing contacts the researcher had in place. Three 
Judges, six scholars, six lawyers, five shareholders and five directors agreed 
to the interviews, which the researcher considered to be a fair representative 
sample. 21 questions were crafted that would intentionally probe the subjects 
that were most likely to extract the core information about the state of 
directors duties in Iran. These answers would ultimately aid the researcher to 
address the research question of the thesis. The interviews were carried out 
during the month of December 2015 and they produced a significant amount 
of data that was very useful for the researcher. 
Chapter 5 details the findings from the empirical research and 
presented each issue highlighted by the interviewees separately. The 
interviewees clarified that duties are not well understood in Iran and that 
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there are rarely cases of breaches of duties that arise. In cases that are 
brought, the outcome is usually determined by Islamic sources unless 
provisions are made for duties in the company’s articles.  There was a strong 
consensus that duties are required in law and that the reliance on the articles 
was unsustainable. The Business Judgment Rule was considered necessary 
by many interviewees, as there was a strong agreement that directors are 
currently exposed to unfair treatment in cases where they are called up on a 
breach of the duty of care.   
The judicial system was heavily criticised by the interviewees with 
suggestions that it is plagued by corruption, it routinely leads to lengthy 
delays and that the judges are inexperienced and unknowledgeable. The 
interviewees were also heavily critical of companies that appoint unqualified 
directors. The culture of appointing relatives or friends to the role of director 
is a common practice in Iran and it often means that companies have an 
insufficiently experienced or qualified director, as the appointments are not 
made on merit. This culture of appointing friends and relatives also spills 
over into other domains as auditors are often appointed in the same way. 
The interviewees highlighted the concern that the governing body that 
decides on legislative reforms is reluctant to allow any amendments to be 
approved. Legislation changes that have been submitted in recent years 
have not been approved. 
Chapter 6 is where all the research is drawn together to present the 
findings of this work. In terms of the state of directors’ duties in Iran today, it 
was concluded that they are out-dated, insufficiently broad, fragmented and 
unsuccessful in their purpose. Also it should be noted that the empirical 
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research demonstrated a large degree of discontent from the interviewees 
around the present state of duties in Iran and a real desire for change in how 
duties could function. 
Before setting out the potential reforms for Iran, there was a decision 
made that any form of transplantation would have to be applied in line with 
the culture, politics and government agenda of Iran. In order to do this there 
would have to be a series of conditions for transplanting that any new law 
would have to comply with.   
The first reform suggested was the inclusion of a series of general 
duties into Iranian Company Law. These duties would be transplanted from 
the 2006 UK Companies Act, however attention would have to be paid to 
make sure they are in keeping with the Islamic principles of the country. The 
suggested duties are the ‘duty to avoid conflicts of interest’, ‘duty not to 
accept benefits from third parties’, ‘duty to declare interest in proposed 
transactions or arrangements’, ‘duty to exercise independent judgment’ and 
the ‘duty to promote the success of the company.’ Of these five duties there 
are certain ones that are more fundamental than others in protecting 
shareholders from miscreant directors. For instance, the duty to exercise 
independent judgment will help tackle directors who succumb to pressures 
exerted from external sources. Also, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest will 
be instrumental in instances where Iranian directors use their positions to 
gain opportunities for themselves personally. These fiduciary duties are 
needed to increase the loyalty of the director to the company. The chapter 
also proposed a dual standard duty of care, skill and diligence that was to be 
transplanted from UK law with the inclusion of the Australian Business 
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Judgment Rule. This would provide Iran with a much-needed subjective and 
objective approach for assessing breaches of the duty of care. This would 
help shareholders to protect their companies should a negligent director be 
installed. The addition of the Business Judgment Rule will be in place to 
protect directors and allow them the tools to defend themselves should they 
have caused damage to the company through a decision that was made with 
good intentions.   
The second reform suggested is the amendment of two articles that 
are currently limiting the effectiveness of enforcement. Firstly, the 
requirement that shareholders must personally bear the cost of the legal fee 
to carry out a derivative action should be altered so that the company bears 
the cost. This is necessary because the personal financial cost is a barrier 
that prevents many actions being brought. Secondly, there is a need to 
amend the law that prevents shareholders with less than a 20 per cent 
shareholding a company from bringing an action against a director. Allowing 
all shareholders, regardless of their share, the ability to bring actions will 
vastly improve the power of minority shareholders who are currently greatly 
exposed. These reforms to enforcement are an integral feature to the 
objective of improving directors’ duties and they are likely to empower the 
shareholders to bring actions against the directors. 
The third reform suggested is to introduce new regional commercial 
courts.  The purpose would be to improve the processing of commercial 
cases so that all disputes are handled in the same way and that the judges 
are experienced and specialists in commercial cases. There should be 
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increased efficiency in the handling and coordination of the cases and the 
public faith in the courts should over time be restored.   
The fourth reform consists of two legislative amendments that are 
associated with reform of directors’ duties. The first is the amendment of the 
minimum number of shareholders in a company from two to one. This 
change will make it possible to register single shareholder companies in Iran. 
The introduction of single shareholder companies will reduce the culture of 
principal shareholders appointing relatives as token shareholders in order to 
fill the role of the extra-required shareholder. The second amendment is the 
removal of the article that stipulates that directors must also be shareholders 
in the companies they run. This amendment will allow shareholders to select 
directors from a far wider pool of candidates.  
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